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The use of new information and communication technologies in the workplace, including the 
increasing amount of work completed online, whether on the Internet or intranet have 
revolutionized the way business is conducted.  
 
 The use of these new communicating technologies in the workplace provides:  
a) a cost effective way of communicating; 
b) an expeditious means of communication; 
c) the possibility  to conduct business at remote places without the interruption of 
telephones; 
d) the user with a comprehensive source or research material. 
 
 But there is a negative side to the use of these modern communication tools in the workplace. 
Apart from the problems raised by computer abuse, the rising employee liability for the abuse of 
electronic communication facilities, especially the abuse of the Internet is a cause of great 
concern for the employer. As a result employers may choose to increase the level of the 
monitoring of electronic communication in the workplace. 
 
The principal focus of this work is the law that governs and regulates the monitoring of 
employees in terms of South African law. 
 
This works commences by examining the right to privacy in the employment context in relation 
to South African, American, German, Italian and French law. The key question is how do 
employers balance the economic interest of their businesses without infringing on the 
employees’ right to privacy. If the employers do have a legitimate interest in intruding upon an 
employee’s privacy, it needs to be determined when this can occur. 
 
Thereafter, the focus shifts to the legislation in South African law that regulates the interception 
and monitoring of employees in the workplace. 
 
The abuse of these electronic communication tools by employees pose serious problems for 
employers. These problems may arise where employees defame, sexually harass and 
discriminate others using the employer’s electronic communication system. These issues will be 
examined in greater detail. 
 
As the threat of employer liability has increased, employers seek more advanced methods of 
monitoring and surveillance of employees. This often entails the purchase and adoption of new 
software and hardware. This work provides a discussion of some these new technologies that are 
currently available and those that will be available in the near future. 
 
In order for the dismissal by an employer to be fair, an employer must have obtained substantive 
evidence against the employee. The evidence of abuse of the electronic equipment in the 
workplace by employees is normally obtained by the employer resorting to electronic monitoring 
devices, such as, monitoring software, telephone tapping and video recordings. There are 
instances however where the employer may have a legitimate reason or reasons to monitor the 
activities of their employees in the workplace but the information obtained or the method used 
cannot result in employee liability. These situations will be examined. 
 
This work will evaluate permissive employer policy with regards to monitoring electronic 
communications in the workplace, and will assess how effective this is, as a means of controlling 
and monitoring the activities of employees, thus curbing improper electronic communication in 














Workplace Privacy in relation to Electronic Communications in the Workplace 
 
The right to privacy has been often described as ‗the right to be left alone‘
1
, ‗the right to live one‘s 
life with the minimum degree of interference‘
2
 and the right to decide ‗when and under what 
conditions private facts may be made public‘. The right to privacy entails the right to be free from 
intrusions and interference by the state and others in one‘s personal life as well as unauthorized 
disclosures of information about one‘s private life.
3
 Privacy is a valuable and an advanced aspect 
of personality. Sociologists and psychologists around the world agree that a person has a 





 Jayne Ressler describes privacy, more specifically information privacy as, ―the claim of 
individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when and how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others‖, another reasoned that such privacy ―is the 
control over knowledge about oneself‖.
5
 But it is not simply control over the quantity of 
information abroad; there are modulations in the quality of the knowledge as well. We may not 
mind that a person knows a general fact about us, and yet feel our privacy invaded if he knows the 
details‖.
6
 In the case of Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Ltd 
and Others: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 
                                                          
1
 Brandeis J, dissenting in Olmstead v United States 277 US 438 478, 48 S Ct 564 (1928). 
 
2
 International Commission of Jurists Conclusions of the Nordic Conference on the Right to Privacy (1976) 2 et seq. 
 
3
 D McQuoid -Mason ―Invasion of privacy: common law v constitutional law delict: does it make a difference?‖. 
(2000) Acta juridica 227 [see generally J Neethling, ―The concept of privacy in South African law: notes‖. (2005) 122 
(1) SALJ 18-28]. 
 
4
 South African Law Commission. Privacy and Data Protection. (2005). 15 
 
5
 J S. Ressler. ―Privacy, Plaintiffs, and Pseudonyms: The Anonymous Doe Plaintiff in the Information Age‖ (2004) 









(1) SA 545 (CC), the court held that the right to privacy guaranteed in s 14 of the Constitution does 
not relate solely to the individual within his or her intimate space but includes instances when 
persons move beyond this established ‗intimate core‘; in these instances individuals still retain a 
right to privacy in the social capacities in which they act.
7
 Thus, when people are in their offices, in 
their cars or on mobile telephones, they still retain a right to be left alone by the State unless certain 
conditions are satisfied. From the above we can conclude that the right to privacy would come into 
question wherever a person has the ability to decide what he or she wishes to disclose to the public 




 The concerns around a person‘s privacy are not a new social phenomenon. Louis Brandeis and 
Samuel Warren‘s unease at the turn of the century regarding loss of privacy was prompted by the 
technological and media developments of their time.
9
 First, the development of a new form of 
sensationalist journalism, known as yellow journalism, made newspapers wildly successful and 
led to dramatically increased circulation.
10
 Second, technological developments, specifically 
photography, caused ―great alarm for privacy‖. The Internet and related technological 




The courts have held that certain intrusions into a person‘s private life or affairs, or aspects of his 
or her ‗inner sanctum‘ to be warranted.
12
 These have included a raid on a brothel; the persistent 
shadowing of a person; watching a person undress or bath; ‗bugging‘ or entering a person‘s room, 
reading of private documents or correspondence; listening to private telephone conversations; 
improperly interrogating a detainee; and taking unauthorized blood tests.
13
 Most of these 
                                                          
7
 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Ltd and Others: In Re Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC), para [16] at 557A/B - C. 
 
8
 supra note 7 
 
9




  Ressler op cit note 5, 196 
 
11
  Ressler op cit note 5, 196 
 
12
 National Media Ltd and Another v Jooste  1996 (3) SA 262 (A), at 271 
 
13









The right to privacy allows an individual to determine the destiny of private facts. The individual 
concerned is entitled to dictate or determine the ambit of disclosure, the disclosure may have been 
made for example to a circle of friends, a professional adviser or to the public at large.
15
 He or she 
may prescribe the purpose and method of the disclosure. Similarly, a person is entitled to decide 




 A common law right to privacy under the actio injuriarum has existed for many years; 
―But injuria is committed not only when someone is beaten , say, with fists or clubs or even if he 
flogged but also if a clamour be raised against him or his property be possessed as though he were 
a debtor, by one who knows him not to be in debt; or if, to bring another into disrepute, a person 
write, compose, publish a libel, or , by his deliberate act, ensure that any of these things be done; 
or again if one fellow a matron or one under seventeen, whether male or female, or there be a 
person whose chastity is said to be impugned; and, in short, it is plain that injuria might be 
committed in great variety of ways‖.
17
      
 
According to the common law, infringements of private communications have long been regarded 
as wrongful.
18
 The courts have found in the past that it was unreasonable for private detectives in 
matrimonial disputes to use eavesdropping devices and electronic surveillance equipment. The use 
of such was deemed an unlawful invasion of privacy by the courts.
 19
   Likewise the stealing of tape 
recordings of confidential business meetings and offering them to a third party has been held to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
14
 supra note 12 
 
15
 supra note 7, at  271G-272B 
 
16
 supra note 7, at  271G-272B 
 
17
 Institutes of Justinian 4.4.1 [ AD 533] 
 
18








unlawful invasion of privacy.
20
 The Canadian courts have held that a reasonable expectation of 
privacy is violated when a telephone conversation is intercepted by a third party without the 
knowledge or consent of the participants.
21
 Our courts have suggested that the mere fact that 
parties using a telephone are aware that they must be careful when talking to one another cannot be 




Section 14 (d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 provides that: 
everyone has the right to privacy, as well as protection against certain specific infringements of 
privacy, viz: searches, seizures, which includes the right not to have the privacy of their 
communications infringed. 
It must be remembered however that no right is absolute. This right would involve the balancing of 
competing rights such as those of the common law and the employer to preserve their property and 
society‘s interest in eradicating unlawful conduct.
23
   
 
Section 14 of the Constitution
24
must be read together with s 32 of the Constitution, that is, the 
section on Access to information. In terms of s 32: 
(1)  Everyone has the right of access to -  
a. any information  held by the state ; and  
b. any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection 
of any rights. 
(2)  National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may provide for   
      reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and financial burden on the state. 
 
It can be seen however that neither of these sections deals directly with the problems of the 
information age. Section 14 sets out to guard against improper and unlawful infringements to the 
                                                          
20






 S v Naidoo 1998 (1) SACR 479 (N) at 89. 
 
23
 C Mischke ―Workplace Privacy, e- mail interception and the law‖.  (2003). 12 (8) CLL 78     
 
24





right of privacy. Section 32 enables access to information that a person needs to protect or exercise 
his or rights.
25
 These sections fail to establish a general right of access to information. An 
individual is not entitled to demand access to information that a person may have against another 
individual. The right of access to information exists only when the individual is seeking to exercise 




It has been argued that, whether or not consent or notification measures are in place, employers 
should always legitimize  the need to invade an employee‘s privacy
27
 with reference to s 36(1) of 
the Constitution: The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 





(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose 




Despite the fact that an individual‘s ‗will to preserve privacy‘ (‗privaathoudingswil‘) is clearly an 
 important component of his right to privacy, it is also evident that the limits of the individual‘s 
right to privacy are not determined exclusively by the will of the person concerned.
30
 The ambit of 
the right to privacy is, as in the case of any other subjective right, in the final instance determined 
                                                          
25
 R LE Roux ―Aspects of South African law as it applies to corruption in the workplace‖. (2004) 17 (2) SACJ 174. 
 
26
 J Hofman …et al. Cyberlaw: A Guide for South Africans Doing Business Online. (1999)  51 
 
27
 LE Roux op cit note 25, 174 – 175 
 
28
  Ibid 
 
29
 Section 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, see also Troker Bros (Pty) Ltd and 
Keyser (2005) 26 ILJ 1366 (CCMA), at p 1373 
 
30





by objective norms, and attempts to completely subjectify the test for the wrongfulness of acts 
which prima facie constitute an invasion of privacy are therefore not acceptable.
31
  In certain cases 
employers may have a legitimate right to know the detailed and specific manner in which 
employees conduct themselves and it does not matter how the information was obtained. It is 
submitted by Mason
32
, that, where the continuous monitoring of employees‘ communication goes 
too far, it should be regarded as unreasonable, and should be regarded as prima facie evidence of 
breach of the employees‘ constitutional right to privacy. Such employers should then be asked to 




In the case of Toker Bros (Pty) Ltd and Keyser (2005) 26 ILJ 1366 (CCMA), the employer party 
referred a dispute to arbitration in terms of s 188A of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, to 
determine whether the employee party should be dismissed for misconduct. The employee was 
charged with dishonesty in that she excessively misused the company computer for her personal 
use in working hours and without permission. She was further charged with misconduct in that in 
an e-mail sent from the company computer she had made defamatory remarks about her employer. 
The employer alleged that this had destroyed the employment relationship. The employee denied 
the dishonesty. She maintained that her employer was aware that she was accessing the Internet, 
and that her access was mainly work related. Her personal use related to a school reunion that she 
was organizing, and which her employer knew about. She admitted the defamatory statement, but 
maintained that it was contained in a private communication and that the manner in which the 
employer accessed her private e-mail was illegal and an invasion of her privacy. Only the issue 
with regard to the second charge is relevant here. On the second charge the commissioner noted 
that s 14 (d) of the Constitution 1996 protects an employee‘s right to privacy and that an employer 
is prohibited from intercepting, monitoring or otherwise acquiring any private communication of 
an employee, except where consent has been given or a clear policy on monitoring and 
intercepting of private communication is in force at the workplace. Section 35(5) of the 
Constitution further provides that evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill 
                                                          
31
 supra note 30, at 645E, G and H-I. 
 
32
 McQuoid -Mason op cit note 3 
 
33





of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or 
otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. The commissioner took into account the 
possibility that the employer could be held vicariously liable for the content of e-mails sent via its 
system, and also the highly offensive and insensitive nature of the particular e-mail message 
complained of.
34
 The commissioner concluded that it was undisputed that the applicant in this 
matter came across the personal e-mails in its investigation into the respondent‘s abuse of the 
Internet facility. The commissioner held that it could be accepted that the breach of privacy was 
incidental and that the applicant‘s discovery of the e-mails was not maliciously intended.  
Although the respondent argued that she could continue working for the company the 
commissioner found the he could not envisage how this was possible after her own indication to 
her friend that she had no regard for her employer especially after the applicant had seen the 
content of the e- mail. The commissioner held that the employment relationship was certainly 
damaged as the e- mail with the defaming content had utterly shocked the owner of the business 
and insulted his dignity as he was Jewish and any reference to the holocaust in the e- mail was 
deemed to be exceptionally sensitive.
35
 In an employment relationship trust is paramount to the 
harmonious and operational existence of the relationship. The commissioner held that on both 
charges the trust relationship between employer and employee had been seriously challenged and 




 If the plaintiff establishes that his or her right to privacy has been impaired the defendant‘s 
conduct may not be wrongful if the latter can show that the invasion of privacy was reasonable and 




  The constitutional safeguard of privacy by its nature protects a wide range of overlapping and 
inter-related rights. This is particularly true of the workplace where employees share offices and 
where computers, the Internet, and telephones are used as means of communication to perform 
                                                          
34
 Toker Bros (Pty) Ltd and Keyser (2005) 26 ILJ 1366 (CCMA), at p 1374 
 
35
 supra note 34 , at 1369 F-G 
 
36
 supra note 34, at 1375 
 
37





activities of varying nature in the employer‘s interest, but often also in an employee‘s private 
interest.
38
 In the international context, it has been stated that personal privacy in the workplace is 
directly related to one of the basic principles of the concept ‗quality of working life‘ — an 
individual employee is a whole human being and should be treated as such.
39
 In cases where 
evidence was obtained (illegally) by invading the individual‘s privacy, the courts and The 
Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (the CCMA) have balanced the 
employer‘s right to economic activity with the employee‘s right to privacy in accordance with the 




It is generally accepted that ‗a law of general application‘ includes the common law. In this 
instance it is the common law right of the employer to protect its property and business interests 
that may potentially limit the employee‘s right to privacy.
41
 The weight of factors listed in s 36(1) 
can only be determined with reference to the facts of the particular case. The following factors may 




A) This will be determined by the operational realities of the workplace. This would also include 
the efforts made by the employer to notify the employees by means of notices of possible 
invasions as well as clear policies regarding private activities in the workplace. The employer 
must take steps to regularly warn employees of the terms of the contract and polices regarding 
monitoring. 
B) The right to privacy enjoys specific protection in the Constitution. The right to economic 
activity enjoyed protection under the interim Constitution but not under the final Constitution.  
In the case of Moonsamy v Mailhouse 1999 (20) ILJ 464 (CCMA), Commissioner Van 
Dokkum believed this signaled a clear indication that the right to privacy of the employee are 
preferred to the employer‘s right to economic activity. This has been submitted to indicate that 
the employer must provide evidence that his business has been seriously threatened in order to 
                                                          
38
















condone any serious invasion of employee privacy. 
43
   
C)  An important consideration is the extent to which similar evidence can be secured by 
conventional means. If these conventional means cannot be used, the onus is on the employee 
to show that prior notification was given and that the consent of the employee was present, 




In order to determine the extent to which an employee‘s privacy may be undermined by electronic 
monitoring by the employer, is to consider why privacy is important. Privacy according to Hazel 
Oliver
45
 can be divided into two broad categories, - those relating to autonomy and democracy, 
and those relating to dignity and personal well - being.
46
 Personal autonomy relates to the ability of 
individuals to choose freely how to live their lives and is thought of as particularly valuable in 
democratic societies.
47
 Autonomy is threatened by invasions of privacy because individuals are 
thereby deprived of the opportunity to explore different options free from external observation and 
social pressures, thus allowing individuals to develop and explore different ideas before releasing 
their thoughts to others.
48
 An individuals autonomy can also be affected by invasions of privacy 
even where those individuals do not know for sure whether or not it is occurring. The suspicion 
alone that one is subject to surveillance while at work may have a detrimental effect on the 
exercise of rights.
49
 As far as the impact that privacy has on an individual‘s emotional well being, 
Oliver submits, that private time and space gives individuals the opportunity for emotional release, 
which is important for   physical and psychological well being of employees, and provides scope 
for limited and protected personal communication.
50
 This view has been supported by the 
                                                          
43
 Moonsamy v Mailhouse 1999 (20) ILJ 464 (CCMA) at 471G-H 
44
  LE Roux op cit note 25 , 175-176 
45
  H Oliver ―E- mail and Internet Monitoring in the Workplace: Information Privacy and Contracting - Out‖. ( 2002) 
(31) ILJ 321 
46
 Ibid 322 - 323 
 
47
  Ibid 323 
 
48
 Ibid  
 
49








International Labour Office, which has specifically noted that the use of monitoring and 
surveillance as a management technique has serious negative consequences for working 




The protection of the privacy of employees in the workplace can be seen to promote the voluntary 
sharing of private information amongst employees, which enhances the fundamental relationships 




In the Canadian case of R v Dyment
53
, La Frost J described three zones of privacy which may 
require protection - ‗those involving territorial or spartial aspects, those related to the person, and 




Information privacy relates to the preservation of the confidentiality of information about 
individuals, and it is this type of privacy that is most relevant to the issue of e- mail and Internet 
monitoring.
55
 Electronic surveillance of employees is potentially a threat to employee privacy 
largely because of the likelihood that the employer will obtain private information about 
employees - whether directly because this is the purpose of monitoring, or indirectly as a result of 
surveillance for other purposes.
56
 If the focus is on information privacy , then perhaps Alan 
Westin‘s definition of privacy  as ‗the claim of individuals , groups or institutions to define 
themselves and when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others‘, 
is the most appropriate in the context of e- mail and Internet monitoring in the workplace.
57
  The 
definition above summarises and describes the main concerns about such practices - namely the 
fact that employees may thereby be denied the opportunity to define when, how and to what extent 
                                                          
51
  International Labour Office, ―Monitoring and Surveillance in the Workplace‖. (1993), Vol 12, Part 1, Conditions of 
Work Digest at 11. 
52
 Oliver op cit note 45,  322 
53
  R v Dyment 1988 2 SCR 417 
54
  supra note 32, at 428 
55
 Oliver op cit note 45, 322 
 
56
 Oliver op cit note 45, 322 
 
57








The scope of a person‘s right to privacy extends only to aspects of his or her life or conduct in 
regard to which a legitimate expectation of privacy can be sought.
59
  The subjective component of 
the test recognizes that a person cannot complain about an invasion of privacy if he or she has 
explicitly or implicitly consented to the invasion.
60
 The objective component is more important, 
but it is often quite difficult to assess due to the kinds of privacy expectation that society would 
regard as objectively reasonable.
61
 An individual‘s subjective expectation of privacy in respect of 
these three concerns will usually be regarded as objectively reasonable. 
In the first instance, the right to privacy seeks to protect certain aspects of a person‘s life in respect 
of which every person is entitled to be left alone, this includes a person‘s body, certain places, and 
certain relationships. Secondly, the right to privacy aims to protect the opportunities for an 
individual to develop his or her personality, and so extends to certain forms of individual and 
personal self-realization or fulfillment. Thirdly, the right to privacy seeks to protect the ability of 
individuals to control the use of private information about themselves.
 62
 It is clear that all three 
these concerns are to some extent applicable to the employee in the workplace. 
 
 The requirement that the employee have a ‗legitimate expectation‘ that her privacy will be 
respected indicates that one must have a subjective expectation of privacy. But, at the same time, 




 Initially, the courts argued about the parameters of the right to privacy in the workplace, usually in 
the context of telephone calls. The South African Constitutional Court in the case of Bernstein v 
                                                          
58
 Oliver op cit note 45, 322 
 
59
 See the case of Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa and Others 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) 
where the court held  that ―the scope of a person‘s privacy extends only to those aspects to which a legitimate 
expectation of privacy can be harboured‖. 
 
60
 A  Dekker. ―Vices or Devices: Employee Monitoring in the workplace.‖ (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 624 
 
61
 Ibid 624-625 
 
62
 Ibid  624 
63




Bester 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) provided some clarity.  In this case Ackerman J emphasized that, 
―while privacy is acknowledged in respect of a person‘s inner sanctum (such as family life, sexual 
preference and home environment), protection erodes as he or she moves into communal relations 




There is great concern that in addition to the invasion of employee privacy, the monitoring of 




1. Lack of trust among workers, supervisors, and management. Employee monitoring may and 
has the potential to undermine workplace morale and create distrust and suspicion between 
employees and their supervisors or management. It is no co- incidence that as employee morale 
declines, so does the production levels.
66
  
2. The potential increase in stress levels. Due to the increased monitoring of their behaviour, 
employees may experience high levels of stress and anxiety in the workplace.
67
  
3. Repetitive strain injuries (RSI). RSI is a set of work related muscular skeletal disorders caused 
by repeated and prolonged body movement resulting in damage to the fibrous and soft body 
tissues like tendons, nerves, and muscles. RSI is the consequence of a demand on a person to 
perform a task that exceeds the person‘s working capacity. This may occur when employees 
who need to take needed breaks fail to do so. The failure to take breaks arises due to the fear of 
                                                          
64
 Bernstein v Bester 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC) at 792 G-I, 793 E, and 795D , - “The truism that no right is to be 
considered absolute implies that, from the outset of interpretation, each right is always already limited by every other 
right accruing to another citizen. In the context of privacy, this would mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a 
person, such as his/her family life, sexual preference and home environment, which is shielded from erosion by 
conflicting rights of the community. This implies that community rights and the rights of fellow members place a 
corresponding obligation on a citizen, thereby shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a 
concrete member of civil society. Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into 
communal relations and activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks 
accordingly‖. [see also the case of Magajane v Chairperson North West Gambling Board and others (2006) 5 SA 250 
(CC) at,  50 A-G] 
 
65
 J M Kizza & J Ssanyu ―Electronic Surveillance‖. In Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: Controversies and 











being considered lazy by their employers.
68
 
4. Lack of individual creativity. Most highly monitored jobs do not require personal creativity. 
The employee usually is not allowed to vary the procedures, but must follow them to the letter. 
Employees also have a fear of exercising creativity that is outside normal procedures because 
they fear being questioned or even losing their jobs in the event of anything going wrong. 
5. Reduced or no peer or social support. Highly monitored employees are usually given separate 
stations where specific equipment can monitor them in full view.  An employee is thus forced 
to be where he or she can be seen.
69
 
6. Lack of self esteem. The isolation, and daily routine of work coupled with a lack of freedom to 
vary employee activities lowers employee morale and consequently self esteem. This lack of 
self esteem amongst employees emanates from the belief that they are lazy or incompetent and 
thus need to be highly monitored in the workplace.
70
 
7. Employee alienation. Alienation is higher among employees in industries and companies with 
automated monitoring technologies. This is due to the fact that high levels of automated 
monitoring are associated with lack of worker freedom, control, purpose, function, and self 
involvement in employee‘s work.
71
  
8. Lack of communication. It is well established that information technology does affect 
communication. When information technology is used for surveillance it can further affect 
communication by reducing or eliminating the need for individual workers to be involved in 
communication. Employees who find themselves in this situation become objects of 
information collection without participating in the process of exchanging information.
72
 
9. Psychological. The mere presence of electronic monitoring in a workplace may give rise to the 
perception among employees that their movements are being watched, even if that is not the 
case. This may ultimately lead to adverse psychological effects on an employee.
73
 






















 In terms of s 36 of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 (the limitation clause), the infringement of the 
right to privacy can sometimes be justifiable in the context of the employment relationship. To 
determine justifiability, it is necessary to balance the competing interests of the employer (the right 




The need to engage in a balancing of interests was discussed in the case of  Goosen v Caroline‘s 
Frozen Yoghurt Parlour (1995) 16 ILJ 396 (IC) at 400C. The employee in this case recorded 
telephone conversations between the chairman of the disciplinary enquiry and the employer in 
order to prove bias on the part of the chairman. The permissible limitation on the employee‘s 
constitutional right that was applicable here was that of the interim Constitution. In terms of the 
limitation clause in the interim Constitution, the right to privacy could be restricted if it was 
reasonable and justifiable, and if the restriction did not negate the essential content of the right. 
The limitation clause provided certain levels of scrutiny, in terms of which stronger protection was 
given to certain rights, which required that it be proved that the infringement of those rights would 
also be necessary. The right to privacy did not fall within that category, and so the restriction of the 
right to privacy had only to be shown to be reasonable and justifiable. To determine the meaning of 
‗reasonable‘, the court looked at the Canadian Charter for Human Rights. According to the 
Canadian courts, it should first be determined if there had been an infringement of a fundamental 
right. If so, the inquiry had to determine whether the infringement was reasonable. According to 
the court an infringement would be reasonable if the ―interest underlying the limitation is of 
sufficient importance to outweigh the constitutionally protected right and the means must be 





The case of Protea Technology Ltd and another v Wainer and others 1997 (9) BCLR 1225 (W), 
was decided in terms of the final Constitution. It concerned the interception of a telephone 
conversation by an employer. The court held that in this case that the scope of a person‘s privacy 
extends only to those aspects in regard to which a legitimate expectation of privacy can be 
harbored. Whether there is a legitimate expectation of privacy depends, the High Court held, on a 
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‗subjective expectation of privacy which society recognizes as objectively reasonable‘.
76
 The 
conversations taped were by the employee, conducted from the employer‘s business premises 
during business hours, and so did not enjoy Constitutional protection.  Relying on the Bernstein 
decision the High Court held:  
―Thus he may receive and make calls which have nothing to do with his employer‘s 
business. The employee making such calls has a legitimate expectation of privacy. 
Although he must account to his employer if so required for the time so spent, the employer 
cannot compel him to disclose the substance of such calls. The content of conversations 
involving his employer‘s affairs (whether directly or indirectly) is a different matter. The 
employer is entitled to demand and obtain from his employee as full an account as the 
latter is capable of furnishing. In this sense also, the company can fairly be regarded as the 




In the case of Moonsamy v The Mailhouse (1999) 20 ILJ 464 (CCMA), the arbitrator considered 
what would be regarded as a justifiable infringement of the right to privacy in view of the 
Constitutional limitation clause. In question was whether the employer was entitled to use 
evidence which had been obtained by way of an interception, listening and recording device that 
was connected to the employee‘s office telephone. The evidence the employer obtained using the 
telephone tap was led at the disciplinary hearing against the employee. It was clear that the 
evidence was obtained in contravention of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act of 127 
of 1992 (IMP Act). The commissioner held that evidence obtained in breach of the IMP Act was 
not necessarily inadmissible and that admissibility or otherwise of such evidence would depend on 
the circumstances of the case.  
 The arbitrator held that the issue was one of balancing the competing interests of the employer and 
the employee, that is, the employer‘s  the right to economic activity (in terms of the interim 
Constitution
78
) as against the employee‘s right to privacy.
 79
 It was held to be ―extremely difficult 
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to clarify, at least with any degree of precision, the nature of the right to privacy of an employee on 
the premises of the employer during working hours‖.
80
 The arbitrator structured his reasoning on 
five premises based on the factors set out in section 36 of the Constitution to be considered when 
fundamental rights are limited. 
 
The first premiss concerned the nature of the right. The arbitrator relied on American case law
81
 to 
the effect that a person is entitled to a ‗reasonable expectation‘ of privacy. This expectation exists 
only when (a) the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy, and (b) where society 
recognized the expectation as reasonable. Within the context of the employment relationship, it is 
determined largely by the operational requirements of the workplace. In another American case,
82
 
the court held that the operational reality of the workplace may render some employee 
expectations of privacy unreasonable, but these might be found to be reasonable in other 
non-employment contexts. It was clear that office practices and procedures, and legitimate 
employer regulations, might reduce the employees‘ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, 
and filing cabinets. Given the great variety of working environments, the question is whether an 
employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 
 
The CCMA in Moonsamy
83
 noted that the employer‘s conduct in the case before it went further 
than rummaging in an employee‘s desk or filing cabinet. A telephone interception with the express 
purpose of monitoring all the employee‘s conversations was in issue. Whilst one may argue that 
the telephone conversation took place on the employer‘s telephone (which indicated ownership), 
on the employer‘s premises, and was related to the employer‘s business, telephone conversations 
by their nature demand a higher degree of privacy than the employee‘s office desk. The court 
stated it could be argued that if a telephone call related to the employer‘s business, the employer 
was entitled to be privy to that conversation. But if the employer were allowed to make that initial 
decision regarding the nature of the call (personal versus business), the right to privacy would be 
meaningless. The right would then amount to having a tribunal decide, after the interception of the 
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call, that the call did not relate to the business of the employer and so was confidential. In a 
nutshell, the employee‘s right to privacy regarding work-related matters had to be qualified on the 
basis of the fiduciary relationship between employee and employer that entitled the employer to 
loyalty and honesty.
84
 The employer argued that it considered its actions necessary for its financial 
self-preservation, as the employee conducted business that was damaging to the employer. At the 
same time, the employer‘s business necessity could legitimately impact on the employee‘s 
personal rights in a manner not possible outside the workplace. So there had to be a clear balancing 
of rights. The court held that section 22 of the Constitution emphasized the employee‘s personal 





The third premiss concerned the nature and extent of the limitation. Telephone calls were 
considered to be very private.
86
 An employer might have the right to ask an employee to disclose 
the number of personal as opposed to business calls that he made during working hours. But the 
right to disclosure ended at this point, unless the employer could show, when it sought prior 
authorization, that there were compelling reasons within the context of business necessity for the 




The fourth premiss related to the limitation and its purpose. The interception of the telephone calls 
was intended to provide evidence against the employee. The commissioner emphasized that there 
must have been other methods to accumulate evidence of wrongdoing. If an employer could show 
that telephone interception was the only method of securing evidence, in circumstances where the 
employee was clearly causing harm to the employer, then telephone tapping might be justified. In 




The fifth premiss was that less restrictive means had to be used to achieve the purpose. If an 
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employer actually could have used other more conventional methods of obtaining incriminating 
evidence against an employee, it should have done so. Put differently, other less restrictive means 
had to be considered. If there were none, the employer had to seek prior authorization to tap the 
telephone. Prior consent could be obtained by way of employee consent as a condition of the 




The commissioner held that the right to privacy in the context of the employment relationship is 
unique and very difficult to clarify. At the same time, the commissioner did not accept the right to 
privacy as being unlimited and absolute and he took into account the relevant issues arising from 
the employment relationship:  
―An employee stands in a fiduciary relationship to his employer and the employer is 
entitled to expect loyalty and honesty from the employee, especially during work hours. 
For this reason alone, and due to the exigencies of the workplace, it is clear that the 




The commissioner further held that the employer is contractually entitled to know the content of 
the employee‘s calls in so far as they relate to business. It is also in the financial preservation of the 
employer‘s business to determine if the employer is doing something to prejudice or cause damage 
to the employer‘s business. 
―The rights that a citizen is entitled to in his or her personal life cannot simply disappear in 
his or her professional life as a result of the employer‘s business necessity. At the same 
time the employer‘s business necessity might legitimately impact on the employee‘s 





Employers are increasingly adopting the practice of monitoring their employees‘ telephone  
conversations, e- mail and use of the Internet in the workplace. It has become all too easy for 
employers to carry out, in what in most instances can be seen as pervasive surveillance of 
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employee activity by electronic means. The result is that such practices have potentially serious 
implications for employee privacy.  
 
Privacy protects a number of values which are held to be very important by society, and this is as 
true of the workplace as elsewhere. If privacy is worth protecting, then its costs will often be worth 
bearing. It should be noted that in certain instances employers do have business reasons for 
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CHAPTER 2  
FOREIGN LAW 
 
1. The United States of America 
 
In the United States most if not all employers admit to having some form of employee monitoring. 
To find the reason and to understand why, one need only look at the statistics of Internet and e-mail 
misuse by employees and the potential liability for employers created thereby.   
This topic continually brings about a huge uproar and debate concerning the privacy rights of 
employees, who often act under the assumption that the web sites they visit and the e-mail 
messages they send and receive are confidential.
92
 It has become more and more difficult on a 
daily basis to distinguish between the conduct of employees that is seen to be of a private nature 
from the conduct that provides employers with legitimate grounds to monitor their employees. The 





Perhaps the best starting point is to first determine whether there is a need for employees to be 
monitored while at work in the United States of America (USA). 
 
A two-year study was conducted by Alexa Research.
94
 The results of this study was alarming. It 
showed  that ‗sex‘ was the most popular search term on the Internet.  ‗Porn‘ was the fourth 
most-searched term, followed by ‗Nude,‘ ‗XXX,‘ ‗Playboy,‘ and ‗Erotic Stories,‘ all of which 
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were in the top twenty most-searched list.
95
  According to another study conducted by Websense 
Enterprise, an Internet management business, 70 percent of all Internet porn traffic occurs during 
the 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. workday.
96
  The results of one survey showed that, more than 60 percent 
of companies report having disciplined employees, and more than 30 percent having terminated 




 The misuse by employees made headlines when Dow Chemical Company fired fifty employees 
and suspended two hundred more for sending and storing pornographic and/or violent e-mail 
messages.
98
 The New York Times, in December 1999, terminated over twenty employees for 
sending inappropriate and offensive e-mail messages.
99
  According to The Wall Street Journal the 
employees of IBM, Apple Computer, and AT&T were among the most frequent visitors to 
Penthouse Magazine‘s website.  It was estimated that these employees spend the equivalent of 
over 347 eight-hour days in a single month visiting pornographic websites. Internet misuse is not, 
of course, limited to the private sector.
100
 A study by the Internal Revenue Service showed that 
many of its employees viewed sexually explicit websites. Internet misuse by employees was even 
uncovered at the Departments of Commerce and Housing and Urban Development and even 
former White House administrations. Due to the increase in the misuse of the internet some 




The following are the most overwhelming arguments raised by employers in the United States in 
favour of electronic monitoring of employees in the workplace.  


























The first of these relates to issues that revolve around productivity. The argument is that even if 
employees are not viewing inappropriate or offensive websites at work, they are likely to be 
spending time looking at other non-work related sites.
102
 According to a survey conducted by 
Vault.com, 25.1 percent of employees admitted to spending ten to thirty minutes a day surfing 
non-work-related sites, 11.9 percent admitted to spending one to two hours a day, and an 
astonishing 12.6 percent spent over two hours a day surfing non-work-related sites.
103
 
Employees admit to using the Internet to read the news each day, book flights, buy shares, and to 
shop for gifts.
104
 This was proved to be true by a survey conducted in November of 2000. 
According to respondents of the survey between a half day to two days per week is spent shopping 
on the Internet for holiday gifts.
105 
E-mail is a serious productivity culprit with the impact on 
businesses being enormous.  According to the survey mentioned above, half of the employees 
surveyed admitting to sending and/or receiving one to five non-work-related e-mails each 
workday.
106
 It has been estimated that a company with five hundred Internet users could lose 





The results of a survey conducted by the American Management Association reveal that 68 
percent of employers cite potential legal liability as their main reason to monitor employee 
activities.
108
 This point is supported by the increase in the number of claims against employers for 
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  AMA Survey, Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance: Policies and Practices (American Management Assoc. 




employee misuse of the Internet and e-mail
109
. Liability on the part of the employer can be costly. 
This was illustrated in a $2.2 million settlement by the employer, Chevron.
110
 This case involved a 
sexual harassment lawsuit involving, in part, an Internet message entitled ‗Why Beer Is Better 
Than Women‘.
111
 However, sexual harassment lawsuits are not the only concern for employers. 
Other types of liability have also increased and pose serious risks to employers such as and what 
has become known as ‗cyber liability‘ not to mention racial and other forms of discrimination that 
has become prevalent on the World Wide Web.
112
 While no court has ever ruled that an employer 
must monitor electronic communications, many courts have suggested that such monitoring would 
be wise.
113
 The following cases illustrate this point. One federal circuit court judge opined that 
―the abuse of access to workplace computers is so common ... that reserving a right of inspection is 
so far from being unreasonable that the failure to do so might well be thought irresponsible‖.
114
   
 
Three major US corporations – RR Donnelly and Sons Co., Morgan Stanley and Co and Citicorp‘s 
Citibank N.A. were sued by black employees for racial discrimination. The action was based on 
the circulation of certain e- mail messages that contained racist jokes.
115
 In Harley v. McCoach
116
 , 
a Pennsylvania employer faced a claim of racial harassment that involved an e- mail identifying 
the plaintiff as Brown Sugar. The plaintiff‘s allegations however were insufficient to support a 
claim of a hostile work environment. 
Employees‘ sexual e- mail messages or graphics are now a commonplace in sexual harassment 
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In Blakey v. Continental Airlines,
117
 the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the issue of 
whether an employer could be held liable for sexual harassment that was rendered through the use 
of the Internet.  The issue in point was the use of the ‗Crew Members Forum,‘ an on-line electronic 
bulletin board which was used by Continental pilots and crews to post messages and communicate 
with one another.
118
 The plaintiff was a female pilot for Continental. She alleged that the Forum 
had been used to publish derogatory gender-based messages about her in the middle of a federal 
lawsuit she had filed against the airline involving claims of sexual discrimination.  When the 
plaintiff discovered the on-line messages, she instituted a state court action against her 
co-employees for defamation, as well as against the airline for a hostile work environment arising 
from the allegedly defamatory statements.
119
 
The trial court granted the Continental‘s (the respondent) motions to dismiss and for summary 
judgment. The Plaintiff appealed.  The Appeals Court agreed with the trial court‘s finding and held 
that Continental ―was not vicariously liable for defamatory statements by ... [Continental] 
pilots‖.
120
 The court went further and found that because Continental did not require employees to 
access the bulletin board, and because employees bore the cost of using the board, Continental was 
not liable under the doctrine of respondent superior. 
The matter was then sent to the New Jersey Supreme Court. The New Jersey Supreme Court 
reversed the Appeal Court‘s decision and held that although employers are not specifically 
required to monitor their employees‘ communications, employers do have a duty to try to stop 
employee harassment when the employer knows or has reason to know that such harassment is 
occurring in the workplace.
121
  The evidence established that the only way pilots were able to 
access the electronic bulletin board was through a personal computer and modem accessed through 
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the airline‘s contracted Internet service provider, CompuServe.
122
 It is important in terms of the 
judgment that the court found no difference between a ‗bulletin board‘ on the Internet and an 
actual bulletin board in the pilot‘s lounge. The court noted: 
―the fact that the electronic bulletin board may be located outside of the workplace 
(although not as closely affiliated with the workplace as was the cockpit in which similar 
harassing conduct occurred), does not mean than an employer has no duty to correct 
off-site harassment by co-employees. Conduct that takes place outside the workplace has a 
tendency to permeate the workplace‖.
123
 
However, the court stated that it was unclear in this case whether the Forum ―was such an integral 
part of the workplace that harassment on the Crew Members Forum should be regarded as a 
continuation or extension of the pattern of harassment that existed in the respondent‘s 
workplace‖.
124
 This issue was referred back to the lower court.
125
  The court suggested that the 
trial court should first determine whether Continental obtained a substantial workplace benefit 
from the overall relationship with CompuServe (noting that the record did not contain 
Continental‘s contract with CompuServe), the number of current users of CompuServe services, 





Whether the defamatory statements sent via e-mail was circulated on the internet or internally may 
not absolve the employees or their employers from liability. It is possible that an employer may be 
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Employers will have to defend themselves and the interests of the company against claims of 
defamation that are initiated via e- mail communications.
128
 In the case of Meloff v New York Life 
Inc
129
., a discharged employee brought an employment discrimination and defamation claim 
against her former employer because of an e- mail sent to others at the company improperly stating 
that the reason for her termination was credit theft  and fraud. Meloff had worked almost three 
decades with New York Life when she was fired from her position as a service consultant, 
allegedly for misuse of her corporate credit card. At the trial the evidence showed that Meloff had 
violated company policy by using her corporate credit card to charge personal expenses for which 
she never reimbursed the employer.
130
 She met a number of times with her supervisors, and her 
services were ultimately terminated. Immediately following the meeting that preceded in her 
termination, one of her supervisors sent an e-mail to seven persons which had the subject title 
―FRAUD‖ and which stated: 
―WE FOUND IT NECESSARY TODAY TO TERMINATE PHYLLIS MELOFF, WHO 
USED HER CORPORATE AMERICAN EXPRESS CARD IN A WAY IN WHICH THE 
COMPANY WAS DEFRAUDED. PHYLISS HAD APPROX 27 YEARS WITH NEW YORK 
LIFE, AND WHOM WE CONSIDERED TO BE A VALUED ASSOCIATE. THIS ACTION 
REFLECTS OUR COMMITMENT TO ―ADHERE TO THE HIGHEST ETHICAL 
STANDARDS IN ALL OUR BUSINESS DEALINGS.‖ I SEND THIS TO YOU FOR YOUR 
OWN INFORMATION‖.  
 
After a trial a jury awarded Meloff $250,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive 
damages on the defamation claim.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the jury‘s finding 
that the employer acted with malice in sending the e-mail and thereby abused its qualified 
privilege, because one of the supervisors had assured Meloff, after the credit card abuse was 
initially discovered, that it was ―no problem,‖ but less than a week later sent the inflammatory 
email. 
 
Employers can face liability for copyright infringement. This can occur where an employee 
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improperly places copyrighted materials on the Internet.
131
 In the case of Marobie – FL, Inc. v. 
Nat. Ass‘n of Fire Equip. Dist
132
., a software company successfully brought a claim against the 
association for copyright infringement after an employee placed files containing copyrighted clip 
art on the association‘s web page.  
 
Following is an analysis of the U.S. laws regarding the various forms of monitoring of an 
employee, with reference to federal and state responses to the issue of privacy in the workplace. 
When defining an employee‘s right to privacy in the workplace, it is essential to determine 
whether the employer is a government agency or a privately owned operation.
133
 When the 
government employs, it must honour the constitutional rights to privacy that all employees are 
entitled to. This right comes to the fore when an employer has reason to search an employee‘s 
work space or take other steps which have the potential to infringe upon its employees‘ 
constitutional rights to privacy, such as monitoring e-mail and Internet usage.
134
 
The issue of workplace privacy was addressed in the landmark Supreme Court case of O‘Connor 
v. Ortega.
135
 In that case the Supreme Court recognized that employees may possess legally 
protected privacy interests, but the court stated that these rights are qualified. The court held that 
employees‘ individual privacy interests must be balanced against the realities of the workplace. 
The Supreme Court noted that even at work employees have a few areas in which an employee has 
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a reasonable expectation of privacy. These areas may include, for example, desks and file cabinets. 
However, the Court also noted that these expectations with regard to privacy of an employee ―may 
be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures.‖ An important aspect of this 
judgment is that the court recognized that with the question of privacy in the workplace there are 
no absolutes. The conclusion reached by the court was that the question of employee privacy and 
the expectation thereto is determined by specific practices within the employee‘s workplace, and 




The ‗right to privacy‘ is not explicitly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution. There are however 
certain sections, which if read together do imply a right to privacy.
137
 One such section is the 
Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment guarantees ―the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated.‖ This, however, applies exclusively to the government, and not to private individuals.
138
  
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution protect government 
employees from unlawful searches and seizures by the federal and state governments.
139
 The 
intrusion upon any employee‘s privacy by a government employer can only be regarded as lawful 
if the employer‘s intrusion is proved to be reasonable.  Such a search is deemed to be reasonable if 
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The question as to whether a search intrudes upon an employee‘s reasonable expectation of 
privacy is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
141
 Therefore it is incorrect to hold the view 
that the search of an employee‘s computer, desk, file cabinet, or other work space, may or may not 
be searched under any circumstances. The constitutionality of each search depends on the 
circumstances surrounding it.
142
 To determine the constitutionality of any intrusion into employee 
privacy by a governmental employer, it is essential to consider the reasons for and against the 
search.
143
 The approach adopted by the courts is to balance the employer‘s justification for the 
search. This would include the need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the 
workplace, against the employee‘s legitimate expectations of privacy in the property searched.
144
 
If the employer‘s needs for the search outweigh the employee‘s reasonable expectations of privacy 
in the property searched, then the search will be upheld as constitutional.
145
  It order to determine 
whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in certain property, or certain areas 
of work space it must first be considered whether or not the work area in question is given over to 
the ―employee‘s exclusive use ... the extent to which others had access to the work space ... the 
nature of the employment ... and whether office regulations placed employees on notice that 




Historically The Fourth Amendment has provided only limited privacy protection to governmental 
employees.
147
  Courts have often given public employers the power to determine whether to search 
employee computers and other work areas, provided the employer can articulate a legitimate 
justification for the search and show that the employee had no reasonable expectation of 
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 For example, in Bohach v. City of Reno
149
, the plaintiffs claimed that the City of Reno, 
Nevada, violated their constitutional right to privacy by intercepting messages sent between 
officers from their squad cars over a computerized communications system similar to e-mail.  The 
court held that even though the officers‘ messages were intercepted their constitutional rights to 
privacy were not violated because they did not have an objectively reasonable expectation that 
their messages were protected from employer monitoring.
150
  The e- mail system was designed in 
such a manner that all messages were received and stored in a central computer before being 
forwarded.
151
 This meant that all messages were accessible to the employer at the central 
computer. It was held that the officers could not have a reasonable expectation that their messages 
would remain private because they had been notified by the police chief that all e-mail users would 
have their messages ‗logged on the network‘ and that some messages (e.g. those violating the 
department‘s anti-discrimination policy) were banned.
152
  The officers thus had notice from their 




Only certain states have constitutional provisions which also provide some privacy protection.
154
  
Thus far the state of California has attempted to extend this protection to private sector employees.  
This move has been met with opposition by a yet to be published California Superior Court 
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Prior to 1986 there were laws in place to protect the privacy of mail and voice communications, but 
no laws existed to protect the privacy interests of persons who chose to communicate through the 
emerging use of telecommunications and computer technology.
156
 To correct the situation in what 
lawmakers called a ‗gap‘ resulting in legal uncertainty, the American Congress passed the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) in 1986, to provide protection for electronic 
communications.
157
  Title I of that Act amended the Federal Wiretap Act (which previously 
addressed only wire and oral communications) to protect against unauthorized interception of 
‗electronic communications‘.  Title II of the ECPA created the Stored Communications Act, which 
protects against unauthorized ‗access‘ to electronic communication while it is in electronic 
storage.  Civil and criminal penalties are both provided for in the Act. In essence then, a successful 
civil plaintiff may recover the greater of either: 1) actual damages suffered and any profits made by 
the violator, or 2) statutory damages (the greater of $100 a day for each day of the violation or 
$10,000).  Attorney‘s fees and costs may also be awarded. Criminally, a violator may be punished 




 The ECPA is criticized for its ambiguity despite the efforts of the American Congress‘ to 
implement legislation that attempts to catch up with technology.
159
 The reason for some of the 
difficulty may be attributed to the fact that the Act was written prior to the advent of the Internet. A 
further complication is the absence of any specific provisions relating to e-mail, which is 
transmitted and stored in much more complex ways than other forms of communication.
160
 The 
legislative history does indicate that Congress intended the Act to cover e-mail, however the term 
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‗e-mail‘ appears nowhere in the Act. Despite this, courts began to apply the ECPA to monitoring in 
the workplace, and in doing so, gave employees the privacy protections Congress desired.
161
 As 
will be seen below, the exceptions to the Act nearly override the rule, and in the process makes the 




 Analysis of the ECPA and Its Exceptions 
 
 
 Interception versus Storage 
The ECPA has a two role, firstly of providing protection against unauthorized interception of 
communications, and secondly protection against unauthorized access to stored communications. 
The procedural and substantive requirements for each are markedly different.
163
  The first stage of 
the enquiry is to determine whether the provider has in fact ‗intercepted‘ an electronic 
communication. This question may not be easily answered because electronic communication, 
such as e-mail, by its very nature may go through stages of transmittal, sometimes remaining in 
‗intermediate storage‘ before it reaches the intended recipient.
164
  Communications posted to 
electronic bulletin boards are not expressly catered for in the Act.   All circuit courts called upon to 
consider the issue has ruled that an ‗interception‘ of electronic communication will only be found 
to have occurred if it takes place at the same time with transmission.  This is so, despite the many 
struggles all the circuit courts have had with interpretation of the statute.
165
 For instance, two 
courts have held that an interception did not occur where e-mail was stored on an electronic 
bulletin board, even though it had not yet been read by the intended recipient.  In another case, a 
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court found no interception when the company accessed e-mails from the company‘s central file 




 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently found a web-monitoring company in violation 
of the ECPA. The violation involved the interception of information that concerned Internet users 
contemporaneously with their web use, and thereafter distributing such information to other 
interested parties. The court held that the system used by the web-monitoring company was, in 
effect, an automatic routing program.
167
  
Both the Federal Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act of the ECPA contain 




 Consent Exception 
The first exception is the ‗consent‘ exception. This exception applies when one party to the 
communication has given prior consent to the interception or access.  This exception will not be 
applicable if the interception is accomplished for an unlawful purpose.
169
 The consent required 
may be either express/actual or implied/tacit. The consent may not be constructive.
170
  The courts 
have generally found that there has been implied consent when the employee knew or should have 
known of a policy of constantly monitoring calls, or when the employee conducts a personal 
conversation over a line that is explicitly reserved for business purposes.
171
 In the case of 
Griggs-Ryan v. Smith,
172
 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a tenant had consented 
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to his landlord‘s interception of incoming phone calls when he had been told on a number of 
occasions that all such calls would be recorded. In Jandak v. Village of Brookfield
173
, a federal 
district court likewise found that a police officer consented to interception of his phone calls where 
he knew or should have known that the phone line he was using was constantly taped for police 
purposes, and because he was provided with an unmonitored line for personal use.
174
  Courts may 
refuse to imply consent by an employee if the employer had only indicated that it might be forced 





 It is possible for employees to consent to monitoring of only part of a communication or to only a 
specific set of communications.
176
 Therefore, employers must be cautious in their drafting of 
policies that are directed at communications that are to be monitored. Employers must also ensure 
that any monitoring conducted must be kept within the set limits determined by that policy 
document.
177
 If a policy as the one mentioned above is in place, any continued private use of the 




 Provider Exception 
The second general exception is the ‗provider‘ exception. This exception relates to employers who 
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own and provide their company e-mail networks.
179
  The cases discussing the provider exception 
primarily concern telephone use, but one federal circuit court has discussed the exception in the 
context of e-mail. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual
180
 
held that access to an insurance agent‘s stored e-mail is exempt from the ECPA because the e-mail 
is stored on the insurance company‘s system, which the company administered as a provider.  The 
Appeals court in this case relied on Bohach v. City of Reno,
181
  in which a district court similarly 
held that the retrieval of alphanumeric pages stored on the police department‘s computer system 
was not a violation of the ECPA. The court noted that when it comes to accessing communications 




 The two cases discussed above involved access to stored communications, and were governed by 
the less restrictive Stored Communications Act. This Act provides complete exclusion to anyone 
who is a provider of an electronic communications service.
183
  If, however, the provider is 
intercepting communications, additional requirements must be met under the Wiretap Act. These 
requirements include that the provider must be able to show that the interception occurred in the 
normal course of employment while engaged in an activity that is either a ‗necessary incident to 
the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that 
service‘.
184
 The few cases reported that discuss the interception of communications by providers 
indicate, that these additional requirements are not hard to meet. For  instance in the case of  United 
States v. Mullins
185
, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that American Airlines acted 
lawfully in monitoring a travel agent‘s computer reservations because American Airlines, as the 
provider of the computer reservation system, was monitoring to uncover suspected fraud. The 
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court found that the airline security chief who monitored the travel agent‘s computer was doing so 
‗within the scope of her employment‘ and ‗to protect the rights and property of her employer‘.  




Ordinary Course of Business Exception 
For a violator to be regarded as liable under the ECPA, it must be shown that any interception of 
communication that occurred had been conducted with the use of an ‗electronic, mechanical or 
other device‘.
187
 The phrase ‗electronic, mechanical or other device‘ does not include any 
‗telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof‘, which is 
used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service ‗in the ordinary course of its 
business‘.
188
  Thus far, this exception has only been applied to telephone monitoring and has not 
been extended to the monitoring of e-mail.    
 
 If the context approach is favoured then a court will examine the employer‘s motive for the 
monitoring and whether ‗it had a legitimate business justification in doing so‘.
189
  Some courts that 
have used this approach have upheld monitoring where an employer had reason to believe that an 
employee was disclosing confidential information in violation of a loyalty agreement,
190
  and 




On the other hand a court using the content approach focuses not on the employer‘s business 
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reasons for monitoring, but rather on whether the monitored communication is of a business or 
personal nature.
192
 This was illustrated in the case of Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co
193
. In this case all 
the employees were aware that the employer was monitoring employees‘ phone calls in 
accordance with an established policy. The plaintiff sued under the ECPA. The reason for her 
action was her discovery that the company had monitored a personal phone call in which she 
discussed an interview for employment she had with another company.
194
 The Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit held that while business calls are necessarily monitored in the normal 
course of business, personal calls cannot be intercepted in the ordinary course of business except to 
the extent necessary to determine that they are in fact personal calls.
195
 Another court using the 
content approach found that a call was not of a personal nature, and therefore validly monitored, 




Many states have formulated their own statutes regarding interception of electronic 
communication.
197
  These state statutes have similar provisions to the ECPA, but there are some 
important exceptions. For example, several states require the consent of both parties to a 
conversation before monitoring can occur.
198
 At least two states, Connecticut and Delaware, 
―require advance notice of any electronic monitoring ....‖  Therefore, even if an employer meets 
one of the above exceptions under the ECPA, the employer must also closely check relevant state 
law. If one has to put things into perspective, one can conclude that, while the ECPA prevents an 
employer from intercepting e-mail in transit, it offers the employees little additional privacy 
protection on their work computers from their employers.
 199
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Lacking adequate protection under constitutional or statutory law, many employees turn to 
common law causes of action when challenging employer monitoring. 
 
In terms of the American Common Law of Tort, there are four distinct state law torts that relate to 
the invasion of privacy:
 200
 
1. unreasonable intrusion into one‘s seclusion, 
2. misappropriation of one‘s name or likeness, 
3. public disclosure of private facts, and  
4. false right. 
The only theory that would be applicable to hold an employer  liable for violating work computer 
privacy is ‗intrusion upon seclusion,‘ for which a plaintiff must prove ‗(1) an intentional intrusion, 
physical or otherwise, (2) upon the plaintiff‘s solitude or seclusion or private affairs or concerns, 




  The concept of intrusion upon seclusion is defined as:
 202
 
 ―One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for the invasion 
of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person‖.   
 
To a large degree the common perception of employees is that employers should not have the right 
to monitor workplace e-mail and Internet use.
203
 The law, however, has provided differently on 
this point. While employees are often under the misconception that any use of the Internet and 
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e-mail at the workplace is private, the courts have indicated on several occasions that there is no 





The case of Smyth v. Pillsbury Co. 
205
discusses common law privacy.  In Smyth, the Pillsbury 
Company fired one of its regional operations managers for sending what the company ‗deemed to 
be inappropriate and unprofessional comments over ... [the company‘s] e-mail system‘.
206
  The 
manager made threats against sales management to ―kill the backstabbing bastards‖ and referred to 
the planned Holiday party as the ‗Jim Jones Kool-Aid affair‘ when replying to e-mail messages 
from his supervisor over the company‘s e-mail system. Although the manager sent the messages 
via company e-mail, he did so from his personal computer at home, and did so based upon the 
company‘s assurances that ―all e-mail communications would remain confidential and 
privileged‖.
207
 The manager sued the company for wrongful discharge, when his contract was 
terminated, claiming that his termination violated Pennsylvania‘s public policy against 




The court balanced the company‘s reasons to intercept the manager‘s e-mail with the manager‘s 
reasonable expectations that the e-mail would remain private. The court held that the manager had 
no ―reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communications voluntarily made ... over the 
company e-mail system notwithstanding any assurances that such communications would not be 
intercepted‖. The court went on to explain that once the manager made comments over ―an e-mail 
system which was apparently utilized by the entire company, any reasonable expectation of 
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privacy was lost‖. The court was of the view, which appears to be fatal for employees wishing to 
bring privacy claims based upon e-mail monitoring in Pennsylvania, that there are ―no privacy 
interests in ... [email] communications‖. The court went on to hold that even if the manager could 
have had a reasonable expectation of privacy to the content of his e-mail messages, the company 
did not commit a ―substantial or highly offensive invasion‖ of the manager‘s privacy by reading 
his messages.  The court based its finding upon the fact that, unlike a compulsory employee drug 
or alcohol test conducted by the employer, the company merely monitored e-mail messages that 
the manager voluntarily sent over the company e-mail system.  The important aspect of this 
judgment is that it seems to indicate that a company‘s interest in monitoring e-mails to prevent 
inappropriate and unprofessional comments, or even illegal activity over its e-mail system, 




Recent cases have applied these principles to monitoring of e-mail. This is illustrated in the case of 
McLaren v. Microsoft Corp
210
., the Texas Court of Appeals held that an employee did not have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of stored e-mail messages, despite the fact that 
they were stored in ‗personal‘ folders under a private password.  The court held that the e-mails 
were stored on a company computer given to the plaintiff to perform in the course and scope of his 
employment, and as such, were an ―inherent part of the office environment,‖ and not the 
employee‘s personal property. The court additionally pointed out that although the e-mails were 
stored in password-protected folders, they were initially sent over the network and were at some 
point accessible by another individual.
211
 The court went further and held that even if the 
employee had some expectation of privacy in the e-mail messages, that a reasonable person would 
not find the search a ―highly offensive invasion‖.   The court held that the plaintiff was on leave 
pending a sexual harassment investigation at the time the e-mails were accessed and that some of 
the e-mails were indeed relevant.
212
 The court held that the company‘s interest in preventing 
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inappropriate, or even unlawful conduct, outweighed any claimed privacy interest in those 
communications.
213
 In cases based on similar facts the courts have held that no reasonable 




In conclusion it is true to say that in terms of American law employees have no privacy rights in 
their e-mail and Internet use, and Federal law does not prohibit employers from monitoring that 
use. However the failure to monitor employees‘ e-mail and Internet use can lead to legal liability in 
more ways than one for the employer. Unless there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 
suggested by an employer, that employer is legally allowed to monitor the computer use of its 
employees on company computers. The onus then rests on all employees to carefully read and 
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2.  The law on Employee Monitoring in the United Kingdom 
 
There has been ever increasing number of employers monitoring staff e- mail and Internet 
activities in The United Kingdom (UK). It has been estimated that in the year 2000, 55 percent of 
employers monitored e-mail usage and 77 percent monitored Internet activities of their employees 
in the workplace.
216
 It has been common practice that employees were given little to no protection 
against infringements of their privacy in the work place. This enabled employers to legitimately 
monitor and scrutinize workers on- line activities, irrespective of whether these communications 
were of a personal nature.
217
 Thus it was deemed fair for employees to be dismissed for 
downloading inappropriate Internet material and also for making extensive Internet searches with 




 The landmark case of Halford v United Kingdom [1997] IRLR 471 ECHR, dealt with the 
interception and monitoring of telephone calls in the workplace. It was argued in this case that the 
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace that had been infringed, as she 
had not been warned that her communications would be intercepted. The European Court of 





In light of the Halford
220
 decision The Home Office issued a set of standards and guidelines for the 
use of telephone and communications surveillance devices at work. This was done in preparation 




One of the main objectives of the HRA is to give further effect to domestic law to rights and 
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freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The most 
relevant of these rights for the use and monitoring of e- mail and the Internet at work is article 8. 









1. ―The HRA requires all legislation to be read and given effect in a way which is compatible 
with the Convention rights. This obligation may affect the interpretation given by the 
courts to the relevant legislation. 
2. The Act makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right unless, as a result of the provisions of primary legislation, it could not 
have acted differently. The victims of such acts may bring proceedings against a public 
authority, or rely upon Convention rights in any other proceedings. Thus, employees 
employed by ‗public authorities‘ who allege that their employer has violated their rights 
under article 8 may sue them‖. 
 
Two sets of legislation regulate the use and monitoring of e- mail and the internet at work:  
a) The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and b) The regulations made under the 
authority of that Act, and the Data Protection Act 1998. For the purposes of this dissertation only 




The main purpose of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 would be to ensure 




 The interception of communications; 
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 The acquisition of communications data  
 Intrusive surveillance ( on residential / in private vehicles) 
 Covert surveillance in the course of specific operations; 
 The use of covert human intelligence sources 
 Access to encrypted data 
 
For each of these powers, the Act will ensure that the law clearly covers: 
- the purpose for which they may be used; 
- who should authorise each use of the power; 
- which authorities can use the powers; 
- the use that can be made of the material gained; 
- independent judicial oversight ; 
- a means of redress for the individual  
 
Section 1 (3) of the RIPA provides that: 
―Any interception of a communication which is carried out at any place in the UK by, or with the 
express or implied consent of, a person having the right to control the operation or the use of a 
private telecommunication system shall be actionable at the suit or instance of the sender or 
recipient, of the communication if it is without lawful authority and is either: 
 
1. An interception of that communication in the course of its transmission by means of that 
private system; or 
2. An interception of that communication in the course of its transmission, by means of a 
public telecommunications system, to or from apparatus comprised in that private 
telecommunication system‖. 
 
Section 1(3) of the RIPA, creates civil liability for unlawful interception on a private person who 
may bring an action under this subsection. This includes the sender, recipient or intended recipient. 
Therefore, either the employee or the third party may sue the employer where there is reason to 




employee and the third party.
 226
 
Section 1 (1) of the RIPA prescribes the circumstances in which interception of a communication 




In terms of the aforementioned section, it would be a criminal offence for a person to intentionally 
and without lawful authority to intercept, at any place in the UK, any communication in the course 
of its transmission (a) by means of a ‗public telecommunications system‘, or (b) by means of a 
‗private telecommunications system‘.
228
 A ‗public telecommunications system‘ means any such 
parts of a telecommunications system by means of which any public telecommunications service is 
provided as are located in the United Kingdom; a ‗ public telecommunications service‘ means any 
telecommunications service which is offered or provided to, or to substantial section of, the public 




Section 1(2) of the RIPA sets out the circumstances when the interception of a communication 
being transmitted by a private telecommunication system is an offence.
230
 A ‗private 
telecommunications system‘ means any telecommunications system which, without itself being a 
telecommunications system, is a system which (a) is attached, directly or indirectly and whether or 
not for the purposes of the communication in question to a public telecommunications system; and 
(b) there is apparatus comprised in the system which is both located in the UK and used (with or 
without other apparatus) for making the attachment to the public telecommunications system. This 
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 What constitutes the interception of a communication in the course of its transmission by means 
of a telecommunication system is explained in section 2 (2) of the RIPA. This is relevant to the 
criminal offence and civil liability in section 1of the RIPA; and to the issuing of a warrant by the 
Secretary of State which authorises or requires the interception in section 5 of the RIPA.  In terms 
of the RIPA, a person intercepts a communication if he or she: 
1)  modifies or interferes with the system , or its operation, 
2) monitors transmissions made by means of the system , or 
3) monitors transmissions made by wireless telegraphy to or from apparatus comprised in the 
system as to make some or all of the contents of the communication available, while being 





Any conduct which relates only to the traffic data comprised in or attached to a communication, or 
which relates only to so much of the content of the communication as is necessary in order to 
identify this traffic data is excluded from the definition of interception in the Act.
233
 Where any of 
the contents of the communication, while being transmitted, are diverted or recorded so as to be 




The provision thus allows  the sender or recipient of a communication to seek  an order against, or 
claim  damages for any loss incurred from an employer who intercepted a communication to or 




The Act specifies a range of circumstances where the requisite authority is considered to be 
present, two of which are relevant to employment. The first of these is where the communication is 
one which the person intercepting has reasonable grounds for believing, is sent by a person who 
has consented to the interception and secondly the case where the intended recipient of the 
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communication has also consented to the interception.
236
 Employers may prove that the requisite 
consent was present. They can do this by simply showing that the employee‘s contract permitted 
interception.
237
 In some instances it may be possible to argue that a practice of interception 
familiar to the employee could be sufficient. However, the duty of the courts under the Human 
Rights Act to interpret legislation compatibly with Convention Rights, as well as the terms of the 
European Convention (EC) Directive 97/96, may lead to the conclusion that this would be 
insufficiently unequivocal.
238
 Employer‘s therefore tend to choose rather to rely upon a second set 
of exceptions, contained in the Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) (Interception of 
Communications) Regulations 2000, made under the authority of the Regulation of Investigatory 




 The Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) (Interception of Communications) 
Regulations 2000 authorises certain interceptions of telecommunication communications which 
would otherwise be prohibited by section 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
240
 
In terms of article 5 .1 of the Directive 97/66/EC, any interception has to be with the consent of a 
person carrying on a business (which includes the activities of government departments, public 
authorities and others exercising statutory functions), the  purposes of which must be  relevant to 
that person‘s business and using that business‘s own telecommunication system. 
 
In terms of the above regulations interceptions are authorized for monitoring or recording 
communications in the following circumstances:
241
 
 to prove a set of  facts; 
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 to determine compliance with regulatory  requirements including certain specified 
procedures; 
 to ascertain or demonstrate standards which are ought to be achieved in  the interests of 
national security ( in which case only certain specified public officials may make the 
interception); 
 the prevention of  crime, 
 then investigation of  unauthorized use of telecommunication systems; 
 to promote effective system operation, 
 to monitor received communications in order to determine whether they are business or 
personal communications, 
 
 These interceptions can have a lawful and legitimate purpose provided that the interceptor/manger 
of the telecommunications system has made all reasonable efforts to inform employees and 
potential users that interceptions may be made. A proper and legitimate effort would include 
clauses in the employment contract and/ or regular notices, reminders on notice boards in offices 




 An employer will be liable for court action if any communications are monitored in breach of 
instructional regulations. It is thus essential that any evidence collected, is stored and used in the 
appropriate manner.
243
 If there is a need for any disciplinary action, such action must be taken in 




The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 including its supplementary provisions 
govern the situations under which employers may monitor the use of e- mail and the Internet at 
work.  In light of these aforementioned Regulations, interceptions for specified purposes (which 
includes investigating or detecting unauthorized use of a telecommunications system and 
determining whether communications relate to the business) are authorized provided that the 
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employer has made all reasonable efforts to inform those who may use the system that 




In the UK there is no legal requirement for monitoring to be discussed with employee 
representatives. This being the case, government has indicated that it encourages businesses to 
agree with employees on appropriate levels of recording or monitoring if they wish, but does not 




It would constitute repudiatory breach of contract in terms of the common law should an employee 
fails to comply with the regulations laid down by the employer with regard to the use of the e- mail, 
Internet and other electronic devices of the workplace. In such cases this could justify dismissal of 
the employee without notice.
247
 A single act of misconduct can justify dismissal only if it is of 




Employees do have statutory protection against unfair dismissal. In terms of this protection   
employers are required to have a fair reason for the dismissal of employees. This would involve 
consideration as to whether the employer followed fair procedure for dismissal. In terms of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, legislation should be interpreted compatibly with the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
249
 The effect of this is that, should an employer dismiss and 
employee in violation of any right in the Convention, the dismissal would not be regarded as fair. 
However European courts have held that the use of illegally obtained evidence in criminal 
proceedings suggests that the fact that an employer may have obtained the information leading to 
the decision to dismiss in breach of the Convention, may not in itself render that information 
inadmissible in court.
250
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There is no explicit right to privacy in The German Constitution. The right to privacy in terms of 
German law is derived from a general constitutional personality right. This personality right is 
further derived (Allegemines Personlichkeitsrecht) from the protection of dignity against abuse of 
state power (Recht auf Schutz der Menschenwiirde),  and the individual‘s right to free 
development of one‘s personality (Recht auf freie Entfaltung).
251
 The Federal Labour 
Court has regarded the aforementioned rights to be applicable to an employment 
relationship.
252
 The protection of employees‘ privacy is protected by the Constitution and many 
legislature enactments. The State in terms of the Constitution is bound to respect and 
protect a person‘s right to privacy.
253
  All employees have the right to the free development of 
their personality insofar as this does not violate the rights of others or undermine any 




The right to privacy in the employment context has dealt with the following provisions of the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court and labour court cases in relation to privacy rights 
have dealt with the monitoring of employee telephone conversations, use of video cameras 
and the processes involved in storage of employee personal information.
255




a) Protection of human dignity. 
 Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all 
state authority.  
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b) Rights of liberty. 
 In terms of [Article 2(1)], everyone shall have the right to the free development of 
his personality in so far as it does not violate the rights of others or offend against the 
constitutional order or the moral code. Everyone shall have the r ight to life and to 
inviolability of their person. The liberty of the individual shall be inviolable. These 




c) Restrictions of basic rights. 
 Insofar as a basic right may, under this Basic Law, be restricted by or pursuant to a 




Any employer who allows employees the private use of Internet in the workplace 
will be regarded as someone who ―commercially provides or assists in the provision of 
telecommunications services‖.
259
 In terms of Section 85(2) of the Telecommunications 
Act of 25 July 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Telecommunications Act), an employer is 
obliged to maintain telecommunications secrecy.  Section 3(16) of the Telecommunications Act  
defines telecommunications as, ―the technical process of sending, transmitting and receiving 





This significance of this definition is that it brings the private use of Internet within the scope of 
applicability of the Act. In terms of the Act, an employer who grants his employee‘s access to 
the Internet is regarded as someone who provides this telecommunication service 
commercially.
261
    
 



















 Where the employer does not allow any private use of Internet by employees the 
Telecommunications Act will not apply. This is because there is no ‗offer‘ of 
telecommunications.
262
  The processing of personal data will be subject to the Federal Data 
Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz). In terms of the Federal Data Protection Act all 
the collecting and recording of data that relates to phone calls of employees amounts to the 
processing of personal data in the sense of section 3 (1).
263
 In terms of section 4(1) of that Act, 
the processing and use of personal data will only be admissible if this Act or any other legal 
provision permits or prescribes them or if the person concerned has consented. The scope of 
this section has recently been extended by Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament 





 It has become a popular notion amongst German writers that, technically , e-mailing 
comes close to telephoning. Due to the similar conditions of electronic transmission in 
respect of the telephone and e- mails it seems justified in principle for the same arguments to be 




The result of this is that for employees 
to be able to use e-mails for private purposes the permission of the employer is required.  
However if there is an existing permission concerning private phoning it can be 
extended to the use of e-mails.
266
 In terms of section 87 (1), no. 6 of the Works Constitution 
Act the introduction and running of any monitoring equipment is subject to prior consent of 
the works council. Besides these requirements any monitoring of e- mails has to be brought in 




In terms of this approach, monitoring is only permissible when there is a belief that there is 
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unlawful behavior by employees in the form of sexual harassment through the use of 




In principle, employees face the same conditions and restrictions with regard  to other 




In terms of German law, if employees make private telephone calls in the workplace when 
this has been forbidden, then this violation could lead to dismissal which would have been 
preceded by a warning (Abmahnung).
270
 If private calls are to be permitted then the 
employment contract will stipulate time restrictions for the duration of the calls and whether 




  The German Works Constitution Act section 87 (1), no. 6, provides for a compulsory co – 
determination process. This would apply in cases where there has been an introduction of new 
technical equipment that is specifically designed to control the behaviour or the performances of 
employees.
272
 This section would apply to telephone monitoring systems. Any monitoring device 




 In principle, German law regards any monitoring of employee‘s behaviour in the workplace by 
hidden video cameras as ―an attack on the right to privacy‖.
274
 It is important to note that in certain 
instance German courts will permit so – called spying on employees.  This would normally arise 
where there is a serious breach of contract, if an unlawful act has been perpetrated or if there are no 
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The German model is interpreted as providing extensive protection of workplace privacy. The 
employer can only lawfully interfere with an employee‘s personality right if permitted by 
legislation, collective agreement or the company works council. 
 
 
4. ITALY  
 
 In Italy the most important legal document that governs labour management relationships and 
regulates the use and monitoring of e-mail in the workplace is the Data Protection Act and the 
Employees‘ Statute (Act 30 May 1970 No. 300).
276
  This Act contains rules and provisions aimed 
at protecting the freedom and dignity of employees and the freedom of trade unions and of their 




 Article 4, paragraph 1, states: 





The principle that shaped the statute was the view that an employee is a human being whose rights 
should be protected in the workplace and not the view that an employee is merely someone obliged 
to perform a job.
279
 The right to dignity in the workplace encompasses freedom of expression, 
autonomy and freedom from control by unidentified, impersonal objects. The statute affirms that 
all discriminatory practices are unlawful.
280
  The statute ensures the equal treatment within the 
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workplace through the identification of discriminatory practices and other anti discriminatory 
practices. Article 4, paragraph 2 of the above mentioned Act refers, to ―control equipment and 
appliances required for organizational and productive reasons or for work safety but which could 
be used for the remote monitoring of employees…‖. This equipment referred to above ―may be 
installed only after obtaining the agreement of the trade union delegations or, failing this, of one of 
the works councils‖.
281
 In terms of the nature of this provision it is essential that all employees are 




 In terms of article 26 of Workers‘ Statute, it is permissible during working hours to promote union 
activity and to advertise for new membership for a specific for trade union.  In doing so, employees 
must be weary not to interfere with the normal activities and functions of the employer.
283
 This has 
been interpreted to mean that any of the activity of an employee as the one mentioned above, must 
be carried on only during breaks. In the same sense, Italian courts have permitted the use of a 





In light of the above it is plausible to conclude that using computer facilities would be considered 
legal if it is used for communicating to other colleagues as well as to other people, (provided that 
the use of the computer facilities does not become excessive)  for promoting union activity 
provided that such takes place during the break period.
285
 Conversely, it would be plausible to 
conclude that it is unlawful to use any electronic communication equipment for leisure or for 
private business.
286
 An exception to the rule would be written or oral permission granted by an 
employer. An Italian judge has held that, in a case where the unlimited use (of the telephone) by 
the employees constitutes a deeply rooted practice known by the employer, that has to be 
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An infringement of employer property rights by the employee does not give an employer an 
inalienable right to monitor the activity of the employee, or listen to a conversation, or read the 
contents of a message.
288
 If however, the use of telephone or e- mails is abusive or excessive and 
when the employer experiences losses or damages because of this, monitoring by the employer 




In light of the above, it can be noted that Italian law on surveillance and monitoring of employees 
involves a human element and must not be as anonymous or inflexible as to prevent independence 
of the employees‘ performance. Italian law provides that supervision must be directly related to the 
tasks required of the employee and must be proportional to the nature and importance of those 
tasks. The Trade union representatives have an important function in providing assurance that 
these limits are observed by the employer by playing an active role in the decision – making 








There is no explicit right to privacy mentioned in the French Constitution. The preamble to the 
Constitution of 1946 does however provide that no employee may be discriminated against 
because of origin or beliefs.
291
 The Civil Code (section 9) does provide for a general right to 
privacy while the Penal Code provides for the secrecy of letters (section 187) and the 
confidentiality of speech and pictures (section 368).
292
 There is also no references to the Internet 
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and new technologies of information and communication within The French Constitution. 
However, a statute, called the Computer Science and Freedom Act, was adopted as early as 6 




Section 1 of the Computer Science and Freedom Act states, ―computer science must be in the 
service of each citizen‖ and further that ―It must not undermine either human identity, human 
rights, privacy or individual and public freedoms‖. Section 3 of the Act provides that ―every 
person has the right to know and to challenge information and thought processes used into data 
processing with which results he can be confronted‖.  Section 25 adds that ―data collection carried 
out by any fraudulent, disloyal or unlawful means is forbidden‖.  A punishment of a maximum of 
five years in jail and a fine of two million Francs is imposed by section 226- 18 of the new Penal 
code while eight other sections also penalise ―attacks against the rights of the person resulting 




Since 1970 article 9 of the French Civil Code provides that: ―everyone has a right to respect for 
their private life‖. This provision is also deemed applicable to an employment relationship.
295
  The 
debate that has emerged in recent times is whether a right to privacy can be effective in the 




 The French Labour Code has been interpreted to provide for monitoring and surveillance of 
employees. As general principle, article L. 120- 2 of the Labour Code states that:  
―Nobody may limit the rights of the individual unless the limitation in question is justified 
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and proportionate to the desired aim of the measure of practice in question‖.  
 
In terms of the article, employees must be made aware of the existence of surveillance equipment 
that is used by their employer.
297
 The article makes it unlawful for an employer to implement any 
method of obtaining information concerning employees without informing the employees of the 
method to be used to obtain that information.
298
 As a result it is illegal for an employer to monitor 
an employee‘s online activities whilst at work without first bringing this to their attention. An 
employer must provide proper justification for an intrusion into the privacy of an employee.
299
  In 
order to be justified, the practice in question must be both relevant to the tasks performed by 




In the case of Ministre du Travail v. Societe Peintures Corona [1980] 6 Dr. Soc. 317, the court 
made it clear that economic considerations alone are not enough to deprive  employees of their 
right to privacy.
301
 The question as to whether the employees have consented to such invasive 
monitoring is irrelevant.  In the Noecel case, the court de Cassation affirmed that article 9 of the 
Civil Code prohibits the use of surreptitious surveillance devices in the workplace. Thus 
employers cannot dismiss employees on the basis of information obtained through unlawful 
surveillance. 
302
   
 
 
The French Penal Code 
 
The French Penal Code protects employees against video camera surveillance, telephone 
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monitoring and other types of recording of conversation in the workplace.
303
 There is punishment 
in the form of imprisonment for a period of two months to a year, or a fine of 2000 to 6000 French 
francs, or both, for anyone who voluntarily causes prejudice to the privacy of someone else by:
304
  
a. listening  to, recording and / or transmitting , by means of a device , the speech of a person in a 
private place without the consent of the concerned person; 
b. recording and/ or transmitting, by means of a device, the picture of a person who is in a private 
place without the person‘s consent (section 369). 
 
 Section 368 of the Penal Code has been applied to the employment relationship in cases where 
there has been recordings of speeches and telephone tapping and monitoring.
305
 For example, the 
Tribunal de Grande Instance of Saint - Etienne applied section 368 to sanction an employer who 
had installed a device in the canteen to record conversation of employees. On the same topic the 
Court of Appeals of Paris ruled that private conversations between employees which were 
recorded on a cassette and disclosed to all employees of the undertaking by the employer was 




The Secrecy of Correspondence with regard to e- mails in the workplace 
 
According to section 226-15 of the Penal Code  a maximum jail term of one year and a fine of 
300,000 Francs is imposed for: ―The fact perpetrated in bad faith to open, suppress, delay or divert 
correspondence, whether delivered or not, or to read them with fraud‖.
307
 The term 
correspondence in this context   refers to any written relation existing between two identifiable 
persons, whether it be in the form of letters or messages that were in closed or open envelopes.
308
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The fact that the correspondence are aimed specifically between two people and not the public at 
large is the reason why French law seeks to protect this relation.
309
 In a specific case, a female 
student working at one of the laboratories of the university had complained of being harassment 
via e- mail. A  Kuwaiti visiting doctoral student whose volume of e- mail was abnormally high was 
considered the prime suspect. His mailbox was subsequently monitored and messages opened by 
The Director of the Laboratory, the system engineer and the Webmaster. They subsequently 
discovered that 90 percent of his e -mails were of a private nature as well as derogatory to the 
Laboratory. The student was later expelled on these grounds. The student sued the University on 
the basis of section 226-15. The Court fined the Director of the Laboratory, the system engineer 





From the above it has become apparent that European countries accord a better measure of 
protection to the employees‘ right to privacy in the workplace than the US. The right to workplace 
privacy is derived from numerous EU directives on data protection and telecommunications. The 





























An analysis of South African legislation as it applies to the Monitoring of Electronic 
Communications in the Workplace 
 
Surveillance and monitoring of communications (‗wiretapping‘ or ‗bugging‘) is conducted in 
nearly every country in the world by governments and private groups, for a range of reasons. The 
most common form of surveillance is the wiretap on a standard telephone system. Surveillance and 
monitoring techniques have no extended beyond the telephone wiretap to more modern and 
innovative methods of monitoring individuals.
312
 Since 11 September 2001, wiretap laws around 




It is clear that employees do not abandon all privacy rights when they enter the workplace. 
Employees are vital for the success and sustainability of any organisation, therefore they are 
entitled to respect, which entails some measure of privacy.  
 
The problems that employers face due to the abuse of their company resources are immense.  The 
overuse of an employer‘s resources has a negative impact on the working environment. For 
instance the use of these resources consume employees‘ working time, and have the potential to 
pollute and congest computer space not to mention cost the company exorbitant amounts of 
money.
314
 Uncontrolled and irresponsible internet usage also exposes computer systems to the 
ever present danger of computer viruses that may damage and destroy the company equipment.
315
  
Employer‘s also have the legitimate concern of the overloading of network servers and the 
forwarding of unsavoury messages that may be associated with the employer‘s brand or domain 
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name. The use of e-mail may also be used to transmit anonymous communications which are 
offensive or insulting to employees. 
316
   
 
The South African law on surveillance was first significantly amended in 1992. This was done to 
increase individual privacy protections: the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act (No. 127 
of1992) focused primarily on telephonic and postal communications.
317
 The South African Law 
Project (SALC), Project 105, November 1998 sought to review old apartheid security laws decided 
to prioritize the investigation into interception and monitoring of communications for crime 
investigation and intelligence gathering purposes, and to extend its ambit from just telephones and 




The law reform process was further impacted upon by the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime (COE). South Africa is one of four non-member signatories to that convention and as 




The COE Convention is the first international treaty on crimes committed using  the Internet and 
other computer networks, dealing particularly with infringements of copyright, computer related 
fraud, child pornography and violations of network security.
320
 The Convention also contains 
powers and procedures for the search of computer networks and interception. Its main objective, 
set out in the preamble, is to pursue a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society 
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Two pieces of legislation govern the impact and use of the Internet in the workplace. 
 
The following is a discussion of the relevant sections of the Electronic Communications and 
Transmissions Act 25 of 2002 (ECTA) and the Regulation of Interception of Communications and 
Provision of Communication – Related Information Act No 70 of 2002 (RICPCIA).  
 
The Electronic Communications and Transmissions Act 25 of 2002 (hereafter referred to as the 
ECTA) came into force on 30 August 2002. The purpose of the ECTA is to address issues, such as 
the formulation of a national electronic communication strategy, the promotion of universal access 
to electronic communications and the encouragement of e- government services.
322
 The are 
however, a number of provisions that may, directly or indirectly, impact on the use of e- mail and 




The Electronic Communications and Transmissions Act (ECTA) and the law relating to the 
time of electronic contracting.  
 
The nature of the Internet is such that it enables employers in the form of corporate entities to 
communicate and transact in ways that were not previously possible. This is so, because electronic 
contracts improve business efficiency and reduce administrative activities in the form of files of 
paperwork.
324
 The Internet does pose new challenges to employers. The challenges that arise are 
those that stem from the fact that due to the nature of the medium less information is known about 





The law of contract was formed for contracts that involved pen and paper. It was never intended to 
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cater for contracts that would be concluded in cyberspace.
326
 Thus the use of electronic 
communications for commercial purposes posed complex legal problems for both companies and 
their clients. This problem was not unique to South Africa but experienced internationally by all 




The common law rules that were used for paper based contracts, more specifically the law that 
deals with the time when such contracts were formed cannot be applied to determine the time of 
electronic contract formation.
328
 The normal determination of the time of communication as being 
either ‗instantaneousness‘ or ‗non- instantaneousness‘ to determine the instance when an 
electronic contract is formed is outdated. If one is to use the rules of paper based contracts and their 




The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law established a group to formulate 
rules with regard to electronic commerce. The result was The UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce adopted on 12 June 1996.
330
 The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce provided solutions for online contracting and set the foundations for most electronic 
laws in other jurisdictions.
331
 Although the crucial aspect of the time of electronic contract 
formation remained undecided, the fundamental principles on the legal recognition and validity of 




Despite the fact that The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce has no binding effect 
on international law. The Model Law has however helped shape the e- commerce legislation 
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South Africa adopted the ECT Act. The overall objective of the ECT Act
334
 (hereafter referred to 





The Act seeks to promote e- commerce in South Africa by formulating practical rules for 
electronic contracting. The Act also seeks to provide legal certainty by granting recognition to data 
messages. Another objective of the Act is to provide protection of individuals through consumer 
protection. The Act provides for measures to be taken against illegal activities and enforcement 





Section 4 (2) of the  Act provides that the Act must not be construed as requiring any person to 
generate , communicate, produce, process, send, receive, record, retain, store or display any 
information , document or signature by or in electronic form.
337
 The Act provides for the legal 
recognition of data messages and the requirements of writing, signature, and contract formation 
may be met by data messages. Section 3 is important in that it confirms that the Act applies to the 
common law as well as all legislation except where the application of the Act is specifically 
excluded.
 338
   
 
Electronic communication methods makes the determination of the time and place of transmission 
and receipt of data messages difficult to determine. Therefore certain rules must be put in place to 
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determine the time and place of dispatch and receipt of electronic communications.
339
 The reason 
for these rules are simple: whether a contract becomes effective when the acceptance is sent or 
received, the law must provide certainty as to when a data message may be deemed sent and 




The Act provides clear rules for the time and place that the dispatch and receipt of data messages 




The Act stipulates that a data message enters an information system at the time when it becomes 
available for processing within that information system.
342
 Attention is drawn to the meaning of 
‗entry‘ into an information system, which is used to define when dispatch and receipt of a data 
message becomes effective. In terms of the Act unless the message is complete and intact, receipt 




In South Africa the ECT Act
344
 adopted the reception theory for electronic contract formation.
345
 
Section 22 (2) of the ECT Act
346
  adopts a specific rule for the formation of an electronic contract. 
It provides that an agreement concluded between parties by means of data messages is concluded 
when the acceptance of the offer is received by the offeror.
347
 The Act provides that the reception 
theory offers an effective and realistic solution to the problems that arise due to consensus and long 
distance contracts. In terms of the reception theory the electronic contract will cone into existence 
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at the time the acceptance is deemed to be received by the offeror.
348
  This section of the Act 




A criticism raised against the provisions of the ECT Act
350
 on the time of contract formation is that 
the provision is not technically neutral. A data message is deemed to be sent when it enters an 
information system outside the control of the sender. It is deemed to be received when the 
complete data message enters an information system designated by the receiver or used for that 
purpose by the receiver.
351
 It is obviously important that the message reach the intended recipient 
intact and complete. If the message is not received intact, it is thus ineffectual and no contract 
comes into being. Pistorius
352
 submits that the effectiveness of an illegible record, and whether and 
to what extent it binds any party, should be dealt with by the general principles of law. It is by 
submitted Pistorius that ―It is an established legal principle that the question whether the message 
is legible is a separate issue from whether the record was received. The intelligibility or usability 
of a record should be irrelevant , let alone a determining factor , in determining whether a record 





Section 1 of the ECTA
354
 defines ‗data‘ in wide terms as being, ―electronic representations of 
information in any form‖, and both e- mail messages and other forms of internet information 
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Section 12 of ECTA
356
 provides that if there is a legal requirement that a document or information 
must be in writing, the requirement will be met if the document or the information must be in 
writing, the requirement will be met if the document or the information is in the form of a data 
message and it is accessible in a manner usable for subsequent reference.
357
 A ‗data‘ message 
means data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means and includes voice – data 




Section 13 of the ECTA
359
 provides that if a signature is required by law and there is no 
specification of the type of signature, an advanced electronic signature will meet the requirement. 
Section 13 (2) provides that an electronic signature is not without legal force and effect merely on 




Section 15 of the Act relates to the admissibility and evidential weight of data messages
361
 – the 
rules of evidence must not be applied so as to deny the admissibility of a data message only 
because it is not in its original form.
362
 
Section 22 of the Act provides that an agreement is not without legal force and effect solely on the 
basis that it was concluded partly or wholly by means of data messages. An agreement concluded 
between parties by means of data messages is concluded at the time when, and place where, the 
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The ECTA and Consumer Protection.  
 
 The Internet does offer exciting new opportunities. This is achieved by transforming the way 
companies and other organisations conduct their businesses, it has also provided the means to 
gather electronic mail and to distribute them expeditiously with little to no cost.
364
 Unsolicited e- 
mail commonly referred to as spam, refers to an e-mail message that is transmitted to a large 
number of recipients who have not requested those messages, and do want them. Spam is usually 
some sort of advertising, inappropriately sent to a mailing list or newsgroup.
365
 The first major 
commercial spamming is said to have occurred in 1994, when two lawyers posted a message 
advertising their services to several thousand newsgroups on USENET, the world‘s largest online 




Junk e- mail is undesirable to employers for the following reasons:
367
 
 Unsolicited messages lead to the users spending a considerable amount of time reading 
messages, thus, in turn, causing them to stay on line longer and incur further expense.  
 The messages may cause the employer‘s e- mail server to malfunction due to congestion 
and potentially prevent important business mail from reaching the intended recipients. 
 The messages may be sent with a fraudulent purpose. Numerous Internet businesses that 
send junk e- mail spoof (i.e. forge) their e-mail headings.  
 The messages cause great concern to employers because these messages mean a loss of 
productivity due to the time spent by employees perusing or reading their mail.  
 
Section 45 deals with ‗unsolicited communications‘, which are defined as ‗communication by 
means of data messages‘. Section 45 (1) provides that:
368
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(1) Any person who sends unsolicited commercial communications to consumers, must provide 
the consumer: 
(a)  with the option to cancel his or her subscription to the mailing list of that person; and 
(b) with the identifying particulars of the source from which that person obtained the consumer‘s 
personal information, on request of the consumer. 
 
Section 45 (2) provides that no agreement is concluded where a consumer has failed to respond to 
an unsolicited communication. 
Section 45 (3) and (4) criminalizes the following conduct:
369
 
3) Any person who fails to comply with or contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and 
liable, on conviction, to the penalties prescribed in section 89 (1). 
(4) Any person who sends unsolicited commercial communications to a person who has advised 
the sender that such communications are unwelcome, is guilty of an offence and liable, on 
conviction, to the penalties prescribed in section 89 (1). 
 
 Gerrie Ebersohn  believes with the recent developments in America , Australia and Europe , S.A 
legislators should seek to amend the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 




 Spam undermines two of the advantages of e- mail that is, low cost and convenient 
communication). The reason being is that the recipient of spam incurs costs in downloading, 
reviewing and deleting unwanted spam.
371
 The activating of spoofing on the other hand, Ebersohn, 
believes impinges on the internet user‘s trust in the internet because they cannot rely on or trust the 
sender‘s e- mail address. Furthermore, the amendment of the ECT Act will help prevent spam 
becoming the method of choice for those who wish to distribute pornography, perpetuate 
fraudulent schemes, or introduce malicious viruses onto computer programs.
372
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 More attention must be paid on how spammers have obtained the recipients e- mail address. 
If this is done it will create an environment of transparency and curb the activities of 
spammers. 
 Spammers should be prevented from using false and misleading e- mail headers, referring 
to both the subject matter as well as the sender‘s e- mail address and disguising the origin 
of the e- mail. 
 People who send e-mail should be compelled to indicate that their e-mails contain 
advertisements by using an abbreviation such ‗ADV‘, an abbreviation for an advertisement. 
Similar practice should be adopted for those who wish to send pornographic material. This 
would thus enable a recipient of these types of e- mails to activate filtering software to 
block these e- mails without having to search through them on their own. 
 Stiffer penalties should be adopted to for those who contravene the amended provisions of 
the ECT Act. For instance some American states such as Illinois, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island and Virginia provides from criminal penalties of US$ 10 per 
spam message up to a maximum of US$ 25 000 per day.  
 Currently, the ECT Act only protects Internet users against spam, provisions of the ECT 
Act need to be amended to protect Internet Service Providers (ISP‘s) because their 
computer resources are usurped by spam.  
 The Australian approach creating civil liability for sending spam and using harvested e- 
mail addresses is plausible and should be investigated and perhaps adopted in South 
Africa. 
 The South African government should regularly review spam legislation. The Australian 
and American spam legislation mandate legislatures to regularly review spam legislation. 
 
Failure to curb spam and spoofing undermine consumer confidence and the viability of the Internet 
as a medium of communication. 
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ECTA and Cyber protection 
 
Chapter XIII of the Act is of importance. This chapter relates to the issue of cyber crime. Section 
86 of the Act states that, subject to the provisions of the Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication related Information Act 70 of 2002 (hereafter 
referred to as the RICPCIA), a person who intentionally accesses or intercepts any data without the 
authority or permission to do so, is guilty of an offence.
374
 The effect of this provision is such that, 
unless the employer complies with the RICPCIA
375
 or has authority or permission to do so, its 




In terms of section 86 of the ECTA
377
, the following also constitutes criminal offences.  
 The intentional and unauthorised interference with data resulting in a modification , 
destruction or rendering ineffective of the data;
 378
 
 The production , sale, design or adaptation of devices primarily to overcome security measures; 
379
 
 Unauthorised access (that is, unlawfully overcoming security measures designed to protect 
data, or hacking into a system);
 380
 and 
 The denial of service offences (that is, committing acts with the intent to interfere with access 





Section 89 provides that the maximum penalty for a contravention of s 86 of the Act is a fine or 
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The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 (The Monitoring Act) is repealed 
and replaced by the RICPCIA. Before we look at the provisions of the RICPCIA, it is important to 
provide a brief study of the provisions and application of the Monitoring Act, as this Act sets the 
framework for the RICPCIA. 
 
The Monitoring Act  
 
In terms of section 2 (1) (a) of the Monitoring Act, 
―No person shall intentionally and without the knowledge or permission of the dispatcher, 
intercept a communication which has been or is being or is intended to be transmitted by 
telephone, or in any other manner over a telecommunications line‖. 
 
The term intercept was defined in the Monitoring Act as, ‗seize, catch or stop (a person, message, 




Section 8 (1) (a) of the Monitoring Act makes it an offence to contravene s 2 (1). In the event of a 
conviction, the penalty is a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years. 
 
In terms of the provisions of s 2 (1) (a) of the Monitoring Act, person may, with the knowledge or 
permission, of the dispatcher, intercept a communication. The term dispatcher is not defined in the 
Act, it therefore bears its ordinary meaning, and would be synonymous with ‗sender‘. 
 
Section 3 of this Act limited the application for a directive in terms of s 2(2) to be made by certain 
persons only, including members of the SA Police Service, the SA Defence Force and the 
Intelligence Services.  
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Other than these provisions this Act did not make provision for the interception and monitoring of 
communications and conversations. 
 
I will look briefly at the application of the Monitoring Act by South African courts. 
 
In the case of Van Wyk Independent Newspapers Gauteng (Pty) Ltd and others (2005) 26 ILJ 2433 
(LC); the applicant employee, the chief sub-editor of the Pretoria News , had a heated argument 
with her editor, the deputy editor, her superior and a back desk editor while on night duty one 
evening. The applicant then sent out a series of e- mails to colleagues and managers to which her 
superiors took exception.  
 





1. ―Gross misconduct in that you on 10 May 2001, sent an e-mail to staff and 
management containing allegations which are of a malicious nature with the intention 
of undermining the authority of senior management.  
2. Gross misconduct in that you in an e-mail dated 11 May 2001 made derogatory 
statements about the editor and deputy chief editor of the Pretoria News. ― 
   
At the Arbitration proceedings the employee contended that the dismissal had been too harsh a 
sanction.
385
 The arbitrator found that the employee had acted without malice but irrationally and 
had displayed bad judgment. The arbitrator found that the both the managing director and the 
editor had every right to feel insulted by the first e-mail.
386
 The arbitrator held that the argument 
that the second e-mail was inadmissible to be without substance as it had been sent to a communal 
computer which was the property of the first respondent. He found the dismissal to be 
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Insofar as the review application was concerned, the applicant relied on the Interception and 
Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 (The Monitoring Act).  It was argued on the basis of this 




The court was unable to accept the employee‘s reliance on the Interception and Monitoring 
Prohibition Act. Firstly, because it was not raised before the arbitrator and secondly, the first 
respondent‘s information technology usage policy specifically cautioned employees not to assume 




The court held that very few employers will tolerate this type of behaviour from their subordinates. 
Therefore the court found that the decision reached by the arbitrator was not irrational and that the 





In S v Kidson 1999 (1) SACR 338 (W)  a private individual had been fitted with a tape recorder by 
the police prior to attending a meeting with a third party . The conversation was recorded and was 
used as evidence against the third party, who was unaware that the conversation was being 
recorded. Kidson, the accused, sought to have the recording excluded on the ground that the 
monitoring contravened the Monitoring Act. The court held that the Monitoring Act was a criminal 
statue, and must be narrowly interpreted. The court held that the legislature‘s primary purpose was 
to ‗protect‘ confidential information from ‗illicit eaves- dropping‘.
391
 The court held what was 
prohibited is ‗the conduct of third person acting in relation to a conversation between others‘
392
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and not that of a person monitoring a conversation in which he or she takes part. It is not necessary 
the court held, for a person in these circumstances to apply for authority to conduct the recording 




The court in this case also considered whether in such circumstances it could be said that the 
monitoring was to gather ‗confidential‘ information. The court concluded that confidentiality 
implies that the information in question is ‗confided‘ to another person, namely that some burden 
or duty rests on the person to whom the information is communicated. On the facts of the case, the 
court concluded that the information imparted in the two – way conversation about the 
communicator‘s ( accused) own criminal conduct , was not ‗ confidential information‘ in relation 




In the case of Tap Wine Trading CC and another v Cape Classic Wines (Western Cape) CC and 
another 1999 (4) SA 194 (C), a telephone conversation had been recorded ‗at the instance of one of 
the parties‘. The court held that this constituted participant electronic surveillance (that is, the 
surveillance was consented to by one of the parties to the conversation) which is not in 




In S v Dube 2002 (2) SA  586 (N), a private investigator acting on behalf of Toyota SA had 
arranged a meeting between himself and the accused at which the accused had made certain 
statements relating to stolen vehicles. The investigator had tape recorded the conversation and had 
arranged for a photographer surreptitiously to take pictures of the meeting. The court concluded, 
consistently with S v Kidson
396
 and Tap Wine Trading CC
397
 that the investigator‘s conduct in 
making the recording amounted to participant monitoring, which is not prohibited by the 
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 The court held further that the information obtained at the meeting did not have 




The cases above relate to employer – employee cases where the interception and monitoring forms 
part of an investigation being conducted by the employer into the conduct of the employee. It is 





The Regulation of Interception of Communications Related Information Act  
 
 It must be noted that the RICPCIA
401
 is not just simply an updated version of the 1992 Act. Even 





The Interception Act applies to a wide range of issues, including the regulation of the interception 
of certain communications, the monitoring of signals and radio frequencies /spectrums, the 
provision of certain communication related information, the issuing of directions authorising the 
interception of communications and the provision of communication related information, entry 




Important definitions for present purposes include: 
 
The word ―intercept‖ in section 1 of the Act is defined as being: 
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―the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any communication through the use of 
any means, including an interception device, so as to make some or all of the contents of a 
communication available to a person other than the sender or recipient or intended 
recipient of that communication, and includes the - 
a) monitoring of any such communication by means of a monitoring device; 
b) viewing, examination or inspection of the contents of any indirect communication; and 





The definition of intercept also refers to an ‗interception device‘. An interception device is any 
electronic, mechanical or other instrument, device, equipment or apparatus which is used, or can 
be used, whether by itself or in combination with any other instrument, device, equipment or 
apparatus, to intercept any communication.
405
 The definition of a ‗monitoring device‘ in the 
context of interception is important. A ‗monitoring device‘ is thus defined as being any electronic, 
mechanical or other instrument, device, equipment or apparatus which is used, or can be used, 
whether by itself or in combination with any other instrument, device, equipment or apparatus, to 




The effect of such a definition of ‗intercept‘ is, in essence, a wide definition – it refers to the 
acquisition of the contents of any communication by any means: it is not only limited to the use of 




The term ‗business‘ means any business activity conducted by any person, including activates of 
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The term ‗communication‘ is defined as including both direct and indirect communication. The 
definition of ―direct communication‖ in section 1 relates this form of communication to actual 
speech and utterances between two persons who in each other‘s presence.
409
 For present purposes 
the definition of ―indirect communication‖ is of greater importance: 
 
‗'the transfer of information, including o message or any part of a message, whether— 
in the form of- 
(ii) speech, music or other sounds; 
(ii) data; 
(iii) text; 
(iv) visual images, whether animated or not;  
(v) signals; or 
(vi) radio frequency spectrum; or 
(b) in any other form or in any combination of forms, that is transmitted in whole or in part 




A party to direct communication is a direct participant. It is a person to who the communication is 
directed or a person who was present when such communication occurred
411
. A party to an indirect 
communication is the sender, recipient or intended recipient. If it is intended by the sender that 
such indirect communication received by more than one person, than any of those recipients is a 
party. It is also a person who, at the time of its occurrence, is in the immediate presence of the 




The definition of indirect communication is broad, and includes a number of communications that 
occur through the media, telephone calls, music, visual images and data or text.
413
 The implication 
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of both data and text included in this form of communication means that electronic mail constitutes 
a form of indirect communication. In essence, an e- mail message amounts to a transfer of 




A broadcast or transmission for general reception is not considered indirect communication that 
can be intercepted. Interception takes place in South Africa only if it is affected by conduct within 
South Africa and the communication is intercepted in the course of its occurrence or transmission 




The time of transmission by telecommunication system includes any time when its transmissions 
are or were used for storing in a manner that enables the intended recipient to collect them or 





In terms of s 2 of the RICPCIA, it is clear that no person may intentionally acquire the contents, 
that is, intercept, any e- mail message in the course of that e-mail message‘s occurrence or 
transmission by using an interception or monitoring device. This also refers to indirect 




The RICPCIA does not define ‗transmission‘ for the purposes of s 2 of the Act. It is safe to assume 
that the entire transmission process, from the point where a computer user clicks the send button in 
respect of a single e- mail message to the point where the e- mail message appears on the computer 
screen of the recipient is intended. There is no indication in the Act to suggest a narrower 




The use of the word ―occurrence‖ is important to note. The question that arises is, does the e-mail 







 Stassen & Stassen op cit note 100, 39 
 
417







message ―occur‖ on the employee‘s individual computer or on the employer‘s network server?  In 
many cases, an e- mail message is not transmitted to an individual employee‘s computer or stored 
on the hard drive of the employee‘s computer; the message is stored (and often remains) on the 
central mail- server of the employer, where that e- mail message may be accessed by any user 
server with access privileges to the server.
419
 Any employee therefore seated at his own desk, may 
use Interactive Mail Access Protocol (IMAP)
420
 to access the messages stored on the central mail 
server. In doing, so- the employee is accessing ―remote‖ information. Using IMAP, this employee 
can view, delete and otherwise manipulate the e-mail messages that have been appended to his or 





From the wording of s 2, it does not appear that much emphasis is placed on the word ‗occur‘. The 
scope and purport of s 2 is wide, and seeks to protect communications from interception regardless 
of how, when and where they are transmitted, and irrespective of where, the e- mail message is 
stored on the computer network.
422
 It would according to Mischke
423
 be safer to assume that s 2 
prohibition encompasses the entire transmission process and protects the contents of the e- mail 
message no matter where it is situated. Where the information is located is still important with 
respect to who exercises control over the information, as well as for the purposes of tracking the 




The RICPCIA does provide for a number of ways in which the s 2 prohibition can be avoided.  In 
terms of s 3 of the Act, an authorised person may execute an interception. An authorised person in 
terms of the Act is a law enforcement officer from the South African Police Service (SAPS), the 
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Defence Force, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), the 





The question that subsequently arises is when an employer can intercept a communication in terms 
of the Interception Act. Subject to the provisions of the Interception Act, no person may 
intentionally intercept or attempt to intercept or authorise or procure any person to intercept or 
attempt to intercept any communication.
426
 
This means that unless the interception is authorised in terms of the Interception Act, it is 
prohibited. The Interception Act authorised interception or attempted interception in a number of 
circumstances. Within the employment context, there are three important provisions of the 
Interception Act which permit the employer to intercept or attempt to intercept any 
communication.
427
 These provisions are as follows: 
 
Section 4 of the Act states that a party to the communication may intercept, unless such 
communication is intercepted to commit an offence.
428
 This means that any person who is a party 
to the communication may intercept such communication. The term ‗party‘ is not defined. It will 
therefore have its ordinary meaning, and would include the sender, the recipient, and any person to 
whom the communication is copied. There is also potential argument that the employer, by 





A law enforcement officer may intercept if he is a party to a communication and satisfied that 
reasonable grounds are present that permits such an interception.  Unless such communication is 
intercepted to commit an offence. Section 16 (5) sets out these reasonable grounds.
430
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With regard to the issue of workplace privacy and the interception of communications by 
employers, section 5 is the most important. Section 5 of the RICPCIA relates to the interception of 
communications with the consent of the one of the parties to the communication. This section 
provides that any person may intercept any communication if one of the parties to the 
communication has given prior consent in writing to such interception.
431
 This may be the route 
that an employer will take, to secure the written prior consent of employees for the purposes of 
intercepting their e- mail messages and reading the contents of those messages.
432
  It is important 
to note that the consent must be prior consent, i.e. it must be given before the interception occurs (it 
may of course be argued that the person may ratify the interception, after the interception has 
occurred, in which event any objection to the interception will fall away).
433
 Secondly, the consent 
must be in writing. Employers will argue that, if a general consent is contained in the terms and 
conditions of employment (either in the contract of employment, applicable policies, practices and 
procedures, or some other document), this would amount to consent which complies with the 
provisions of s 5(1). An argument may however be raised that the words ‗consent in writing to 
such interception‘ may imply consent on a case by case basis. It has been suggested, that consent 
given freely and voluntarily in the terms and conditions of employment would address 
interceptions contemplated in the consent, i.e the scope of the consent and the manner in which it is 




Unless the employer carefully sets out the scope of the consent, it may result in an argument being 
raised by employees that consent is not enforceable because the employee, when giving consent, 
could not contemplate the scope and therefore, the consent is not proper consent.
435
  
It may be interesting to note that s 5 (1) provides that the communication may be intercepted ‗if 
one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent‘. This, Beech
436
 believes could 
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lead to a situation that where there is multi - party communication, provided that one party gives its 




Section 6 of the RICPCIA provides that any person may, in the course of the carrying on any 
business, intercept any indirect communication:
438
 
 by means of which a transaction is entered into in course of that business; 
 which otherwise relates, to that business; or 
 which otherwise takes place in the course of the carrying on or that business. 
 
Section 6 (1) appears according to Beech
439
 to address the situation where for example, the 
transaction is recorded for the purposes of recording the terms and conditions of the 
transaction, protection of the parties. Section 6 (1) essentially provides for the recording of 
transactions which take place in the course of carrying on the business of the employer.  
 
Such interception may take place only if:
 440
 
 effected by, or with the express or implied consent of, the system controller; 
 the system concerned is provided for use in connection with that business; and 
 the system controller has made all reasonable efforts to inform in advance a person, who 
intends to use the system, that indirect communications may be intercepted or if such 
indirect communication is intercepted with the express or implied consent of the person 
who uses it. 
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 in order to establish the existence of facts; 
 to, investigate or detect unauthorised use of that system; or 
 To secure, or as an inherent part of the effective operation of the system. 
 
Such interception will also be allowed for:
 442
 




 which is free of  charge, other than the cost of making a telephone call; and 
 operated in a way that users thereof may remain anonymous if they so choose. 
 
The purpose of the monitoring must therefore fall within one of three defined purposes. The first of 
these purposes would be to establish the existence of facts.
443
 The interception could also be for 
the purpose of investigating or detecting the unauthorized use of the telecommunication system. 
(This would include monitoring and intercepting for the purpose of detecting unauthorized use of 
the internet system. In this context, unauthorized use would be any use which is not authorized by 
the company. Any access to, for example, pornography, transmission of racist jokes, etc, would 




The third purpose would be to secure or to ensure the effective operation of the system.
445
 
Fourthly, the system controller must make all reasonable efforts to inform, in advance, the person 
who intends to use the telecommunication system that indirect communications transmitted may 
be intercepted, alternatively, the indirect communication must be intercepted with the express or 




The provisions referred to above mean that an employer can continue to monitor and intercept 
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communications in the workplace provided that, where it seeks to rely on a particular provision, it 




Section 6(2) would therefore authorize the employer to intercept and monitor for these purposes. 
The reference to detection of unauthorized use is extremely wide, and would include interception 





In addition to interception for one of the listed purposes, it is however essential for an employer to 
obtain the express or implied consent of the person who uses the telecommunication system. It 
must be kept in mid that reference to express or implied consent does not necessarily require 
written consent.
449
 For example, if a person is advised that communications may be intercepted oil 
a particular telecommunication system, and the employee nevertheless makes use of that 
telecommunication system, this would be implied consent.  In order to avoid any possible 
arguments, written consent should be obtained.  If   all reasonable efforts have been made to 
inform a person who intends to use the telecommunication system concerned that indirect 
communications may be intercepted, there would be compliance with the provisions of s 6(2), and 




The requirement of prior written consent has been controversial. On the one hand it has been 
argued that it is absolutely essential for an employer to obtain the prior consent of its employee in 
writing before such employer may intercept the electronic communications such as e- mail or short 
messages (SMS‘s) of an employee.
451
 On the other hand, it is argued that the only time such prior 
written consent is required, is in section 5 where the employee as a party to the communication has 
to give such consent. As result of this requirement in section 5, it has been an adopted practice by 










 Ibid 659 
 
451
 VA Lawack Davids & A van der Walt. ―Interception of Electronic Communications in the Workplace‖ (2005) 26 





some, to read prior written consent into s 6. Section 6 however does not expressly require prior 
written consent.
452
  If the employee, has consented in advance, it can be taken that the system 
controller has made all reasonable efforts to inform in advance that indirect communications 
transmitted by means of a telecommunication system may be intercepted. Therefore if written 
consent should be obtained, it will be viewed as interception with the express consent of the 
employee who uses the system (s 6 (2) (d)).
453
 
As a result of the uncertainty, van der Walt and Davids
454
 believe, that from a practical point of 
view, it would be advisable for an employer to obtain the prior written consent of all its employees 
who use its telecommunication system that their communications may be intercepted in 
accordance with an electronic communications or office communications policy.
455
 Due to the fact 
that prior written consent is not required in terms of s 6, it may occur in certain instances that an 
employee will refuse to give his or her consent. In cases where this occurs, an employer must have 
alternative methods of ensuring that its system controller has made all reasonable efforts to inform 
in advance a person who intends to use that system that indirect communications may be 
intercepted.
456
   
 
 Section 51 of the RICPCIA sets out offences and penalties. It provides that any person guilty of an 
offence or behaves contrary to the provisions of the Act will be liable to a fine not exceeding R2 
































1. Reasons for monitoring Electronic Communications in the Workplace  
 
The use of computers in the workplace is now a normal occurrence and is often taken for granted. 
It has become impossible for employees to ensure proper performance of their tasks without the 
use of increasingly sophisticated electronic communication tools.
458
 The use of computer 
networking, e-mail facilities and the Internet have greatly increased an employees‘ access to 
information. A company‘s computer network, and the Internet has allowed employees virtually 
unrestricted access to the World Wide Web from their desktops. In light of this it has become 









 telephones, mobile phones and voice-mail facilities  
 e-mail facilities  
 fax machines, modems and servers  
 computers  
 network tools (for example, Internet browsers and Internet access facilities)  
 
These above mentioned tools have been made available to employees by their employers and are 
intended to provide and promote business communications as well as to enhance the productivity 
of company employees. The employer as the owners of these tools, gives them the inalienable 
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These ‗electronic communication tools‘ can be utilized to access and distribute confidential 
information with ease and on an anonymous basis. If the electronic tools are used in this way it 
poses a high risk to their employers because of the potential loss and litigation that may occur.
 462
  
The abuse of these ‗electronic communication tools‘ by employers, will, in most instances 
compromise the employer. The difficulty in differentiating between business and private usage as 




There are inherent dangers to employers due to the unauthorised and inappropriate use of 
corporate computer systems and resources by employees.
 464
  Employers may find themselves 
exposed to legal liability in cases of inappropriate use of corporate Internet and email facilities. 
There may even be potential liability for employers on grounds of harassment, discrimination, 
defamation, copyright infringement (where the employee carelessly downloads and disseminates 




This places a greater responsibility on employers not only to guard against attacks being launched 
against them in the cyber world but also to ensure that they are not used as a vehicle to launch a 
similar an attack on another company. 
 
Employers must therefore be vigilant as they may be faced with liability on grounds of harassment 
and defamation resulting from an email which one of their employees sends, they could also be 
faced with claims based on discrimination and the creation of an unacceptable workplace 
environment if employees, for instance, view pornographic or sexually explicit or offending 
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1. Vicarious liability 
 
The general rule with regard to the commission of unlawful or delictual acts is that a person is 
liable only for acts committed personally.
467
  In contrast to this rule, our law  recognises the 
doctrine of vicarious liability in terms of which one person can be held liable to a third party for the 





Vicarious liability is a doctrine of liability without fault in terms of which one person is held liable 
for the unlawful acts of another. It is a strict liability, or liability without fault, on the part of the 
defendant and is additional to that of the other person‘s delict.
469
 The decision to treat a class of 
persons differently and to impose vicarious liability is based on social policy regarding what is fair 
and reasonable and amounts to an expression of a society‘s legal convictions that victims of a 





Vicarious liability will be incurred if there is a special relationship between the two persons. For 
purposes of this discussion, one such important relationship is the employer-employee 
relationship. In terms of the doctrine of vicarious liability as applied in the employment context, an 




 The reasons advanced for the existence of the doctrine is that the victim should enjoy fair and just 
compensation (out of the deeper pocket of the employer), this is so because the employer is better 
equipped to spread the cost of compensating victims by taking out insurance and by price increases 
and that employers will take measures to prevent employees from causing damage to third persons 
if they will be held liable for the acts of their employees.
472
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Despite the fact that vicarious liability has its origin in the law of delict it has developed as a 






The requirements for vicarious liability are:
 474
 
(a) A relationship of employment must exist; 
(b) Commission of a delict; 
(c) The employee must have acted in the course and scope of his employment. This phrase refers 
to acts committed by the employee in the exercise of the functions to which he/she was 
appointed, including such acts as are reasonably necessary to carry out the employer‘s 
instructions. 
 
A) Relationship of employment 
There must be some form of employer – employee relationship between the parties in that one 
person makes his working skills available to another person for some form of numeration. The 
employer will usually employ people to do his work, and takes interest in their capacity to work.
475
 
The risk of damage arising from the employee‘s actions increases if the employer does not do the 
work on his own. Therefore where the employer trusts the employee to execute the work for third 
parties on his behalf, then it seems just for the employer to bear the burden of damage should it 
occur.
476
 In an employment relationship there must be some form of control over the employees by 
the employer. A person will be vicariously liable for the actions of another if the person has control 





B) Commission of a Delict 
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This requirement entails that during the course of the employment, the employee fails to perform 
his duties adequately or at all and consequently causes damage, the employer could be held liable 
for the damage.
478
 The action committed must be wrongful and the employee must have acted 
negligently or with intent. There must also be a causal link (factually and legally) between the 





(C) The employee must have acted in the course and scope of his employment 
The test to determine whether or not an employee was acting in the course and scope of his 
employment was laid down by the court in the case of Minister of Law and Order v Ngobo 1992  4 
SA  822 (A), where Scott JA described the test as: 
―The standard test for vicarious liability of a master for the delict of a servant is whether 
the delict was committed by the employee while acting in the course and scope of his 
employment. The enquiry is frequently said to be whether at the relevant time the employee 




There is no general rule for establishing the liability of an employer that can be applied to all South 
African cases involving vicarious liability. The question whether the act falls within or outside the 
scope of employment is not without problems and the answer has been described as a question of 




In determining whether an employee‘s actions fall within the scope of his or her employment and 
therefore renders the employer vicariously liable, both a subjective test and an objective test may 
be applied.
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 Manamela op cit note 14, 126 
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1989 (1) SA 116 (ZH) at 126) in the following terms (at134C±E): [`It seems clear that an act done by a servant solely 




The consequence of these tests is that an employer will be able to escape liability only if the 
employer can prove that the employee‘s intention was to solely promote his or her own interests 
(the subjective test) and that the employee had completely disengaged himself or herself from the 
affairs of the employer when committing the delict (the objective test).
483
 For the employer to 





Certain sub-rules have been developed by the courts for different types of actions of employees. 




 The application of these rules are discussed below. 
 
 In Viljoen v Smith 1977 (1) SA 309 (A) the employee, although prohibited by his employer, 
climbed through a fence and walked some 70 metres onto the third party‘s farm to relieve himself. 
While doing so, he lit a cigarette and caused a fire. The Court held that the employee had not 
abandoned his place of work and that he was still acting within the course and scope of his 
employment. This indicates that the mere existence of a digression does not automatically result in 
the employer not being found vicariously liable for the delict of an employee. The employee may 
still be engaged in the business of the employer whose instructions for the conduct of that business 
he has disobeyed. Whether the employer will be vicariously liable will depend on the nature of the 




 In South African Railways & Harbours v Marais (1950) (4) SA 610 (A), the third party was a 
passenger in the guard van of a mixed passenger and goods train. In contravention of standing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
employment, and that in deciding whether an act by the servant does so fall, some reference is to be made to the 
servant‘s intention. . . . The test is in this regard subjective .On the other hand, if there is nevertheless a sufficiently 
close link between the servant‘s acts for his own interests and purposes and the business of his master, the master may 
yet be liable. This is an objective test. And it may be useful to add that . . . ―a master . . . is liable even for acts which he 
has not authorised provided that they are so connected with acts which he has authorised that they may rightly be 
regarded as modes ± although improper modes ± of doing them‖]. 
 
483
 supra note 10, at 742 
 
484
 supra note 10, at 742 
 
485
 Calitz op cit note 15, 218 
 
486





orders, the engine driver invited the third party to join him on the engine‘s footplate. The two of 
them and a fireman drank brandy. On route, the engine left the rails due to the driver‘s negligence 
and all three died of burns sustained in the accident. In a claim for damages by the third party‘s 
wife against the driver‘s employer, the Court ruled that the transportation of the third party on the 
engine was entirely the driver‘s own action and fell outside the scope of his employment. The 




These cases indicate that an employees act must have had something to do with the carrying on of 
his or her employment in order to conclude that the act fell within the scope of that employment; if 
not, the employee will be deemed to be on a ‗frolic of his or her own‘. The employer will not be 
vicariously liable if the act of the employee is not performed to accomplish an object for which the 
employee was employed, but in the furtherance of a personal act, motivated solely by personal 
reasons.
488
 A possible distinction between the cases referred to above may be that, on the one hand, 
if there is a deviation by the employee which does not amount to a complete abandonment of the 
employer‘s business, the employer will be held liable; but, on the other hand, if the deviation by 
the employee is so great that it cannot be said that the employee is still performing his or her duties, 
the employee will not be deemed to be acting in the course of his or her employment so that the 




An employer may still be held vicariously liable for the conduct of employees even though an 
employee is not conducting the exact duties imposed on him by the employer. This is illustrated in 
the case of Estate Van der Byl v Swanepoel 1927 AD 141 at 146  where Wessels JA held that there 
are situations where the employee acted outside the scope of employment but where those actions 
are reasonably considered to complete his duties. The court held that an employer will definitely 
be liable for the negligence of the employee where the employee followed his employer‘s 
instructions exactly and a stricter approach is to hold the employer liable for the employee‘s 
negligence in cases where the employee contravenes the exact instructions of the employer and 
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commits actions which are not necessary to complete his duties but still commits these actions 
whilst engaged in the affairs of the employer. In such cases the court held public policy will dictate 




The circumstances in which an employer must guard against being vicariously liable are 










‗‗Good name in man and woman, my dear lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls; 
Who steals my purse steals trash; ‗tis something, nothing; 
‗Twas mine, ‗tis his, and has been slave to thousands; 
But he that filches of me my good name 
Robs me that which not enriches him 
And makes me poor indeed.‘‘  
 
Defamation is the ‗unlawful, intentional, publication of defamatory matter (by word or conduct) 




In order to determine whether the contents of an e- mail is defamatory, it must first be ascertained 
whether a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence may reasonably understand the e- mail to 
contain a defamatory meaning as regards the plaintiff.
493
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network access and internet access‘‘. (1999) 12 CLL 46.  
493
 JM Burchell The Law of Defamation in South Africa (1985) 35.  The meaning of the words published , allegedly 
defamatory material is determined by establishing whether: 
― a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence might reasonably understand the words to convey a meaning defamatory 
to the plaintiff … The test is an objective one … the reasonable person of ordinary intelligence is taken to understand 
the words alleged to be defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning… the Court must take account not only of 
what the words expressly say , but also of what they imply‖ (see Corbett CJ in Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 
v Esselen‘s Estate 1994 (2) SA 1 (A), at 20 E-G  later followed in Delta Motor Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Van der Merwe 
2004 (6) SA 185 (SCA), at 370C ; Dendy v University of Witwatersrand  2005 (2) All SA 490 (WLD) , at 514 F 
earlier on in Channing v South African Financial Gazette Ltd 1966 (3) SA 470 (W) 474 A-C ), where  Colman J 




Publication can be defined as an ‗‗act of making known a defamatory statement or 
the act of conveying an imputation by conduct, to a person or persons other 
than the person who is the subject of the defamatory imputation‖.
494
 The requirement of 
publication is met when a defamatory statement that impairs the reputation of a third party is 





An employer can be liable for defamatory e- mail sent by an employee in the course of his or her 
employment, provided that the requirement of ‗publication‘ was met. The question that 
subsequently arises is, what exactly constitutes publication on the Internet. 
 
In National Media v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1195 (SCA);  it was stated that ‗‗publication is the act of 
making known a defamatory statement or the act of conveying an imputation by conduct, to a 





 It can be inferred from this statement that the following acts will amount to publication: postings 
to a newsgroup, sending an email, making a website available on the internet, internet relay chat 





In terms of the South African law of delict, no publication has taken place if the person to whom 
the statement was made did not understand the meaning thereof. Consequently, if a defamatory 
statement is encrypted, it will be published only once it has been decrypted.
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Publication will take place on the internet where the defamatory statement is read, seen or heard 
and when the receiver understands its contents. Therefore, it is not sufficient for a subject merely 





In the case of CWU v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd 2003 8 BLLR 741 (LC) it is evident 
that liability for defamation can result in vicarious liability for a company. This case concerned a 
derogatory e- mail sent by one of the employees of MTN. The e- mail contained allegations that 
MTN‘s management was corrupt and that they show favouritism to a certain temporary 
employment agency. 
 
MTN charged the employee with: (i) intentional circulation of an email insinuating that MTN 
management was corrupt; (ii) intentionally and disrespectfully engaging in abusive and insulting 
language in that he insinuated that management were ‗‗fat cats‘‘; (iii) making unfounded 
allegations against management by insinuating in the email that management was benefiting from 
recruitment processes; (iv) bringing the company‘s image into disrepute in 
that he circulated the email to MTN employees; and (v) intentionally conducting himself in an 





The court found that the employee had failed to comply with the procedure established by MTN 
for reporting allegations of fraud, and that he was seeking a wider audience in the form of MTN 
management and employees.
501
 His email therefore increased the damage to the reputation of 
MTN and his actions therefore justified a defamation suit against him. The court held that in 
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A court can find that in providing an employee with ‗‗tools‘‘ to access the internet and email 





Employers that decide not to regulate publication of material on the internet by their employees  
could be potentially exposing themselves to a possible claim for negligence on grounds that they 




From the above therefore it is accurate to conclude that if a defamatory statement is posted on a 
Usenet newsgroup or where the email is sent to a person other than the person who is defamed in 




Where an e- mail or e- mails are used as the medium for defamatory remarks in the workplace it is 
important to remember that the defamation will probably occur at the place where the offending 
material is accessed. This might impact on a defamatory e-mail received from a foreign 
jurisdiction, as a South African court will only have jurisdiction in South Africa if the words were 




This could pose even further problems for employers as practically every country in the world has 
access to a specific company‘s web site, which in turn means that the company is exposing itself to 
the possibility of being sued in every country where that specific e- mail has been accessed as a 
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3. Sexual Harassment and Discrimination 
 
 Sexual harassment can occur through electronic means.
508
 The sexual harassment may take the 
form of coarse jokes sent via e-mail, pornographic screen-savers and crude graphics. Racial and 





Sexual harassment has become a major problem in the workplace. Parliament and our courts have 
sought to protect employees who are victims of sexual harassment by imposing certain obligations 




Employers are under a legal duty to prevent discriminatory acts being perpetrated against their 
employees. This was illustrated in the case of Media 24 v Grobler 2005 JDR 738 (SCA) at 741, 
where Farlem JA held that an employer has a legal duty that is dictated by public policy to prevent 
harm such as sexual harassment to its employees.  
 
In terms of section 5 of The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) an employer is under an 
obligation to combat unfair discrimination in the workplace: 
 
―Every employer must take steps to promote equal opportunity in the workplace by eliminating 
unfair discrimination in any employment policy or practice‖. 
Harassment can generally be defined as ‗‗any humiliating or degrading treatment 




Harassment is a form of unfair discrimination and is prohibited in the workplace.
512
  The reference 






 Etsebeth op cit note 40, 758 
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to harassment includes sexual harassment. Harassment in any form is treated in the EEA as a form 
of unfair discrimination. The most prevalent form of harassment in the workplace is sexual 
harassment.
513
 An employer who fails to prevent or put an end a case or cases of sexual harassment 





Sexual and racial harassment are two forms of harassment that occur most frequently in the 
workplace. In terms of section 203 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, sexual harassment 
amounts to ‗‗unwanted conduct of a sexual nature‘‘.  
 
A Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual Harassment Cases
515
 was issued with the 
purpose to combat sexual harassment in the workplace. The Code of Good Practice on the 
Handling of Sexual Harassment Cases states that sexual attention will become harassment if it is 
‗‗(a) persistent, although a single incident of harassment can constitute sexual harassment; and/or 
(b) the recipient has made it clear that the behaviour is considered offensive; and/or (c) the 




The Code defines sexual harassment as including various types of conduct, such as, physical, 
verbal, and non-verbal conduct.
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In the case of Ntsabo v Real Security CC [2004] 1 BLLR 58 (LC); Ms Ntsabo was employed as a 
guard with Real Security CC.  Ms Ntsabo, a single mother, found herself stationed at Khayelitsha 
Day Hospital. She reported to a supervisor who turned out to be worse than a mere groper. On one 
occasion the supervisor all but raped her, then threatened to shoot her if she told anybody about the 
incident. The matter was ‗sorted out‘ by transferring Ms Ntsabo to another site, where she was 
required to work at night. When she complained, Ms Ntsabo was told that if she did not like night 
work she could resign. She did so. After resigning, she approached the Labour Court for relief, 
claiming compensation for an automatically unfair dismissal and damages for future medical costs 
and humiliation, impairment of dignity, pain, suffering, emotional trauma and the loss of the 




The court had to consider whether the employer Real Security was liable for making the continued 
employment of Ms Ntsabo intolerable, even though the cause of the intolerable situation was due 
to the conduct of an employee of Real Security (the supervisor), who, while he may have harassed 
the employee during working hours, could hardly be said to have been acting in the course and 




The court held that an employer can only be held liable for the conduct of one of the employees if 
the employer created an intolerable situation by failing to prevent one of its employees from 
creating and perpetuating an intolerable situation for another an further that an employer can only 
be held to have failed to prevent an employee from creating and maintaining an intolerable 




Pillay AJ held that Ms Ntsabo had done all that could reasonably be expected of her ―to attempt to 
hold onto her employment and avoid being sexually harassed‖. The employer had ―brushed aside 
her complaint‖. This inaction was unfair and had created an intolerable working environment for 
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The EEA now gives the Labour Court power to grant compensation and/or damages to employees 




The court found that Ntsabo had been constructively dismissed and awarded her 
R12 000 as compensation. On the sexual harassment issue, the court found that the senior 
employee of the corporation had contravened section 6(3) of the EEA and that the corporation was 
liable for the conduct of such employee in contravening the Act.
523
 
The Labour Court exercised its power in terms of section 50 to award compensation and damages 
in respect of unfair discrimination. It awarded Ntsabo R20 000 for future medical costs, and R50 




If the traditional test
525
 of vicarious liability is applied to sexual harassment cases, the employee 
would have to prove that, when the harassment took place, the perpetrator was acting within the 
course and scope of employment. It was thought that an aggrieved employee would be unlikely to 
prove this, as there is no employee who can be said to be acting within the course and scope of 
employment when he or she sexually harasses co-employees.
526
 Instead in this instance, the 
harassment will be regarded as a ‗frolic‘ of the employee, which has traditionally been a defence to 
a claim based on vicarious liability.
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The High Court had to consider the common law doctrine of vicarious liability in sexual 
harassment cases in Grobler v Naspers 2004 (4) SA 220 (C). 
 
In Grobler v Naspers
528
 a trainee manager (Samuels) sexually harassed his secretary (Sonja) who 
suffered severe trauma. She claimed damages from Naspers on the ground that they were on 
common law principles vicariously liable for the manager‘s conduct. The victim did not claim 
from the employer in terms of section 60 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, since this Act 
requires that the perpetrator and victim should be employed by the same employer. She was 
employed by Naspers Tydskrifte, while the perpetrator was employed by Naspers Ltd. 
 
The court referred to ABSA Bank Ltd v Born Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 
372(SCA) at 378, where the following was stated:  
―The standard test for vicarious liability of a master for the delict of a servant is whether 
the delict was committed by the employee while acting in the course and scope of his 
employment. The enquiry is frequently said to be whether at the relevant time, the 
employee was about the affairs, or business, or doing the work of the employer. . . . A 
master is not responsible for the private and personal acts of his servant, unconnected with 
the latter‘s employment, even if done during the time of his employment, and with the 
permission of the employer‖.  
 
The court had to consider whether the actions of Samuels took place within the scope of his 
employment. The court referred to Costa da Ouro Restaurant (Pty) Ltd t/a Umdloti Bush Tavern v 
Reddy 2003 4 SA 34 (SCA). In this case the Supreme Court of Appeal had to decide whether a 
barman acted inside or outside his scope of employment when he assaulted a patron outside the 
bar. The reason for the assault was that the patron (Reddy) made remarks about the barman 
(Goldie)‘s efficiency. Reddy afterwards tipped another barman excessively in front of Goldie. 
Goldie was provoked and followed Reddy when he left the restaurant. He attacked Reddy outside 
the restaurant. Reddy claimed damages from the restaurant on the ground of vicarious liability. 
The court a quo also applied the degree of deviation test and held that Goldie‘s act was committed 
within the scope of employment for the following reasons: 
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―It was not a grudge which Goldie harboured against the plaintiff independently of his work 
situation. It was a grudge which arose directly out of his work situation. The digression or 
deviation, if any from what Goldie was employed to do, and what he in fact did was so close in 
terms of space and time that it can reasonably be held that he was still acting within the courseand 




This is an example of the degree of digression used as test in order to establish the vicarious 
liability of the employer. The court a quo was in fact prepared to hold the employer liable for the 
intentional wrongdoing of the employee. This decision was, however, overturned on appeal. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that the restaurant was not vicariously liable because the assault 
occurred after the barman had abandoned his duties. The court stated the following: 
―It was a personal act of aggression done neither in furtherance of his  employer‘s interests, nor 
under his express or implied authority, not as an incident to or in consequence of anything Goldie 
was employed to do. The reasons for and the circumstances leading up to the assault may have 
arisen from the fact that Goldie was employed by the restaurant as a barman, but personal 




 Should the court apply the rule as interpreted in that case, the acts of Samuels would also fall 
outside the scope of employment. The reason this is that the acts of Samuels could be similar to the 
acts of Goldie the barman, that is, classified as acts of personal aggression and passion, not done in 
furtherance of his employer‘s business and not authorised by the employer. 
South African cases on vicarious liability do not provide guidelines. Since sexual harassment 
would always be against the employer‘s instructions, it could not be described as being done in 
furtherance of the employer‘s business and therefore will not fall within the scope of the 
employee‘s appointment.
531
 The court in Naspers
532
  therefore considered foreign cases in this 
regard: 
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The leading American case is Faragher v City of Boca Raton 524 US 775 (1998), where the court 
held that an employer may be held vicariously liable ―for conduct that may be fairly regarded as 




In a Canadian case of Boothman v Canada [1993] 3 FC 381 (TD), the court held that an employer 
will be liable in sexual harassment cases because an ―employer must ensure that every person 
employed in a position of trust is capable of curbing his or her sexual urges‖. 
 
The court in Boothman v Canada, stressed the importance of ―finding a sufficient connection 





In the case of Proceedings Commissioner v Ali Hatem 1999 1 NZLR 30, the court held that 
although  sexual harassment cannot be regarded as part of the ordinary course of the firm‘s 
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The court in Naspers
536
 stated that even if the supervisor test could not be used, the courts in 
Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom would have held Naspers liable on the ground that 
the work relationship created a risk of harassment or enhanced such a risk and that the harassment 
took place in that employment relationship. 
 
The court applied factors suggested in Bazley v Curry (1999)174 DLR (4th), to establish whether 




The court investigated the employment relationship between the trainee manager and secretary 
and found that the intense and personal relationship created an inherent risk of sexual harassment 
and that the acts of Samuels were sufficiently connected to and fell within the risk that was created. 
The court held that because there is a sufficiently close connection between the enterprise risk and 
the wrongful acts, policy purposes (adequate compensation of the victim and deterrence) will be 
served if Naspers is held vicariously liable for the sexual harassment of the secretary by her 
manager. 
 
Nel J stated that section 173 of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 allows the court to develop 
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 Bazley v Curry (1999)174 DLR (4th (1999)174 DLR (4th)  at para 41 –[ McLachlin J concluded that in determining 
whether an employer is vicariously liable for an employee‘s unauthorised intentional wrongdoing in cases where 
precedent is inconclusive, courts should apply the following principles: 
(1) ``They should openly confront the question of whether liability should lie against the employer, rather than 
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employer be made to pay the generally foreseeable costs of that business. In contrast, to impose liability for costs 
unrelated to the risk would effectively make the employer an involuntary insurer. 
(3) In determining the sufficiency of the connection between the employer's creation or enhancement of the risk and 
the wrong complained of subsidiary factors may be considered: 
(a) the opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to abuse his or her power; 
(b) the extent to which the wrongful act may have furthered the employer's aims; 
(c) the extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction, confrontation or intimacy inherent in the employer‘s 
enterprise; 
(d) the extent of power conferred on the employee in relation to the victim; 









In light of the above Nel J held that the employer was vicariously liable for the actions of its 
employees even though the said delict, in this case sexual harassment of a fellow employee, might 









 demonstrate two different approaches that have been 
adopted by the courts in seeking to grant relief to victims of sexual harassment. Ntsabo is based on 
the provisions of the EEA, which incorporates the doctrine of employer liability.
542
 The employer 
has a defence if it can show that it took reasonable steps to guard against actual harassment taking 





As things stand, however, Naspers
544
 is a landmark judgment not only for cases of sexual 
harassment in the workplace, but also for the law of vicarious liability in general. It reveals that the 
courts will not hesitate to break the shackles of the common law where that law is perceived as no 
longer satisfying the requirements of modern society and the values enshrined in the Constitution. 
The judgment therefore sounds a clear warning to employers: If employees harass their colleagues 
to the extent that they suffer physical or psychological harm, employers will have to cough up.
545
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 Grogan op cit note 85, see also  Grobler v Naspers supra note 71 at  (277D - F and 278H - I) - where Nel J stated 
that : 
-the test for vicarious  liability is not a strict and unchangeable rule 
-the application of the rule must be determined with reference to public policy. 
-the most important rule of public policy is that a fair right of recourse will  be awarded which can double as a deterrent  




In the interests of public policy, courts tend to rule in favour of the existence of vicarious 
liability.
546
 In order to grant some form of relief to the victim, the courts sometimes make a ruling 





Since misconduct in the workplace such as sexual harassment is not unforeceable, an employer 
cannot escape liability merely because the actions of the employee was the frolic of his own. 





The case of Cronje v Toyota Manufacturing 2001 3 BALR 213 (CCMA) dealt with discrimination 
through racially offensive material. 
 
The commissioner remarked that the email sent by the applicant was ―crude, offensive and had a 
racist stereotype developed over centuries by white people that associates black people with 
primates; beings of lesser intelligence and low morality‘‘. The commissioner decided that Cronje‘s 




The reason for the increase in the popularity of emails as the chosen form of harassment and 
discrimination can be explained as follows: 
‗‗. . .because it appears to be anonymous and transitory, and is thought of as being akin to 
the spoken rather than the written word, the tone utilised in e-mail is generally more 
informal and discursive than in formal written correspondence. Written words lack vocal 
and visual intimations, and offence may easily be caused where none was actually intended 
as the informal culture surrounding e-mails often result in accuracy, implications and 
consequences of the content of the message being overlooked. This increases the risk that 
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messages may be sent in anger or jest without consideration of the consequences of 
releasing the message into an uncontrolled external environment, thereby also increasing 
the danger of occurrence of harassment . . . In addition the scope of causing offence is 
increased as a single email may reach a wider and more diverse audience than originally 





Harassment can also occur through racially offensive material as illustrated in the case of Bamford 
v Energizer (SA) Limited 2000 12 BALR 1251 (P) and the case of Morse v Future Reality Ltd (ET 
case number 54571/95). 
 
The arbitrator in the Bamford
551
 case held that: 
‗‗[t]o suggest that they thought that it was permissible to use company resources to 
entertain themselves with images which would have been regarded generally speaking as 
socially unacceptable is not credible. Their claim that they thought there was nothing 
offensive with it, is of course, in part, undermined by Oosthuizen‘s evidence that she was 
indeed offended by the bouquet of penises sent to her, and untenable on the basis that the 
material is so obvious contrary to what would circulate amongst self-respecting people. . . . 
those jokes which have a racial connotation, are typical of what one would strive to avoid 
in contemporary South African society. Although it is probable that such humour is 
enjoyed in private, it can hardly be said that in the work place an employer would and 




In the case of Morse v Future Reality Ltd (ET case number 54571/95); an English tribunal found 
the employers vicariously liable as they had failed to take the necessary steps to prevent sexual 
discrimination in the workplace. Morse had been forced to share an office with men who spent 
large amounts of the working day viewing pornographic material, even though circulation and 
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discussion was not directed at her, the tribunal found that  the employer had created an 
uncomfortable working environment by allowing the employees to download sexually explicit 
material. 
 
In light of the above it is clear that an employer can be held vicariously liable for the 
discriminatory conduct of its employees. 
 
4. Viewing of Pornography  
 
The introduction of the internet to South Africa in 1993 ensured the country‘s irrevocable entry 
into the information age. A flood of information, some good and others not so good, were suddenly 
easily accessible.
553
 The introduction of the internet coincided with a period of major political 
transformation in South Africa. With the adoption of the Interim Constitution of South Africa Act 
200 of 1993 and its successor, the Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 saw the 
introduction of the Bill of Rights, including the rights to privacy and freedom of expression.
554
 
Although these rights are not absolute, they need to be jealously guarded. These rights become 
relevant especially when closer attention is paid to the nature of information, such as pornography 




Pornography is easily accessible on the Internet. Certain forms of on- line pornography (also 
referred to as cyber porn) constitute cyber crime and may be prosecuted in terms of the Films and 
Publications Act 65 of 1996 (hereafter referred to as the ACT).  The Act is the principal statute 
governing online pornography in South Africa.
556
  
Section 2 of the Act outlines the objects of the Act as follows:
557
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(a) to regulate the creation, production, possession and distribution of certain publications and 
certain films by means of classification, the imposition of age restrictions and the giving of 
consumer advice, due regard being had in particular to the protection of children against 
sexual exploitation or degradation in publications, films and on the Internet;  and 
(b) to make the exploitative use of children in pornographic publications, films or on the 
Internet punishable. 
 
Section 1 of the Act defines publication as inter alia (i) computer software which is not a film; and 
(ii) any message or communication, including a visual presentation, placed on any distributed 
network including but not confined to the Internet. Most forms of pornography on the Internet will 
be classified as ‗publications‘, with the exception of a pornographic video clip, which could rather 
be classified as a ‗film‘ due to the fact that the definition of film includes ―images (that) will be 




Section 27 of the Act deals specifically deals with child pornography
559
 and in this regard the 
following three categories of offences were created:
560
 
(a) Offences dealing with the actual perpetrator; 
(b) failure to report knowledge of the commission of an offence referred to in paragraph (a); and 
(c) failure to prevent access to certain materials. 
 
Section 27 (1) makes it an offence for any person to be in possession of, create, distribute, import 
or knowingly export or takes steps to export a film or publication which contains child 
pornography or which advocates, advertises or promotes child pornography or the sexual 
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 Act 65 of 1996 - Section 1 defines child pornography : ― It includes any image, however created , or in any 
description of a person , real, or simulated , who is, or who is depicted or described as being , under the age of 18 years: 
(i) engaged in sexual conduct; (ii) participating in, or assisting another person to participate in , sexual conduct ; or (iii) 
showing or describing the body , or parts of the body , of such person in a manner or in  circumstances which, within 













In terms of s 30 (1A) contravention of s 27 (1) is punishable with a fine or imprisonment for a 




Section 27 (2) (b) places a duty upon any person who has knowledge of an offence under section 
27 (1) or has reason to suspect that such an offence has been or being committed to report that 
offence or suspicion of that offence to the South African Police Service. Section 30 (1) provides 
for a sentence of a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years or both in respect of 




Internet Service Providers (ISP‘s) have a vital role to play with regards to the accessibility of the 
Internet. Thus such formal regulation of the industry is to be expected. Ignorance will no longer be 
a defence to the ISP whose services are used for the hosting or distribution of child pornography.
 
564
 Section 27 A is specifically aimed at the duties and responsibilities of ISPs in relation to child 
pornography and was placed in the statue book by the second Films and Amendment Act 18 of 
2004. Every ISP is required to take all reasonable steps to prevent the use of its services for the 
hosting or distribution of child pornography.
565
   
The steps to be taken are not outlined, but the provision that ―all reasonable steps‖ must be taken 




Section 30B (1) contains two presumptions to assist the State in the prosecution of child 
pornography offences in particular. The first presumption entails that, if in any prosecution in 
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terms of the Act it is proved that any message or communication, including a visual presentation, 
was placed on a distributed network, including the Internet, by means of the access provided or 
granted to a registered subscriber or user, it shall be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary which raises reasonable doubt, that it was so placed by the registered subscriber or user.
567
 
Section 30B (l) (b) further provides that if in any prosecution in terms of the Act access was gained 
or attempted to be gained to child pornography on a distributed network, including the Internet, by 
means of access provided or granted to a registered subscriber or user, it shall be presumed, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary which raises reasonable doubt, that such access was gained or 
attempted to be gained by the registered subscriber or user.
568
 
In light of the above, it is clear that employers must ensure that their employees are not engaged in 
the creation, production, distribution and possession of pornographic material. In instances where 
the employees are engaged in this conduct, ISP‘s will be brought to account, with the result that the 
ISP‘s will report the company as the wrongdoer as the company is responsible for the material on 
company computers and e- mail systems( s 27 A).
569
 It is submitted that the implications of s 30 B 
(1) and S 30 B (1) (b)    is that the brand of the company that is ultimately tarnished even if the 





Further reasons why employers need to monitor their employees. 
 
5. Intellectual Property 
 
Electronic content is subject to copyright. In terms of South African copyright law, copyright is the 
right given to the owner of certain types of works not to have his/her work copied without 
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 A   work is copyrighted when it has been created by the author‘s original skill and 




Copyright is protected in South Africa in terms of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (hereafter referred 
to as the ‗Act‘). Copyright gives the owner the right to prevent the unauthorised reproduction of 
his/her work as well as protection against the commercial exploitation thereof.
573
 In terms of the 
Act, two forms of copyright infringement can take place, namely direct and indirect 
infringement.
574
 Direct infringement consists of an act ‗‗done or caused to be done, in the 
Republic, without the licence of the copyright owner, which the copyright owner has the exclusive 
right to do or to authorise‘‘. Indirect infringement will take place where there is the ‗‗importation, 
sale or distribution of unauthorised copies, provided the defendant had knowledge that the making 
of the article concerned constituted an infringement of that copyright or would have constituted 
such an infringement if the article had been made in the Republic‘‘.
575
 In order to be successful, 





In South Africa, one does not have to register copyright (as is the case with other forms of 
intellectual property, such as patents or trademarks). A copyright situation will arise automatically 
as soon as something tangible is produced as a result of the author‘s original skill and effort.
577
 
Once an expression is entered into a computer in a form that can be read on a screen, it is 
considered fixed in a material medium even if it is never printed out or saved to a disk. Therefore 
employees surfing web sites are not entitled to freely copy and distribute content obtained from 
those web sites owned by companies without obtaining prior permission. This extends to copying 
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images and text found on the web site.
578
 
   
The World Wide Web now makes it possible to download magazine articles, reports, song titles, 
videos and photographs, all of which are protected by copyright. A computer software program 
placed on the Internet can also be downloaded at sites around the world and re-posted.
579
 All this is 
possible without it never leaving the computer of its designer. It is also possible to download 
copyrighted graphic and textual material posted to a web site where it can be changed, merged 





This has obviously created numerous problems for publishers and a potential nightmare for the 
creators of articles, songs, software and films, as the owners will want to protect their materials. 
While there are steps and measures being put in place by operators and or creators to protect the 
content of their web sites against indiscriminate copying, there is a large amount of online content 
that is not technically protected against copying.
581
 This being the case, there is a serious potential 









6. Personal use 
It is an implicit term of an agreement between employer and employee that: ―An honest day‘s 




















work will result in an honest day‘s pay‖.
583
 This agreement between employer and employee has 
been established over centuries. The overwhelmingly popular reason advanced by employers for 




The challenge that many companies face is that with the introduction of technological innovations 
in the workplace there has emerged the increased risk of wasted time and resources by employees. 
 
The first of these technological innovations was the introduction of the telephone.
585
 The 
telephone does provide the employer with the benefit of having employees to do more work in a 
shorter period of time. This new technological tool added something not typically found in formal 
office communication, that is, the emergence of idle office conversation, commonly referred to as 
chitchat. Employers do have a vested interest in promoting good communication and strong 
relationships between employees. Thus, employers are willing to compromise and are of the view 
that as long as the number or length of personal calls is not excessive, attempts to ban them will 




Due to the Internet being an increasingly important part of the workplace, game playing is no 
longer the chief time wasting tool by employees. Employees who have Internet access are 
presented with the equivalent of a television set that has a million or more channels.
587
 As a result 
employees are finding it difficult to resist the temptation to engage in on- line shopping, monitor 




 E-mail software is now able to convert voice recordings and even full motion video into one 
e-mail message.
589
 If employees use the multimedia e-mail capabilities excessively this will 
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consume significant portions of the company‘s bandwidth, leading to network performance 
problems and increased operation costs.
590
 A great concern for employers is that the time spent by 
employees on the internet and reading e- mails will inevitably be time wasted. The effect of this is 




7. Electronic Fraud 
 
In an electronic environment, it is possible to impersonate another person‘s identity. 
592
 
   
In almost all cases the true identity of the sender will not be determined. The reliance on e-mail 
headers which would normally reveal the name and e-mail address of the sender will not be a true 
indicator as from whom the e- mail originates.
593
 These headers may have been changed by the 
sender and it would be incorrect to assume in such circumstances that the sender must be the 
source of the e-mail simply because he/she appears to be working from these otherwise 




8. Computer Viruses 
A computer virus may be defined as an unauthorised software program or portion of a program 
that is introduced into a computer or network.
595
 The purpose of a virus whether formed 
intentionally or not is to damage data files, delete data or perform other harmful actions. In most 
instances where a virus has been detected the only method of dealing with that particular virus 
would be to reformat the infected removable storage device or hard drive.  When a removable 
storage device or hard drive is reformatted all the data on that removable storage device or hard 












 Ibid 206 
 
594
 Ibid 206-207 
 
595





drive is lost forever.
596
 This would obviously result in major losses for an employer should crucial 
and irreplaceable company information be lost in the process.  
  Computer viruses are becoming increasingly common and the number of viruses being detected 
has increased. The downloading or copying of unauthorised software onto employees‘ computers 
is one of the most common and simple ways for these viruses to invade a computer or network.
597
  
Networks may also contract viruses. The Melissa virus, for example, has been estimated to have 






On a daily basis companies make use of the World Wide Web to manage and distribute proprietary 
and confidential information. A company‘s e-mail messages to other businesses can contain 
information on business plans, and can carry as attachments detailed spreadsheets, drawings, 
charts and supporting documentation. Besides e-mail, the company may place equipment design 




Employers also have an vested interest in preventing the premature and unauthorised disclosure of 
information by employees which is likely to have a detrimental effect on the financial results, the 
financial position or cash flow of a public company listed on the Stock Exchange, or any 
information pertaining to new developments in its area of activity which has not been disclosed 
publicly or intended for public knowledge. The unauthorised disclosure of such information may 




As a result and as discussed above companies are exposed to an increased risk of exposure of 
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 an e-mail to a distribution list that includes a non-employee (or even co-employees who do 
not have a need to know, in the case of some particularly sensitive information)  
 posting information to a bulletin board or newsgroup that contains non-employee members  
 placing information on a company-controlled intranet that has been configured and allows 
access by non-employees  
 the temporary collapse of an intranet firewall, permitting temporary access by outsiders 
(whether or not such access actually occurs)  
 posting information to a password-controlled, externally accessible web page (where the 
password is compromised) 
 loss of the computer on which the information has been stored (e.g. loss through theft of a 
notebook computer)  
 sale of a used computer (and disk), from which confidential information has not been 
thoroughly removed  
 loss, theft, or improper destruction of computer media (for example a CD ROM) 
containing the confidential information. 
 
 
10. Excessive use 
 
The time spent by employees on the Internet may give rise to a tendency not to do assigned work. 
Overuse may also overload the workplace network. This will cause delays and unwanted 
congestion in the distribution and dispatch of incoming and outgoing business information. All 




In light of the above, employers believe they have adequate reasons to monitor the activities of 
their employees during working hours. 
 









 Employers arguments in favour of monitoring – An Examination of case law 
 
There are legitimate reasons why employers wish to monitor the activities of their employees 
during working hours. For instance,  employees waste time by  sending and forwarding  e- mail 
messages that are not concerned with aspects of work, there is the  possibility of confidential 
information being communicated to someone outside the employer‘s organisation, the possibility 
of sexual harassment or racial discrimination arsing from an employee‘s downloading and 
displaying images or material that is offensive to others.
603
 Frivolous communications can also 
cost money and pollute and congest computer space. The uncontrolled usage of the Internet has the 
possibility of exposing computer systems to the ever present menace of computer viruses, and 
unsavory messages sent by employees through official company channels may damage the 
employer‘s brand or domain name.
604
 Employer‘s also have the legitimate concern of the 
overloading of network servers and the infiltration of computer viruses that may damage and 




The extent to which companies in South Africa are experiencing internet abuse practices has been 
surveyed and the results are presented below. The prevalence and content of internet acceptable 
usage policies has also been surveyed. 
 
The survey described below was conducted through questionnaires. The survey was conducted 
with 644 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The response rate was 25, 4 
percent, which was high and possibly an indication of the relevance and importance of the topic to 
South African business at present.
606
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The responses to different types of internet abuse in the workplace are listed below: 
 
 Yes  No  No 
respons
e 
Loafing on the internet 
 
68,63%  30,07%  1,3%  
Accessing, downloading or sending through e-mail 
discriminatory or sexually offensive jokes or pictures  
69,93%  29,41%  0,66%  
Clogged bandwidth or degraded system performance through 
abuse of the internet system  
64,71%  34,64%  0,65%  
Violating copyright laws or posting information in the name 
of your company that defames other companies or individuals  
15,69%  81,7%  2,61%  
 
 
Sufficient cases have surfaced in the law reports to indicate that abuse of electronic 
communications facilities has become something of a problem for employers.  
 
The case of Bamford & Others / Energizer (SA) Limited [2001] 12 BALR 1251 (P) dealt with the 
illicit use of the internet by employees. 
The respondent‘s South African manager discovered thousands of e-mails of a pornographic, 
racist and sexist nature, some of which parodied the brand names of other companies and had been 
stored by the grievants on the company computer system. The company contended that the use of 
company computers for this purpose affected the efficiency of its computer system and that the 
storing of such material in the international network potentially compromised its brand name. The 
grievants were charged with ―repeated receipt of and onward forwarding to other staff of obscene 
pornographic material and jokes‖ and ―with repeated violations of company policies and 
procedures regarding the use of the electronic mail system and work environment policies‖. After 
a disciplinary hearing presided over by the company‘s attorney, the grievants were summarily 
dismissed. The grievants then referred a dispute to the CCMA. The grievants did not dispute 
sending or receiving the material. They claimed, however, that: there was no clear rule against the 








The arbitrator noted that the company had issued several directives concerning the use of the 
e-mail facility, including one issued in response to the discovery of a chain letter forwarded by one 
of the grievants. While none of these dealt expressly with pornographic or racist material, they left 
no room for doubt that the circulation of such material was forbidden. Employees had also been 
warned against the down-loading of foreign material into the company system, and had been told 
that office computers were for business use only.
608
  
 The company exercised a ‗margin of tolerance‘ in regard to the use of computers for conveying 
messages of a ‗social‘ nature.
609
 All the grievants, save one, had admitted knowledge of the policy 
documents on which the company relied, but they claimed that they had not been under the 
impression that there was an absolute prohibition on the use of their office computers for the 
receipt and transmission of private material. The grievants also claimed that they did not regard the 




The arbitrator rejected the grievants‘ claims that they were unaware that it was impermissible to 
traffic in socially unacceptable material. The arbitrator held that the grievants should have realised 
this even if the company had no rules at all. Apart from the fact that the material was offensive, it 
damaged the business of the company by clogging the computer system and carried the risk of the 
company‘s domain name becoming associated with the messages in its system. The abuse of trade 
names constituted a trademark violation, and demonstrated how frivolous use of office computers 
by untrustworthy employees exposed businesses to risk. Furthermore, there was a distinct 




The arbitrator rejected the grievants‘ claim that the company had invaded their privacy because the 
messages concerned were personal or private, as they claimed. The messages had all been 
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generated by anonymous third parties for the consumption of any member of the general public 
who wished to read or view them. Moreover, all the information used against the grievants had 
been retrieved from the company‘s own e-mail system. Individuals have no right to deposit private 
material in an employer‘s storage facility and then prevent the employer from examining it to 
determine whether there is any point to it being preserved.
612
  





Another case which involved the use or rather abuse of the internet by employees while at work is 
the case of Smuts v Backup Storage Facilities [2003] 2 BALR 219 (CCMA). 
The applicant in this case was a branch manager. He was dismissed for viewing pornographic 
material on the company computer during working hours. He faced other charges of failing to 
account for company money that was allocated to him for business purposes and a further charge 
of using the company vehicle for his private use. The applicant argued that all the charges was a 




The commissioner found that all charges were proved, including with regard to the viewing of 
pornographic material on the company computer during working hours. The commissioner found 
that the applicant had spent significant time during working hours on the internet. Furthermore, the 
commissioner held, that, Mr Smuts (the applicant) should not have been engaging in this type of 
activity in the workplace. Mr Smuts as the most senior person in the office, who was thus required 
to ensure discipline and the smooth running of operations should have known better. It was held by 
the commissioner that Mr Smuts had failed to set an example, abused the facility and had failed to 





                                                                                                                                                                                           
611
 supra note 5, at 1268 para  45.2, 45.6.45.7 B-D 
612
 supra note 5, at 1270 par 47,48 H-J & 1271 A-B 
 
613
 supra note 5, at 1272 par 55 G 
 
614
 Smuts v Backup Storage Facilities [2003] 2 BALR 219 (CCMA) at 220 A-F 
 
615




In the case of Kalam / Bevcap (Nampak) [2006] 6 BALR 565 (MEIBC); the applicant was 
dismissed after the respondent established that over a period of five months he had visited 
thousands of internet sites, mostly pornographic, and spent about a quarter of each working week 
on this activity. He was dismissed for contravening the respondent‘s (Nampak) Internet and 
Information Technology (IT) policy and abusing his position of trust. The applicant denied 




Mr Peter Brown (the HR Manager) testified that on 26 September he received an e-mail alerting 
him about the breach of the IT policy by the applicant. This e-mail report alerted him to the fact 
that the applicant was monitored for a period of five months and it is an established fact that he 
visited 14 802 sites and spent 285 hours per week on the Internet. This meant that 25 percent of the 





The applicant was well informed about the company‘s IT policy. All employees including the 
applicant are consistently alerted each time they log onto the Internet that all internet browsing are 
monitored and if non-conformance to the company‘s IT policy is detected, the details will be 




The commissioner held that the respondent must prove on a balance of probabilities that the 




The commissioner held that according to the evidence presented to him the applicant had violated 
the respondent‘s IT policy. The fact the respondent did not read it was not an acceptable excuse. 
The commissioner held that the fact that the respondent spent approximately 285 hours per week 
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The commissioner held that the applicant visited and downloaded pornographic pictures on many 
occasions. The commissioner held further that, the respondent did this even though he was alerted 
via pop up messages showed that his actions were orchestrated. The commissioner held that the 
applicant had failed to exercise common sense in realising that his conduct was inappropriate. The 
commissioner held further that this posed a serious concern about the applicant‘s lifestyle, 
particularly as a manager and or leader. Thus inevitably, this resulted in the trust relationship 




The commissioner held that the respondent had an obligation to take strict action against abuse of 




In the case of Latchmiah / Billiton Aluminium SA (Pty) Ltd t/a Bayside Aluminium 
[2006] 6 BALR 569 (MEIBC); the applicant, a senior employee, was dismissed for repeatedly 




The applicant was charged as follows: 
―Gross misconduct in that you allegedly committed the following transgression(s): 
Improper use of company resources by repeatedly using the company‘s time and/or computer 
system to access pornographic material.‖ 
In doing the above you also contravened the company‘s Internet Access Policy and/or the Business 





Page 5 of the Business Ethics Policy particularly paragraph 4 stated that: 
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―The company‘s electronic communications systems are company resources and all electronic 
communications are regarded as company records. Offensive material (for example, pornography 




The problem according to the respondent with accessing pornographic sites was that viruses are 
distributed on them. Viruses are also prevalent on gambling sites. These viruses load themselves 
onto the computer and gather information from a user‘s computer and which then can be 
distributed onto the Internet. There are also viruses, which can destroy one‘s computer. The 
respondent company has specific computers which are dedicated to monitoring computers for 
viruses. In addition virus protection software is updated on a weekly basis. 
The respondent prohibits the viewing of pornographic material as graphics take up space and 




The applicant signed acknowledging having received a copy of the company‘s business ethics 
policy. In addition to the business ethics policy employees are given a Guide to Business conduct; 
page 26 states that:– 
―The company‘s electronic communications systems are company resources and all electronic 
communications are regarded as company records. Material such as pornography is not permitted 
on BHP Billiton systems in any form.‖ 
The applicant received copies of all the company‘s policies. New employees are given a handbook 
titled Business Ethics at Bayside which states that:– 
―Offensive material such as pornography is not permitted in any form.‖ 
 Furthermore a warning appears on the computer warning users that they are being monitored. An 




The commissioner noted that by the applicant misusing his company computer in the manner he 
had done, the applicant had contravened several company policies and prescripts of which he was 
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well aware and having regard to the excessive nature of the viewing of pornographic sites by the 
applicant, on one occasion more than 3000 pages of the same, the commissioner held that 




Racial harassment through the inappropriate use of the company computer e- mail systems has 
also surfaced in the workplace. In the case of Cronje / Toyota Manufacturing [2001] 3 BALR 213 
(CCMA); the applicant, a Senior Manager and National President of the Staff Association of the 
Motor & Related Industries (SAMRI), was dismissed for circulating a cartoon he had received via 
company e-mail. The cartoon depicted the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe as a gorilla. The cartoon 
version of Mugabe was holding another smaller gorilla, and was captioned: ―Mugabe and his right 
hand man. We want the farms to grow more bananas‖. The applicant claimed that he was unaware 
at the time of the respondent‘s e-mail policy, and that he had received the cartoon as an attachment 
to a petition to President Mbeki, requesting him to intervene in the Zimbabwe crisis. The applicant 
said he had added his name to the petition, and had sent the message and its attachment on to a 
number of colleagues. Although he was aware of the racial stereotype that associated black people 
with monkeys, baboons and gorillas, he did not regard the cartoon as racist, and did not regard 
himself as a racist. The respondent contended that it was obliged to take strict action against racism 
and e-mail abuse in the workplace, and that it had done so on a number of occasions in the past.
629
   
 
The commissioner rejected the applicant‘s claim that he had only made one paper copy of the 
cartoon, and that somebody else had made another copy, and handed it to the shop stewards who 
had reported him to management. The applicant‘s assertion that he was ―framed‖ was 
disingenuous. There was no doubt that the cartoon was racist and inflammatory. It fell into crude, 
offensive and racist stereotyping developed over centuries that associated black people with 
primates, that is, beings of lesser intelligence and low morality. The cartoon had to be evaluated in 
the context in which it was published, i.e. a factory that employs 3 500 black workers in a newly 
independent South Africa, in the year 2000. The fact that stereotyping exists is a matter of deep 
moral, cultural and social sensitivity to blacks. Stereotyping cartoons offend people‘s cultural or 
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racial self-image. The commissioner held that the depiction of a black person as an ape is 
inherently wrong. The commissioner rejected the applicant‘s ‗belated‘ claim that he regarded the 
cartoon as a depiction of Mugabe as the leader of a ‗banana republic‘. The use of the word ‗we‘ in 
the caption indicated that not only Mugabe, but others like him, also wanted the farms to grow 





The evidence indicated that the respondent had a rule against the circulation of offensive e-mail 
material, and that the applicant was aware of it. There was no compelling evidence to indicate that 
the rule had been inconsistently applied. The courts had made it clear that an arbitrator may not, at 
whim substitute his or her views on what may be an appropriate sanction for that of the employer. 
Employers cannot be expected to tolerate racism in the workplace. There was accordingly fair 




The applicant in the case of Dauth / Brown and Weir‘s Cash and Carry [2002] 8 BALR 837 
(CCMA) was dismissed for distributing an offensive e-mail to more than 100 people, including the 
respondent‘s senior management. He admitted that he had done so, but claimed that dismissal was 
too harsh a sanction because he was acting under stress caused by his impending retrenchment and 
while under the influence of prescription drugs.
632
 The applicant also claimed that, as the 
respondent‘s business had since been transferred to another company, a continued employment 
relationship between himself and his new employer was neither untenable nor intolerable.
633
 
 The applicant had insisted that, apart from derogatory and racist remarks contained in the e-mail, 
the contents were true. Even though a colleague on whose computer the e-mail was written had 
been suspended, the applicant had not disclosed that he was author of the e-mail until he failed a 
voluntary polygraph test. The contents of the e-mail and the manner in which it had been 
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As to the applicant‘s attempt to downplay anti-Semitic remarks in the e-mail, the commissioner 
rejected the applicant‘s claim that no weight could be given to these remarks unless the person 
about whom they were made testified. This approach, and the applicant‘s plea for reinstatement, 
indicated that the applicant was either unaware of the shocking nature of the comments in the 




The dismissal of an employee is justified if his or her conduct was of such a gravity that it makes 




 In Philander / CSC Computer Sciences [2002] 3 BALR 304 (CCMA); the applicant was charged 
with a contravention of the respondent‘s electronic communications policy in that he had 
intentionally and knowingly accessed sexual and/or pornographic material of an offensive nature 
and forwarded it via CSC‘s electronic communication system to Old Mutual staff as well as other 
external clients on specified dates and times.
637
 He acknowledged knowing that the e-mail content 
was not allowed according to CSC policy and that he had seen and was aware of the policy 
document.
638
 When confronted with the charge, the applicant had initially admitted to sending 
e-mails in contravention of the respondent‘s policy. The applicant claimed later, however, that he 
had admitted only to transgressing the e-mail policy of his former employer.
639
  
 The applicant was dismissed for forwarding pornographic material on the respondent‘s e-mail 
system. 
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In an appeal, the commissioner held that the choice of an appropriate sanction did not only depend 
on its nature. The sanction depended also on the particular facts of the case, and on the reasons that 
may justify a more severe penalty.
640
 
 The applicant had neither shown repentance for his conduct, nor had he apparently appreciated the 
harm that could have resulted from his conduct. This attitude indicated that the employment 
relationship had been destroyed. The commissioner held that the attitude of the applicant towards 
his employer was the main reason why the maximum penalty of dismissal was justified:
 641
 
―I have great difficulty in finding a reason why an employer should tolerate such attitude 
from an employee and how an employee can expect the employer to tolerate a continuation 




In Jardine / Tongaat Hulett Sugar Ltd [2002] 4 BALR 426 (CCMA); the applicant, a middle 
manager, was dismissed for ‗incompatibility‘ after he lodged a grievance against a senior manager. 
The grievance was caused by an incident in which the senior manager reminded the applicant of 
the time he was required to start work. The applicant alleged that the senior manager had rebuked 
him in the presence of other members of management. The senior manager denied having done so. 
The respondent found that there was no substance to the applicant‘s complaint. A disciplinary 
hearing was convened, and the applicant was dismissed. The respondent contended that the 




At the CCMA hearing, the commissioner held that the respondent‘s case against the applicant is 
essentially this: the manner in which he framed his grievance against the General Manager was 
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dramatic evidence of a pattern of behaviour that had been manifested for years.
644
  The applicant‘s 
entries in the Process Manual and the way in which he used e-mail are two significant illustrations 
of this pattern. The review meetings are evidence of a consistent attempt by the Respondent to 
warn and counsel the applicant. The warning letter, plus other verbal warnings, signalled to the 
applicant that his behaviour was regarded as misconduct. The commissioner held that the pattern 




Due the fact that the e- mails resulted in the working relationship between the applicant and the 
respondent becoming intolerable the commissioner held that the dismissal of the applicant was 
unfair, but did not order reinstatement or re-employment.  The respondent was to pay 
compensation to the applicant in the sum of R121 920 (One hundred and twenty one thousand, 




In the case of Volkwyn / Truworths Ltd [2002] 4 BALR 455 (CCMA); the applicant, who worked 
as an assistant in the corporate management dining room of the respondent‘s headquarters, had a 
steamy relationship with the manager of the dining room, one DT ( not her real name), who was 
employed by a catering company. The relationship included the exchange of suggestive and 
indecent SMS (text) messages, clandestine meetings, suggestive remarks and physical contact 
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profile mud slinging – particularly when the employer‘s business depends on a positive public image – makes a 
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The applicant claimed that he had been sexually harassed by the manager, and denied any 
relationship with her. He also claimed that because the SMS messages had been sent outside 
working hours, the respondent lacked authority to discipline him for this conduct. The respondent 
claimed that the applicant had willingly consorted with DT, and that his behaviour, which was 
known to other employees ; with the exception of his girlfriend, who also worked in the dining 
room ; had the potential to disrupt the workplace.
648
 
The respondent‘s employee relations manager, Ms Helen Drabbe argued that it was highly 
unlikely that the SMS messages were only sent from Volkwyn‘s residence after hours. The nature 
and content of some of the messages referred to issues only known at the workplace and related to 
certain incidents. She argued that even if the SMS messages were only sent after hours, they had a 





The commissioner held that the impression left by the evidence was of two people blatantly 
flaunting social, ethical and workplace rules and conventions. The SMS messages had become 





The commissioner held that although most of the SMS messages had been sent after hours from 
home, they were received and read during working hours and had led to gossip, breakdowns of 
relations, improper behaviour, and had had a host of other unacceptable effects which the 
respondent could not be expected to tolerate. The applicant‘s record indicated that he had difficulty 
conforming to acceptable standards of behaviour, and he had displayed a total lack of judgement. 
The commissioner held further that such behaviour is generally unacceptable and the average 
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The commissioner held that the employer had proven on a balance of probabilities that it had 
sufficient reason to discipline Volkwyn for sending SMS messages and for the effect those 
messages had on the working environment and staff involved. 




In the case of Sylvester / Neil Muller Constructions [2002] 1 BALR 113 (CCMA); the applicant 
was dismissed after forwarding a crude sexual ‗sms‘ (text) message to a female colleague‘s 
cellular telephone. The woman claimed later that she had been sexually harassed. The applicant 
stated that he was not aware that the messages offended his colleague as he has shared jokes and 
innuendoes of a sexual nature with her in the past. The commissioner held that sexual harassment 
consists of unwanted and persistent sexual advances and or suggestions. The court held that the 
person who claims that he or she was offended by the said conduct must make it clear to the 
offender that he or she objects to the that conduct. The offender must thus be aware that his 




The commissioner found that in this case, the applicant‘s conduct amounted to just a single act. 
Thus he had no reason to think that his colleague will take exception to it. 




In the case of Sugreen / Standard Bank of SA [2002] 7 BALR 769 (CCMA); the applicant, a 
managerial employee (Ms Sugreen), was dismissed for alleged corruption. The main evidence 
against her was a tape recording of a telephone conversation with one of the respondent‘s service 
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providers (Mr Singh). The recording was made by Mr Singh, the person who allegedly offered the 
applicant a bribe. Apparently Mr Singh paid R 30 000 to Ms Sugreen to keep his company on her 
employer‘s panel of service providers. Mr Singh later reported the matter to the respondent.
655
 The 
applicant was dismissed on the basis of the information on the tape. The applicant denied that she 
had received a bribe, and claimed that the tape was a compilation of a series of actual telephone 
conversations, and that they were inadmissible because the recording of her conversation had inter 








a) It constitutes an invasion of the applicant‘s rights; 
b) While it is conceded that there are times when such evidence may be admitted, the role of the 
employer itself in recording is crucial. In the present case the employer had made it clear that it did 
not want to get involved with entrapment and this was then done by a third party; 
c) It is appropriate to take into account the credibility and calibre of the witness before deciding on 
the admissibility of the recording. In this case on his own admission the witness had been prepared 
to pay a R30 000 bribe, and had previously been convicted of theft. 
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472D). In this case it was held that there were other more conventional means for the employer to have gathered its 




Mr Pillimer (for the respondent) argued that the tape was admissible for the following reasons:
658
 
a) The conversation between the applicant and the witness was not a fabrication; it had been 
admitted by the applicant. 
b) There was strong authority in both criminal and civil court decisions that such evidence did not 
constitute a violation of the privacy right. 
c) Section 138 of the LRA obliges the Commissioner to determine the manner in which the 
arbitration should be conducted, that is, ‗fairly and quickly‘, dealing with the substantial merits of 
the dispute with the minimum of legal formalities‘. In light of the above, Mr Pillimer submitted 
that the Commissioner has discretion to admit such evidence. 
 
 The commissioner held that use by employees of their employer‘s telephone and e-mail facilities 
are of legitimate interest to the employer if there is reason to suspect that the employee is guilty of 
misconduct. The commissioner held further that it was also necessary to evaluate the fairness of 
the employer‘s actions. The following considerations were relevant in this regard:
659
 
 the recording was not aimed at enticing the applicant to commit a crime;  
 because the alleged crime had already been committed, there were few other methods of 
securing evidence against the employee;  
 the recording was not part of an on-going monitoring of all the applicant‘s calls;  
 the recording was not undertaken by the employer itself;  
 the recording was made during working hours, using the employer‘s telephone. The tape 
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recordings were accordingly admissible.  
 
Based on these grounds the commissioner was prepared to accept that there has been no 




The commissioner held that the tape was believable in that it reflects a normal conversation with 
interjections and interruptions, with the participants reacting to each other‘s comments and 
questions.
661
 The court confirmed that an employee‘s privacy rights were not infringed by 
telephone monitoring. 
The commissioner held that the implication of the bribe by means of the taped conversation, is that 




The commissioner held that the applicant had not shifted the onus placed on her when she raised 
the defence of a fabricated tape. With the result the commissioner held that he was left with a 
coherent and plausible tape recording with many aspects that are damaging to the applicant.
663
 The 
respondent, the commissioner held, had adduced sufficient evidence to establish, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the applicant accepted a bribe of R30 000.
664
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
659
 supra note 53, at 773 A-B 
660
 supra note 53, at 773 A-B (It is sufficient to recognise that the use by the employee of the employer‘s telephone and 
e-mail are legitimate areas of interest to the employer where it suspects that the employee is guilty of misconduct). 
 
661
 supra note 53, at 777 C-D and E-J 
662
 supra note 53, at 777 C-D and E-J (With this defence, the onus shifted to her to establish the probabilities of this, by 
showing (a) that Singh had a motivation to frame her; (b) that a fabrication of a tape is possible; (c) Singh had the 
ability to fabricate a tape and (d) that there are adequate explanations to her own words on the tape. Of these three 
factors, only the first was suggested with any reasonable explanation, but the respondent offered an equally plausible 
motivation, namely anger. No expert evidence was led as to the ease with which an apparently normal-sounding 
conversation can be created from several other conversations, nor that Singh had the equipment or know-how to 
fabricate a tape). 
 
663
 supra note 53, at 778 D-H 
664




The applicant had not discharged the burden, and so her dismissal was confirmed. 
 
Similarly in the case of Allied Workers Union of South Africa obo Ncube v Northern Crime 
Security CC (1999) 20 ILJ 1954 (CCMA); this case concerned an abusive employee Ncube, who 
used abusive language towards another employee (Koekemoer) and threatened to kill him and 
assault his wife. Ncube was dismissed on the basis of the threats made. The arbitrator allowed the 
tapes on the basis that the recorded conversations did not show evidence of private conversations 
between Ncube and third parties, but between the two employees involved. The CCMA held that 
Koekemoer   had a legitimate interest in recording the conversation because of the threats made 
towards him, and the conversations did not reveal any personal or confidential information about 
Ncube. The tapes were confirmatory evidence of communication in the course of the employment 
relationship, and the recording was made to support the oral evidence. The evidence the 




The cases discussed above not only serve as a reminder for employers to keep a ‗watchful eye‘ on 
their employees but also provides strong argument in their favour for a need to monitor the 








                                                                                                                                                                                           
must be done on a balance of probabilities (See Cycad Construction (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others (1999) 20 ILJ 2340 
(LC) 2344A–E)]. In elaboration of the employer‘s onus, John Grogan in Workplace Law (5 ed 2000) 111 states: ―The 
primary significance of the onus is that when the evidence on a point is evenly balanced or indecisive, the balance will 
tip against the party upon whom it rests. It must be noted, however, that the burden of proving a particular point may 
shift to the party not bearing the onus, on the basis of the principle that ‗he who alleges must prove‘. So for example, if 
an employee accused of theft pleads an alibi, the burden rests on him or her to prove that he or she was elsewhere at the 
time of the commission of the offence. If he or she fails to discharge the evidentiary burden, it may be that the 
employer will be held to have discharged its overall onus.‖ 
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Responding to potential abuse. 
 
 
Employers may seek to reduce abuse of electronic tools by resorting to disciplinary solutions and 
procedures. 
 
The size of the task, the number of users, their use patterns, their usual tasks and the scope, size and 
power of network facilities and resources may all play a role in determining what kind of response 




It must be noted that any disciplinary action arising in the context of computer network abuse, 
Internet, text messaging, telephone calls and even e- mails must comply with the requirements 
contained in Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.
667
 The Act provides that 
disciplinary action must be fair and consistent and that disciplinary rules must be clearly 




It is not necessary for an employer to deal with electronic abuse separately but, the abuse may be 
processed and dealt with in terms of an existing schedule of offences.
669
 For instance, Internet 
abuse or abuse through the telephone may fall into the category of sexual harassment or creating a 
hostile working environment, (which may occur through the display of sexually explicit material 
on the computer screen or through a text message).
670
 Bad conduct like insolence and 
insubordination expressed in an e- mail message retains its character as a disciplinary offence. 
Such offences does not require the formulation of a new disciplinary code to deal specifically with 
the abuse that may occur through the electronic equipment that is made available to an employee in 
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Another method by which it could be possible to respond to other forms of abuse with respect to 
the electronic communication tools in the workplace by employees is by relating that abuse to 
misuse of employer‘s property and the inadvertent downloading of viruses and failing to use anti 





There are however certain limitations that arise by simply relating an offence to be categorised into 
one of the abovementioned offences and thus may call for specific measures to be formulated and 
communicated to employees.
673
 In determining whether or not the employer prefers to specifically 
address the problem will depend on a variety of factors, such as, the number of employees 
regularly using the network, the computer resources available , cost implications and abuse , and 





The punishment handed down for the abuse of electronic tools
675
 in the workplace should involve 
both progressive and corrective discipline, and as a last resort dismissal should be contemplated 
(for cases such as those involving sexual harassment of co -workers using e- mail, and text 
messages). Counselling is also a viable option for less serious abuses for instance the viewing of 




As stated above dismissal for the abuse of employer‘s electronic tools must be the last resort. An 
employer therefore in order to alleviate the abusive conduct of the employee or employees before 












  L Michalson ―The use of the e- mail and the Internet in the Workplace‖ Cyberlaw S.A: the internet and the law.  
CD-ROM (1999) 196 defines electronic tools as : 
 telephones, mobile phones and voice-mail facilities  
 e-mail facilities  
 fax machines, modems and servers  
 computers  









The employer may issue: 
 
a) General warnings 
Warnings may be general or specific.
677
 General warnings are normally issued to employees 
informing them of the rules that the employer has put in place and that are instituted to regulate the 
workplace. These types of warnings are frequently used to signal to all employees that the 
employer intends to take action against specific forms of misconduct. These rules are not sanctions 
in themselves but their purpose is to ensure that employees cannot later claim that they were 
unfairly or inconsistently treated if the employer acts on the general warning.
678
 If employees are 
not given a general warning the conduct on which they have embarked may lead to dismissal, their 




b) Informal warnings 
Informal warnings are those given to individual employees for particular acts of misconduct. 
These warnings act as reminders that should the conduct continue, more serious action will 
follow.
680
  The purpose of specific warnings is to inform and advise the employee concerned of 
defective standards of performance or behaviour, to remind him or her of the existence of the rule 
that has been breached or overlooked.
681
 If the employees are not informed after committing an 
offence, then when disciplinary action is taken they would argue that  they had a right to believe 
that their actions did not deserve any  disciplinary action. The purpose of the warning is to correct 
the defective conduct in whatever form that conduct  may have taken. Informal warnings may also 
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c) Written warnings 
A written warning is more formal than an oral warning.
683
 The purpose of a written warning is that 
it enables the employer to prove that the warning was given subsequent to a disciplinary action. 
This is important  should disciplinary action prove necessary against that employee. An employee 
is normally required to sign a written warning. However a refusal by an employee to sign a written 




d) Final written warning 
A final written warning is the last warning an employee can expect before dismissal. The purpose 
of a final written warning is to give employees a final chance to correct their behaviour. Such 




e) Denial of privileges 
 
The Code of Good Practice on Dismissal (item 3 (3)) states that infringement of workplace rules 
may call for a final warning ‗or other action short of dismissal‘.  This leaves open a wide range of 
options, such as deprivation of a portion of discretionary bonuses, or other special privileges which 
the employer may grant (for example, special leave, or other privileges attached to long service).
686
 
Employer‘s may not however impose fines on employees, or make any deductions from their 
salaries for disciplinary offences without their consent in writing.
687
  







 Ibid,  see also case of Chemical Workers Industrial Union & another v AECI Paints (Natal) (Pty) Ltd (1988) 9 ILJ 
1046 (IC), the court ruled a dismissal unfair because the employer had not given consideration to the circumstances in 
which the earlier warnings had been given. 
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written warning that had been issued to the employee before his dismissal was unjustified , and that the dismissal was 
therefore vitiated ( at 109f) 
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f) Suspension  






At common law and under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, demotion raises 
problems similar to suspension because it constitutes a unilateral variation of the employee‘s 
contract of service.
689
 Unfair suspension, unfair demotion constitutes unfair labour practice. 




h) Dismissal  
 
The Code of Good Practice: Dismissal advises all employees to adopt disciplinary rules that 





―The form and content of disciplinary rules will obviously vary according to the size and 
nature of the employer‘s business. In general, a larger business will require a more formal 
approach to discipline. An employer‘s rules must create certainty and consistency in the 
application of discipline. This requires that the standards of conduct are clear and made 
available to employees in a manner that is easily understood. Some rules may be so well 
established and known that it is not necessary to communicate them‖. 
 
 
Although workplace rules emanate form different sources, they generally give rise to legally 
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 An infringement of one of these rules entitles the employer to institute 
disciplinary action against the offender. The nature of a permissible sanction depends on the 




Both the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1996 and the common law state that employees have a duty to 
abide by rules that are reasonable. The employer‘s right to formulate disciplinary rules does not 





A reasonable rule is said not enjoin the impossible or illegal, does not discriminate unnecessarily 
between different classes of workers, and is not ‗sprung‘ on workers out of the blue.
695
 The broad 
principle is that a disciplinary rule must be designed to promote the efficiency of the enterprise, in 





Grogan provides the following check list to asses the validity of a workplace rule and the legality 




 Did the employer have the authority to make the rule in terms of the employment contract. 
 Does the rule comply with applicable statutes or regulations. 
 Is the rule reasonably required for the efficient, orderly and safe conduct of the employer‘s 
business? 
 Was the existence of the rule known to the employee, or could/ should the employee 
reasonably have been expected to have known of its existence. 
 Has the rule been consistently applied in similar cases in the past? 
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Only if the answer to each of these questions is in the affirmative will the rule be enforceable, if the 





An employer is not required to spell out every workplace rule in meticulous detail; the test is 
whether the employees concerned were actually aware, or should have been aware, of the rule and 




The Code of Good Practice on Dismissal provides that any person who is determining whether a 




(a) whether or not the employee contravened a rule or standard regulating conduct in, or of 
relevance to, the workplace; and  
(b) if a rule or standard was contravened , whether or not 
(i) the rule was a valid or reasonable rule or standard; 
(ii) the employee was aware , or could reasonably have been expected to be aware , 
of the rule or standard; 
(iii) the rule or standard has been consistently applied by the employer; 
(iv) dismissal was an appropriate sanction for the contravention of the rule or 
standard. 
 
In the case of  Bamford & Others/ Energiser (SA) Ltd (2001) 12 BALR 1251 (P), the arbitrator‘s 
findings are insightful for employer‘s who rely on computer driven workstations and workflows 
and lays the foundation for successful workplace disciplinary measures to be taken against 
employees who abuse e-mail. 
 
In this case the facts of which were discussed earlier, the arbitrator held that the employer at the 
time of the disciplinary infractions did have a comprehensive policy with regard to e- mail and 
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Internet abuse. Relevant in this regard was the message the managing director sent to all users in 
response to the political message received from the employee. The director regarded that response 
as an instruction to all e- mail users. The company also had in place a ―Business Practices and 
Standards of Conduct‖ policy which was pinned on the notice board. This policy document which 
is referred to in the letters of appointment, prohibits actions that lead to a hostile working 
environment and instructs employees not to engage in harassment.  Furthermore , an e- mail 
message had been sent out to all users setting out the rules of computer use, the message clearly 
instructed and affirmed that these computers were business tools intended for business use, and 
indicated that employees did not have the time to engage in non business related e- mail and 
internet activities. This e- mailed message also indicated that the Business Practices and Standards 
of Conduct Policy was applicable in respect of electronic information. The arbitrator also 





The most fundamental and important questions that remained in the present case was whether or 
not there was a clearly communicated workplace rule in terms of which employees were given to 
understand that they were not permitted to send chain letters, or to engage in exchanges in 
pornography or trademark infringements. According to the arbitrator there was:  
 
―As to the socially unacceptable material, the text of the standard policy document, of 
course, does not in as many words spell out prohibitions in respect of e-mail usage. There 
is however quite enough in the text of that policy, had any of the individuals bothered to 
pay attention to it, to indicate to them that the ‗tone‘ of the workplace was expressly 
regulated by the employer. The individuals in question are all middle class articulate 
young women who are not bereft of education. To suggest that they thought that it was 
permissible to use company resources to entertain themselves with images which would 
have been regarded generally speaking as socially unacceptable is not credible. Their 
claim that they thought there was nothing offensive with it, is of course, in part, 
undermined by Oosthuizen‘s evidence that she was indeed offended by the bouquet of 
penises sent to her, and untenable on the basis that the material is so obviously contrary to 
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what would circulate amongst self-respecting people. In my view, it cannot lie in the mouth 
of well educated white-collar workers like Wollenschlaeger and Gibson to say that they 
were unaware that it was impermissible for them to traffic in what was socially 
unacceptable material. Those jokes which have a racial connotation, are typical of what 
one would strive to avoid in contemporary South African society. Although it is probable 
that such humour is enjoyed in private, it can hardly be said that in the work place an 
employer would and should condone such exchanges. 
In my view, even if the facts were to demonstrate a deafening silence in regard to any 
express regulatory regime concerning the tone of material which could be trafficked on the 
company e-mail system, it would follow from an application of common sense that images 
as grotesque as those which I have described do not belong in the work place and the 




The employees argued that they were not aware of the fact that they could be dismissed because of 
sending the e- mail. The arbitrator dismissed this argument, stating that whilst there was, indeed, 
nothing in the documentation that linked the abuse of the e- mail facility to dismissal, there was 
sufficient grounds to dismiss the employees. The employees‘ actions had damaged the employer, 
most obviously, said the arbitrator, by clogging up the system and running up costs. There was also 
significant risk that the domain name of the employer would be associated with obscene, 
degrading or offensive transmissions, and the trademark violations could also contain a risk for the 
company. The arbitrator held that some things could not be denied: 
―The axiomatic risk upon commission of a serious transgression, calculated to embarrass 





In the case of Cronje/ Toyota Manufacturing (2001) 3 BALR 213 (CCMA) the arbitrator was 
guided by Schedule 8 of the LRA (item7) as well as (section 188 (2) of the LRA) which lays down 
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The arbitrator held that Mr Cronje had contravened the rule prohibiting the distribution of racist 
and inflammatory material. The arbitrator held that Mugabe appearing as a gorilla, and calling for 
more bananas, commonly fits into the historical racist white stereotype that still lives in the minds 
of white people in this country and elsewhere, that associates black people with gorillas, monkeys 
and the like. It was found that the applicant knew the cartoon was racist was thus was sufficiently 




The arbitrator had to consider whether the employer‘s rules or policies against the distribution of 
racist and inflammatory material were valid and reasonable. 
The arbitrator held that the company‘s code states that breach of this rule may result in severe 
disciplinary action. Severe disciplinary action was defined as including dismissal.
706
 With regard 
to the reasonableness of the code, in this case regard was made to the context of the workplace. In 
the arbitrator‘s view, the fact that the company employed 3 500 black workers, it was eminently 









The arbitrator held that with regard as to how the employer had dealt with previous cases the rule 
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In deciding whether dismissal was the appropriate sanction for contravening the rule, the arbitrator 
stated that dismissal is justified where: 
 
―Where the disciplinary offence has ―the effect of seriously damaging or destroying the 
relationship between employer and employee so that the continuance of that relationship 
could be regarded as intolerable‖; where the relationship of ―trust, mutual confidence and 
respect cannot continue, where the relationship is irreparably harmed and where 




The Code adopts a similar approach. It provides that if the misconduct is serious and of such a 
gravity that it makes a continued employment relationship intolerable, then dismissal is the 
appropriate sanction.
711
  The Code of Good Practice in schedule 8 of the LRA provides that if the 
misconduct is of such gravity that it makes a continued employment relationship intolerable, then 








In the case of Philander/ CSC Computer Sciences (2002) 3 BALR 304 (CCMA) (a case involving 
an employee forwarding pornographic material on e-mail); the applicant acknowledged that he 
knew  that specific  e- mail content was not allowed according to CSC policy and that he had been 




The arbitrator held that it is trite law that before an employee can be disciplined there must be a 
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rule, that the rule must be reasonable and that the employee must have been aware of it before he 




The arbitrator held that the sanction to be imposed depends largely on the specific facts of the 
particular matter.
715
 There may be other reasons why a more severe penalty may be appropriate. 
 
In this case the arbitrator held that the applicant had shown no appreciation of the potential harm of 
his transgression but also no repentance for what he done, seeking rather to feign lack of 
knowledge.
716
 The arbitrator held further that he could find no reason why an employer should 
tolerate such behaviour from an employee an also tolerate a continuation of the employment 
relationship.
717
 The dismissal of the applicant was found to be fair. 
 
In the case of Volkwyn/ Truworths LTD (2002) 4 BALR 455 (CCMA) (a case that involved the 
exchange of indecent text messages by an employee); the arbitrator held that text messages that 
had only become evident in the workplace, had led to gossip, breakdown of relations, improper 
behaviour and a host of unacceptable issues which the respondent employer could not be expected 
to tolerate. It was further held that the text messages affected the general morale and atmosphere in 
the work place and that such behaviour is generally unacceptable and that the average employer 
would be justified in taking the same steps the employer had taken.
718
 The arbitrator held that there 




In the case of Kalam/ Bevcap (Nampak) (2006) 6 BALR 565 (MEIBC); the arbitrator held that 
employer must prove on a balance of probabilities that an employee is guilty of misconduct.
720
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The applicant committed an offence by contravening the company‘s Information Technology (IT) 
policy (all employees including the applicant are consistently alerted each time they log onto the 
Internet that all internet browsing are monitored and if non- performance to the company‘s IT 
policy is detected, the details will be passed to the responsible line and Human Resource (HR) 
management for investigation or possible action).
721
 In terms of the company‘s code of conduct 
the unacceptable conduct and excessive use of the internet is viewed as serious and dismissible 
offence.
722
  The applicant did not dispute the existence of the policy but alleged that he did not read 
it. According to the arbitrator this did not constitute an acceptable excuse. The fact that the 
applicant spent 285 hours per week and visited 14 802 sites on the Internet on non work related 
activities was in the eyes of the arbitrator deplorable. The applicant down loaded pornographic 
pictures on many occasions even though he was warned via pop up messages that these sites were 





The arbitrator held that in viewing the pornographic material and sexually explicit images the 




Thus it was held that the respondent had an obligation to take strict action against abuse of the 
company‘s Internet facility. The arbitrator found that the IT Policy was both valid and reasonable.
 
725
 It terms of the company‘s disciplinary code the failure to adhere to the rule above is a 
dismissible offence. The fact that the respondent held a managerial position, the arbitrator was 
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In the case of Latchmiah/Billiton Aluminium SA (PTY) LTD T/A Bayside Aluminium (2006) 6 
BALR 569 (MEIBC) (a case that involved a senior employee viewing undesirable material on the 
internet); page 5 of the respondent‘s Business Ethics Policy paragraph 4 states that; 
―The company‘s electronic communications systems are company resources and all electronic 
communications are regarded as company records. Offensive material (for example, pornography 




The applicant signed acknowledging having received a copy of the company‘s business ethics 





In addition to the business policy employees are given a guide to Business Conduct. 
The Guide to Business states that: 
―The company‘s electronic communications systems are company resources and all electronic 
communications are regarded as company records. Thus the viewing of material, such as 




The applicant received copies of all the company‘s policies. New employees are given a handbook 
titled Business Ethics at Bayside which states that: 




Furthermore, a warning appears on the computer warning users that they are being monitored. An 





The arbitrator applied the criteria set out in terms of the LRA. 
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There was overwhelming evidence indicating that the rule was well established. The applicant 





The rule was found to be reasonable as the company considered this offence as being ethically 
unacceptable at the workplace during work hours.
733
 The rule is seen further as being reasonable as 
it discourages sexual harassment, offensive material and negates the possibility of hackers 
infiltrating the company computer systems with viruses which could lead to a loss of information 
and damage to computer systems.
734
 The graphics from pornographic sites also causes an increase 






The arbitrator was satisfied that the rule was consistently applied. He therefore had to consider 




The arbitrator referred to the case of  County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others (1999) 11 
BALR 1117 (LAC) at 112 E-F where Kroon JA held the following: 
 
―It remains part of our law that it lies in the first place within the province of the employer 
to set the standard of conduct to be observed by its employees and to determine  the 
sanction with which non-compliance will be visited, interference therewith is only justified 
in the case of unreasonableness and unfairness‖. 
 
 
The arbitrator held that due to the excessive nature of the viewing of the pornographic material a 
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policy as such as the one adopted by the employer is necessary.
737
  The arbitrator held further the 




The arbitrator found that the dismissal of the applicant did not produce a sense of shock and that 





Most employees caught (red handed or otherwise) abusing the electronic tools in the workplace 
should expect get a written warning, and in more serious cases a final written warning. The option 
of suspension or even possible demotion remains an option for the employer. 
 
An employer may even take disciplinary action against the employee in the form of a dismissal. 
Where this occurs the employer often has a policy in place that prohibits and discourages the 
conduct or action in question. The courts have accepted the dismissal provided the requirements in 
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Practical steps to prevent the abuse of „electronic tools‟ in the workplace 
 
An employer seeking methods to put an end to abuse of company equipment may institute or 




It can be made more difficult for an employee to find useful data if the employer somehow 
scrambles data so that interpretation is meaningless without the intruder knowing how the 





Encryption is the formal name for the scrambling process.
742
 In this process normal, unscrambled 
data called clear text is transformed so that they are in unintelligible to the outside observer. The 
transformed data are called enciphered text or cipher text. Using encryption employers can nullify 




Encryption stresses the need for confidentiality of data. Although encryption is an important tool 
in any computer security tool kit, other tools must be used to complement its use.
744
 If encryption 
is not used properly, it may have no effect on security and could even degrade performance of the 
entire system. Therefore it is important that if encryption is implemented it must be used in a 
manner that it can function effectively.
745
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2. Software controls 
 
Programs themselves can be used to protect computer security and thus improve the security for 
the employer.  
Program controls include the following;
746
 
 Internal program controls: parts of the program that enforce security restrictions, such as 
access limitations in a database management program. 
 Operating system and network system controls: limitations enforced by the operating 
system or network to protect each user from all other users. 
 Independent control programs: application programs, such as password checkers, intrusion 
detection utilities, or viruses scanners, that protect against certain types of vulnerabilities. 
 Development controls: quality standards under which a program is designed, coded tested, 
and manipulated to prevent software faults from becoming exploitable vulnerabilities.  
 
3. Hardware controls 
 
Hardware controls devices have been created to assist in providing computer security. These 
devices include a variety of means:
747
 
 Hardware or smart card implementations of encryption 
 Locks or cables limiting access or deterring theft 
 Firewalls 
 Intrusion detection systems 
















4.  Physical controls 
 
In most cases the most effective and least expensive are physical controls. Physical controls 
include locks on doors, guards at entry points, backup copies of important software and data, and 





5.  A User Policy 
 
Upon due consideration the best method to be adopted by the employer to deal with a technology 
based problem is to formulate an Electronic User Policy.
749
  A policy for using e-mail and Internet 
is generally seen as part of the employer‘s prerogative to control the workplace. The employer may 
take the first step and set up a committee involving information technology, industrial relations, 





The purpose, scope, administration, and terminology of the user policy must be assessed against 
the background of the needs of the business, on the one hand, and the reasonable expectations of 
employees that the employer will respect their privacy, on the other.
751
 It may be open for the 
employer to identify specific employees such as the system controller and the system administrator 
to take responsibility for certain issues. Some attention may be given to defining terminology used 





























 A provision that makes some of the employees aware and reminds others that all electronic 
resources provided by the employer at the workplace ( including the desk top, workstation , 
hard drives , monitor , printers , networking facilities, telephone, fax machines, ) and which 




 The electronic resources are intended to be used for work related activities. These works 




 The policy must clearly indicate without any ambiguity whether the employer strictly 




 Where the policy does allow employees permission to use facilities for personal purposes 
such use must be regulated. The policy must encompass guidelines for personal use that 
provides for use that is conducted :
757
 
 responsibly, ethically, and lawfully; 
 that employees must consider and respect the rights of others; 
 they must not overuse the facilities: their use of email for private purposes,     for 
example, must not disrupt network services for business purposes; 
 that in their use employees must not expose the employer to any liability; 
 employees must make it clear that statements outside the scope of their       
employment represent only their personal opinion and should not be construed as 
official opinion. 
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 Employees must be informed that they should have no expectation of privacy in relation to 
information (files, messages, web access information) stored on computers provided by the 
employer. The employer must convey a clear intention or the real possibility that there will 
be the monitoring of online traffic, including electronic mail messages sent to other 
networks, users on the same network, and all access to pages on the World Wide Web. 
758
 
 An important provision in the user policy must be a clause that informs employees that 
their messages would be intercepted by the employer, provided that the sender of the 
message or information is aware of such interception.
759
 
 A provision in the policy that informs employees that access to the Internet and other 
electronic resources is not an absolute right and depends on the nature of the work that the 
employer is charged to do will go a long way towards the effort by employers to restrict or 
discontinue access to electronic source at any time.
760
 
 The user policy must prohibit certain practices. These would include but are not limited to 
the following: 
viewing, storing, downloading or forwarding sexually explicit material (or sexually 
suggestive) or material that is, racist, harassing, intimidating or defamatory. This provision 
can extend also to attempts to gain access to restricted resources either inside or outside the 
computer network of the employer, impersonating another user, damaging or deleting files 
of another user, obtaining, without authorisation, the access codes and /or passwords of 
another user. The downloading, installing or using unlicensed software or software that the 





 The employer in order to provide for an effective a policy must be sure to provide for 
specific forms of abuse or types of behaviour that may be problematic. This may include 
providing a list of e- mail practices that are prohibited (sending unauthorized unsolicited 
















mail, commercial advertising of other businesses, mail flooding), or even excessive cross 
postings on Usenet newsgroups.
762
 




a) A blanket prohibition on using any computer resource to promote any business or 
enterprise except the business or enterprise of the employer 
b) A ban on any attempt to send an electronic message to indicate or gain support for any 
political party or religious party. 
c) A prohibition on any form of violation of network security, including unauthorized 
access to, or the use of, data, systems or network, unauthorized interference with 
network services or equipment. 
d) A restriction on any activity where the employee seeks to gain access to the Internet 
without running anti- virus software. 
 
 It is not unusual for an employer to include a provision that restricts access to a specific 





The drafting of a well thought out policy for the use of electronic tools in the workplace will prove 
to be of immense help to employers especially with regard to issues of privacy and discipline in the 
work place. 
 
The policy will inform employees of what they may and may not do in relation to their 
workstation. It is important for the employer to communicate the provisions of this policy to the 
employee and in certain circumstances where necessary implement provisions through training 
that focuses on acceptable as well as unacceptable use of electronic tools in the workplace.
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This route of action would not only cut down on the risks relating to e mail, telephone and Internet 
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Throughout the years and especially over the last century, improvements in technology have 
dramatically changed our expectation of privacy in the workplace. 
 
The installation of what has become know as advanced switching technology have made it 
possible to dial numbers directly anywhere in the country without the assistance of an operator, 
who might be tempted to listen in.
768
 In addition to this, as the cost of telephone lines and 
equipment steadily dropped, the number of single – user lines increased, and consumers proved 
increasingly willing to pay for them. Thus, over the course of a generation, we came to expect that 




To a large degree and without surprise, this expectation of privacy, with regard to phone calls has 
extended to the workplace. It has become a natural occurrence for any employee to pick up a 
telephone, and assume that no one is secretly listening in to that conversation.
770
 In its 2001 
Annual Survey of workplace monitoring and surveillance, the American Management Association 
estimated that twelve percent of the major North American corporations periodically record and 
review telephone calls, while eight percent more monitor the amount of time that employees spend 




The exercise of tracing the dialled numbers that an employee calls can be as simple as reading the 
monthly phone bill. A slightly more aggressive step that may be adopted is the installation of a pen 
register, which records every number dialled from a particular phone.
772
 However due to the fact 
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that use of computers and telephones are closely linked, it is possible to use personal computers 





According to Telemate.Net, a manufacturer of telephone monitoring software, over twenty percent 
of all workplace calls are personal.
774 
The company has created a software product called Telemate 
(TM) Call Accounting. This product enables an employer to track all the data generated by the 
company‘s telecom resources. The software allows management to identify ―the calls and call 








 Identify call volume, topics, destinations, sources, length, frequency and peak calling times. 
 Track account activity and build a marketing prospect or customer database. 
 Classify phone numbers to identify potential productivity distractions. 
 Identify inbound callers. 
 
1. Employer Bugs 
 
The use of ‗interception devices‘ such as ‗employer bugs‘ have become increasingly popular with 
employers.
777
 Employers will often use these ‗employer bugs‘ and secret wiretaps to effectively 
eavesdrop on the conversations of their employees. These ‗employer bugs‘  go unnoticed as they 
are often hidden in electrical wall plates, smoke detectors, clocks, lamps, radios, frames or even in 
the ceiling. The result is that the employers may be able to know their employee activities even 
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2. Magstripe Cards 
 
Currently, the most popular and widely implemented technology for monitoring employee 
movement is the same familiar magnetic strip (or ‗magstripe‘) found on the back of billions of 




This typical magstripe is a thin strip of plastic film containing thousands of small magnetic 
particles.
780
 With the use of a magnetic field, the particles in various sections of a magnetic strip 
can be oriented to the North or South Pole. Once this information has been recorded on the strip, it 




To put this type of monitoring in place, the employer will issue identification cards to their 
employees. These identification cards contain encoded information on the magstripe, such as an 
employee‘s name, Identification number, security access, etc.
782
 The employees will thus be 





The magstripe readers are normally wired into a network.
784
 In effect, when an employee swipes 
her card, the information in the strip can be verified by a central database. Most of these systems 
are specifically designed to record the date, time, and identity of each person who goes through a 
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The main concern for employers who use this type of surveillance to monitor access and 
movement is the phenomenon of ‗tailgating‘.
786
 Tailgating occurs when one employee swipes his 
card and other employees pass through without swiping theirs. To prevent this, some companies 
insist that such practice is strictly forbidden. In so doing, companies install an alarm device, which 




A possible problem area for employers may arise due the consistent swiping of the card which will 
eventually and inevitably result in the magnetic strip being worn out, which means that the 






3. The Active Badge System 
 
The basic concept of the Active Badge is without many complications. Employees are given a 
special identification card equipped with an infrared transmitter. This card then sends out a unique 
code approximately every fifteen seconds.
789
 If the card is within six meters of an infrared sensor 
(mounted on a wall or ceiling), the code is read by the sensor. The sensor is connected to a network 
of other senses, all of which are linked to a central station. The central station then retrieves data 
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The most obvious benefit of this system is the ability to locate staff more quickly. The aim of this 
method of surveillance is to improve staff efficiency and enhances quality of service to 
customers.
791
 Employers will utilize this additional information to help them evaluate internal 
processes, and that such a system reduces ambient noise (since employees can be located quickly 




The Active Badge System is normally designed with the following features:
 793
 
 WITH- a list of the other badges in the same area as the target badge. 
 LOOK- a list of badges currently located in a particular area. 
 NOTIFY- an alarm that goes off when a particular badge is picked up by the sensor system. 
 HISTORY- a record of the badge‘s location over a period of time. 
 
4. Cameras  
 
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) remains the most public and discussed form of surveillance. 
 
In the mid- 1990s, Conservative John Major based his campaign for re- election as British Prime 
Minister in part on a promise to install more video cameras in public spaces.
794
 Major promoted 
his proposal with a highly successful slogan: ―If you‘ve got nothing to hide, you‘ve got nothing to 
fear‖. After his appointment as Prime Minister Major kept his promise and began a programme 
( which was aggressively continued by Tony Blair‘s government ) that has made the British people  
the most heavily watched and supervised people in the western hemisphere, if not the world.
795
 
There is an estimate of more than 2.5 million surveillance cameras in Britain, and the average 
Englishman is photographed by over three hundred different cameras each day.
796
 It is also 
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Security in corporate entities that are centred around camera systems pose a greater privacy threat 
to society as a whole but an even greater threat to employees due to the fact that  they are more 
consistently monitored, notwithstanding the fact that employers have both the resources and 




The main obstacle to the widespread implementation of video surveillance systems has been cost, 
with the most expensive item being the cameras themselves. This includes the monitors into which 
the cameras are hardwired, and the personnel required to operate and monitor the cameras.
799
 
However this obstacle is slowly diminishing. The costs of cameras are falling steadily, and more 
importantly, the images the cameras produce can now be fed directly into an office network or 
even onto the Internet.
800
 Thus, it is now possible for a single individual to monitor hundreds of 
people using any computer as a monitor.
801
 Images can even be stored on a hard drive for later 





5. The “PC Monitor” 
 
The Personal Computer Monitor (―PC Monitor‖) is a small device, approximately two inches long 
and one and a half inch in diameter, containing a micro- controller and a fixed amount of 
non-volatile memory.
803
 The installation of the PC Monitor is a painless exercise: all that‘s 


























required is to unplug the key- board cable from the back of the computer, plug the PC Monitor into 




 The PC Monitor once installed records every keystroke made on the keyboard port, up to the 
limits of its memory, which is 8Kb, 32Kb or 64Kb. Since each stroke takes up one byte, the largest 




The PC Monitor is easy to use without the employee‘s knowledge. Since all of the monitor‘s 
electronics and monitoring are self contained, it does not cause any unusual hard drive or Central 
Processing Unit (CPU) activity, and only a few employees would ever think to check the back of 




6. Computer Monitoring Software 
 
 
The nature of the office environment over the last decade has dramatically changed and conduct of 
employees is not monitored by an uncompromising manager or supervisor but by a relentless 
observer, that is, software that takes monitoring and surveillance to a brand new level. 
The following are three examples of such software. There are however, hundreds of similar types 
of software that are available to an employer: 
 
A. Investigator: this software not only records every keystroke made on the computer , it also 
maintains a record of dialogue boxes and takes periodic screen shots of what is displayed 
on the computer. The software can be configurated to take secret photographs of the 
computer user if the computer user is equipped with a Web cam. By recording every 
keystroke made by the computer user, Investigator can effectively record every e- mail 













made and sent by a computer user, Internet relay chat, or instant messenger session that 




B. The Survey Suite: this software details the time employees spend using Windows 
applications, e- mail, and the Internet, and provides the employee with easy to understand 
reports so that he or she can better manage their time. The focus of The Survey Suite is on 
the amount of time you spend actually interacting with the programs on the computer 
rather than what you are actually typing. This type of software can be particularly useful 
for keeping an eye on an employee‘s computer and then transmit the results of its 
observations to a central database. The Survey Suite gathers the information during the 





C. Computer Monitoring Software for Corporate Networks or what is commonly referred to 
as Spector CNE: this type of software automatically captures and lets the employer review 
e- mails sent and received, chat conversations and instant messages, files downloaded, web 
sites visited, applications launched and keystrokes typed. In addition to this, Spector CNE 
creates the equivalent of a digital surveillance tape so that the employer can see the exact 
sequence of everything the employees are doing on the computer. The software provides e- 
mail alerts that notify the employer when certain specified words determined by the 
employer are contained in the e- mail, chat, instant message or web site. Spector CNE can 
be remotely configured and installed from any computer on the network and the recordings 





7. Emerging monitoring devices 
 
 
Employers are now beginning to adopt more sophisticated monitoring technologies to help track 
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employee productivity and movement, including Radio Frequency Identification Systems 
(―RFID‖) and Global Positioning Systems (―GPS‖).
810
 The uses of RFID and GPS vary widely and 
can range from simple key-card electronic access employed in many workplaces to more advanced 
systems that can track an employee‘s precise location nearly anywhere on the planet. The majority 
of companies using RFID employ Smartcard technology to control physical security and access to 




This technology now makes it possible for employees to track the location of most employees who 
carry modern mobile telephones.
812
 CityWachter.com, an American surveillance company, based 
in the State of Ohio, caused an uproar when it announced that it embedded RFID tags in two of its 
employees. RFID chips are being used increasingly to track everything from product shipment to 
pets. Veri-Chip, the company that makes the devices, said the implants were created primarily for 
medical purposes. According to the company, approximately seventy people have had the 
implants at the end of 2006.
813
 RFID and GPS raise somewhat unique monitoring issues as they 




Besides the present technological viability for RFID and GPS monitoring, there is current 
experimentation and development of biometric identification tools (such as facial recognition 
equipment).
815
 Biometric tools in contrast to the RFID and GPS which are widespread are not 
currently in use. Contrary to representations in movies and television, biometric tools in particular 
facial recognition technology is unreliable. It is more than likely that in the near future employers 
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 Despite the arguments raised by  employers that they have legitimate grounds to monitor their 
employees so as to ensure that they are  not exposed to litigation on grounds of vicarious liability 
(through defamation or sexual harassment), electronic fraud,  copyright infringement and   costs 
such as those incurred in the excessive use and time wastage  by employees due to employees 
surfing the Internet or even sending e- mails to colleagues during working  hours, this monitoring 
must not progress  further into the dangerous territory where the employer  monitors the 
employee , and at  the same time  the employee is lured into committing a crime for the specific 
purpose of securing a conviction against that employee or even to dismiss that employee. 
 
Entrapment is where a person is lured into committing a crime for the specific purpose of securing 




The Concise Oxford Dictionary (10 ed) defines the word ‗entrap‘ to mean ‗catch in or as in a trap 
(of a police officer), or to deceive a person into committing a crime in order to secure their 
prosecution.‘ The Oxford Dictionary of Law (6 ed 2006) defines the noun ‗entrapment‘ to mean 
‗deliberately trapping a person into committing a crime in order to secure his conviction, as by 
offering to buy drugs.‘ From the dictionary definitions alone it is apparent that central to the 
concept of entrapment or trapping is the premise that a person is lured into committing a crime for 




In S v Malinga 1963 (1) SA 692 (A), at 693 G Holmes JA, defined a trap as ―a person who with a 
view to securing the conviction of another, proposes certain criminal conduct to him, and himself 
ostensibly takes part therein‖. In other words, he creates the occasion for someone else to commit 
the offence. 
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An American judge has described entrapment as ―the conception and planning of an offence by an 
officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except 




It is generally considered to be a controversial form of procuring evidence, because there is always 
the risk that an otherwise innocent person might have been induced to commit the crime on 




The primary objection to ‗entrapment,‘ expressed by Squires
821
, is that it is wrong for the ‗trap‘ to 




It has been recognized as deeply offensive to ordinary notions of fairness‘ stated Lord Bingham in 
Nottingham City Council v Amin [2000] 1 WLR 1071, at 1076–7 ―if a defendant were to be 
convicted and punished for committing a crime which he only committed because he had been 
incited, instigated, persuaded, pressurized or wheedled into committing it by a law enforcement 
officer‖. 
 
Even though it is regarded as somewhat unfair, if not unethical, to catch someone out by means of 
a trap and the modus operandi involving a trap is considered somewhat devious, many believe that 
the use of a trap is necessary only as a measure of last resort in order to deal with elusive criminals 




Not many employers have the confidence to say that their employees will not engage in conduct 
that will bring the employer into disrepute or behaviour that will cause their employer  damages in 
                                                          
819
 Roberts J in Sorrels v United States 287 US 435 at 454 (1932) 
 
820
 PJ Schwikkard and SE van der Merwe.  Principles of Evidence. 2ed. (2002). 246 [In S v Chesane 1975 (3) SA 172 
(T) McEwan J pointed out, at 173G, that ―persons used as traps may have a motive in giving evidence which may 
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some way, either in monetary terms (as is the situation of an employer being found vicariously 
liable for defamation where the employees distributed untrue remarks about a certain person) or 
result in the damage of reputation for the employer (where for instance employees who are 




 Employers therefore are frequently driven to ‗trapping‘. The use of a trap involves appointing 
people, often outside ‗agents‘, whose job it is to try to conclude ‗deals‘ with employees, usually as 
purported receivers of stolen goods. This practice of appointing traps is not unique to the 





The courts have allowed entrapment in many cases for the sake of justice, provided that it takes 




With regards to the entrapment and labour law, it was the case of Cape Town City Council v SA 
Municipal Workers Union & others (2000) 21 ILJ2409 (LC)  , that first set the parameters for 
using entrapment in the employment context.  
 
In this case the Cape Town City Council was approached by a firm of investigators concerning 
alleged cable theft of which the investigators were aware. The investigators were then appointed. 
Two investigators randomly targeted a group of workers at a substation and asked for a cable to 
run electricity for a house for underprivileged children. The women were flashily dressed in a short 
mini- skirt.
827
 They approached the employees twice before a transaction eventually took place.  
Ultimately, 56 metres of cable changed hands at a price of R14 per metre (a total of R630). The 
detectives apparently later handed over a lesser amount to the council, and kept the balance for 
themselves.
828
  The transaction was then video taped. The two employees were subsequently 
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The question for decision by the Court was whether the dismissal of the two workers was fair.  The 
two employees had sold property belonging to their employer for their own profit. The fact that 
they were ‗tempted‘ to do so was irrelevant. An employer cannot be expected to retain employees 
who so easily succumb to such temptation.
829
 However, as Stelzner AJ pointed out, the issue is not 
as simple as that. There is something inherently repugnant about the idea of tricking any person, 
including an employee, into performing a criminal act. The Court summarised the reason why the 
law has traditionally treated the practice with suspicion thus: 
―Although courts and commentators around the world appear to differ … [about] 
the issue in principle … the nub of the concern which emerges … is that persons 
who, in the absence of intervention by the traps, might never have committed or 





―The conduct of the trap/s is inevitably, in the absence of legislative intervention, 
in itself unlawful (as the inciter is the accomplice of the crime committed) and that 




The law gives expression to these reservations in two ways. The first is to disregard evidence 
obtained by trapping when deciding whether the accused committed the offence. Without such 
evidence, the prosecution may be left with nothing else.
832
 The other protection against trapping is 
to treat it as an absolute defence to a criminal charge. If the accused can prove that he or she did 
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The court held that evidence obtained by means of entrapment would be admissible if the conduct 
of the trap did not go beyond providing an opportunity to commit an offence. This will be 
established by means of a two-stage enquiry. The first question is whether the trap‘s conduct went 
beyond the mere providing of an opportunity to commit an offence. If it did, the evidence may still 




The fist stage of the enquiry as set out in the judgment at 2433, read with 2430–2431, quoting s 
252A (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977):  
 
 the nature of the offence; 
 the availability of other techniques of investigation to obtain proof       
 whether an average person in the same     position would be induced to commit the offence; 
 the degree of persistence and the number of attempts; 
 the type of inducement; 
 the timing of the conduct; 
 whether the conduct involved an exploitation of human characteristics such as emotions or 
friendship or personal or professional circumstances; 
 whether a particular vulnerability was exploited; 
 the proportionality between the involvement of the official compared with that of the 
accused; 
 whether before the trap was set there was reasonable suspicion that the accused had 
committed an offence; and 
 whether the official acted in good or bad faith 
 
 
The second stage of the enquiry is set in the judgement at 2433, read with 2431–2432, quoting s 
252A (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act). 
 
In weighing up the public and private interests, the court should look at other questions: 
 the nature and seriousness of the offence; 
 whether it would be difficult to uncover the crime without a trap; 
 whether the crime is so frequently committed that special measures are required to detect 
it; 
 the extent of the effect of the trap; 
 the nature and seriousness of any infringement of any fundamental right; and 
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The court found that, all the facts considered, the two traps had provided the two employees with 
more than an opportunity to commit an offence. This conclusion was suggested by several factors: 
• the two employees involved were not suspected of stealing; in fact, and on its own initiative the 




• the female investigator was flashily dressed; 
• the investigators tried to elicit sympathy by saying that they needed the cable for underprivileged 
children; 
• the investigators made several attempts before the employees succumbed to their request;
836
 and  
• the two investigators were guilty of an offence and enriched themselves in the process by 





The court in this case did not allow the evidence. But the court did indicate that law enforcement 
would be impeded if the evidence obtained from a trapping situation were never to be allowed. The 




Although the Court did not consider it necessary to make a definite finding in principle on whether 
trapping in the workplace should be allowed, Stelzner AJ left no doubt about her views: 
―I might state, by way of an aside, that I would be reluctant if not unlikely to hold that a 
system of trapping (obviously properly constrained) may never be fair in the employment 
context. I say this because throughout the various jurisdictions to which I have referred 
already in this judgment it is noteworthy that, despite a sense of concern and disquiet about 
the unfettered use of entrapment, no jurisdiction has been prepared to hold (albeit in the 
criminal context) that entrapment should never be permissible. It seems to me that, 
provided the courts are satisfied that the use of entrapment is properly scrutinised and the 
admissibility of evidence obtained as a result thereof carefully regulated, then courts tend 
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to recognise that there are circumstances in which law enforcement (and the pursuit of 
justice generally) would be impeded if the evidence obtained from a trapping situation 
were excluded. I see no reason why that reasoning should not be equally applicable in the 




In the case of  Caji and African Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 150 (CCMA)  the court 
again relied on Section 252A of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 to be invoked as guideline to 
judge admissibility.  
 
The applicant was employed by the respondent labour broker to provide services to its client, Path 
Plastics. A private investigator who was conducting an investigation at the premises of a business 
opposite that of Path Plastics observed several plastic containers on those premises and upon 
enquiring where they came from had the applicant pointed out to him. The investigator then 
approached the applicant and another employee, who went with the investigator to the Path 
Plastics premises, where the applicant climbed over the fence and brought out five plastic buckets 
and a pool filter, which were then loaded onto the investigator‘s bakkie in exchange for money. 
The respondent was later called to the offices of Path Plastics and shown a video of the transaction. 
The video tape was sold to the respondent by the investigator‘s employer for R5 000. After a 




It was argued on behalf of the applicant that the evidence obtained by the private investigator 
should not be admissible on the basis that he induced the applicant to take part in a criminal act, in 




It was argued on behalf of the respondent that the applicant was merely presented with an 
opportunity to be dishonest, as most people are presented with, on a daily basis during the ordinary 
                                                          
839
 supra note 11, at 2434 E-H 
 
840
 Caji and African Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 150 (CCMA) , at 151 A-B 
 
841








The court in its judgment referred to the case of Cape Town City Council v SAMWU & others 




The commissioner then considered the evidence of both parties having regard to s 252A and found 
several contradictions between the evidence of the investigator and that of the applicant. 
According to the court neither evidence was above scrutiny.
844
 While the investigator testified that 
the applicant had contacted him on several occasions to finalize the deal, the applicant averred that 
the investigator had induced and coerced him to undertake the theft.
845
 Where the two witnesses 
contradicted each other the onus was on the respondent to prove the facts. The commissioner held 
that the investigator had sold the tape to the respondent, and so had a vested interest in the outcome 
of the matter. In the circumstances the onus was on the respondent to show that the applicant had 
not been induced or forced to take part, and in the absence of such evidence, the evidence of the 
investigator, according to the commissioner, should not be allowed to stand. In the absence of that 
evidence the dismissal was substantively unfair.
846





 believes that each entrapment case must be examined on its own merits to determine 
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whether the evidence obtained should be allowed. The following cases illustrate this point. 
 
In the case of Lawrence v I Kuper & Co (1994) 15 ILJ 1140 (IC); the applicant, (49 years old), was 
employed by the respondent as a building inspector. His most important duties were to visit 
buildings owned or managed by the respondent and to submit written inspection reports to his 
immediate superior. For this purpose he was given the use of a company car. In terms of his 
employment contract dated 14 January 1991, he undertook, inter alia, to devote his time and 
attention to the respondent‘s business.
848
 It was common cause that the applicant performed his 





The applicant was suspected however of running a private business during office hours and using 
the company car for that purpose. At a meeting set up by a private investigator , the employee sold 
a car battery to the investigator , and also issued him with a letter of thanks from ‗ B& B 





The arbitrator in this case held that an employer may sometimes be faced with a situation in the 
workplace where it becomes necessary for him to employ the services of a private investigator in 
order to obtain concrete evidence against an employee who is suspected of being involved in some 
improper conduct such as accepting bribes, or passing on trade secrets to competitors, or of dealing 
in dagga or other harmful drugs with fellow-employees. The arbitrator held that in such 
circumstances he could not see why an employee could not be under surveillance. The evidence 
thus so obtained may then according to the arbitrator be used to give a warning, or a disciplinary 
enquiry. The arbitrator held further that the seriousness of the offence or contravention, the 
interests of the company, and the work record of the employee should determine inter alia whether 
he or she should be summarily dismissed or be given a lesser penalty.
 851
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The nature of the applicant's daily duties in the present case were such that he was for most of the 
time left free to do his own thing. He travelled alone from place to place by car and the respondent 
had no effective means of controlling or supervising his movements. In these circumstances it was 





In the case of SA Transport & Allied Workers Union on behalf of Assegai v Autopax (2002) 2 
BALR 171 (AMSSA); the applicant employee was employed as a coach driver by the respondent. 
He was dismissed after a disciplinary enquiry where he was found guilty of gross negligence in 
that he failed to exercise control over a ticket book and of two counts of gross misconduct in that 
he issued a stolen and/or missing ticket to a passenger and failed to pay in the money handed to 
him for that ticket. On a further count he was found not guilty.  
 
In arbitration proceedings the arbitrator was required to consider the admissibility of a video 
recording made without the employee‘s knowledge by a private investigator who recorded the 
transaction with the false ticket. The union argued that the video footage was an invasion of the 
employee‘s privacy and that it was unconstitutional and should not be allowed. The arbitrator had 





The arbitrator allowed the videotape as evidence. He found that the conduct of the bus driver while 
driving a bus would not constitute confidential information. The arbitrator stated that a 
conversation in the course of employment between a bus driver and passenger was also not 




In the case of SATAWU on behalf of Radebe v Metrorail Wits (2001) 22 ILJ 2372 (ARB); the 
grievant, who had been employed by the company since 1974, was charged with misconduct 
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relating to dishonesty, theft and insubordination. It appeared that, while working as an access 
controller at Boksburg East Station, he had accepted marked money from two undercover 




The court held that where entrapment was used, an employee should be liable to a certain extent 
but the circumstances of the entrapment can be used as a mitigation since the entrapment itself 




The agent‘s evidence was allowed. The arbitrator found that an employer is allowed to embark on 
honesty exercises to rid itself of dishonest behaviour. The arbitrator held however that these 
exercises must be balanced against fairness, and should not be improper or criminal. In this case 
the arbitrator held that the exercise of honesty checks were not improper in view of the fact that the 
employer experienced ongoing financial losses, and because the employees were informed 




In the case of FAWU obo Karolus and Two a Day Ltd (WE 8383-02) 24 April 2003; the employer 
experienced problems with petrol theft. After more regular stock takes could not solve the 
problem, the employer installed a video camera to monitor the petrol pumps. The video camera 
recorded the employee filling a tank with petrol without authorisation. The video evidence was 
allowed by the arbitrator. The arbitrator found that the camera was not set up to entrap the 
applicant but merely to monitor use of the pump. The recording was made while the employee was 
on duty. At the time the employer had a direct interest in the actions of the employee, and so 
therefore could not have been an invasion of privacy.  
 
In SACCAWU obo Libi and Weirs Cash & Carry (EC 2163 – 01), 3 April 2002; two investigators 
posed as installers of closed circuit television cameras. They approached two employees who were 
selected at random. The investigators asked one of the employees for headache tablets and the 
other for a tin of custard. Both the employees handed over the goods. One of them handed over the 
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goods with the knowledge that he was being filmed. The court refused to allow the videotape as 
evidence. The court held that the trapping in this case was a fishing expedition. The court held 
further that there was no suspicion of these employees. The court held that applicants were not 
entirely innocent, but the detectives‘ conduct towards them did not comply with the spirit, purpose, 





The case of SACCAWU on behalf of Jacobs and Portswood Hotel ( WE 39639) 29 June 2001; 
involved the situation where the Portswood Hotel had a policy that guests were not allowed to 
entertain prostitutes in their rooms. This was a policy that was to be strictly enforced by the desk 
clerks of the Hotel. The Hotel did spot checks on their desk clerks by means of a ‗mystery guest‘. 
One such ‗mystery guest‘ requested a prostitute. The desk clerk assisted him by making all the 
necessary arrangements with the agency. The desk clerk was then dismissed. The arbitrator 
allowed the evidence supplied by the trap (‗mystery guest‘), as the agent merely supplied an 
opportunity to the clerk to commit an offence. The clerk could not prove that the conduct of the 




In the case of Metrorail and SA Transport & Allied Workers Union on behalf of Magagula (2002) 
23 ILJ 1641 (BCA); the employee, a ticket officer at one of Metrorail‘s stations, took money from 
two passengers without issuing them tickets. The passengers were in fact employees of Metrorail 
who were conducting an ‗honesty test‘. They reported the employee to security officers. When 
they confronted him, the employee dropped the money, abandoned his ticket machine and fled. He 
returned to work the following day. At a disciplinary hearing the employee was found guilty of 
misconduct, specifically theft, dishonesty, disregarding a lawful instruction, gross negligence and 
absence without permission. He was dismissed. In arbitration proceedings, the employee denied 
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The arbitrator considered and approved the comprehensive note by John Grogan
860
 Sibergramme 
10/2000 on the issue of trapping and the requirements for its use in the employment environment. 
She was satisfied that in this case the trap in which the employee had been caught was a fair one. 
The security officers had no reason to suspect that the employee was involved in skullduggery at 
the time the trap was set and they did not target him specifically, although they did suspect that 
ticket officers were defrauding Metrorail by taking money without issuing tickets. They did not do 
anything more than provide the employee with the opportunity to commit the offence; they did not 





In the case of Mbuli/ Spartan Wiremakers CC (2004) 5 BALR 598 (MEIBC); the respondent 
employer was experiencing severe shrinkage of their product and had been informed that the 
applicant and another employee were involved in stealing and selling the product. The employer 
arranged for another of its employees, a buyer (who was acting as a trap) to approach the applicant 
and seek to buy rolls of netting wire from him cheaply. The applicant agreed to sell the wire at less 
than half its true price, and this transaction was observed and recorded. After a disciplinary enquiry 
the applicant was dismissed.  
 
The court had to consider whether evidence of the trap was admissible. The admissibility of such 
evidence in criminal courts is regulated by section 252 A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 




The court held that subsection 3 of s 252 A of the CPA 51 of 1977 allows further, for a discretion in 
regard to the admission of evidence even where it is found that the conduct goes beyond providing 
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an opportunity to commit an offence but through a process of weighing up the public interest 
against the personal interest of the accused with reference, again, to a list of stated factors. The 
court held that it accepted the evidence obtained by means of a trap in this case.  In the present case 
the applicant had been a willing participant and had not been unduly induced, coerced or tricked 
into committing the theft and furthermore the fact that staff theft was prevalent.
863
   
 
In the case of Numsa obo/ Abrahams / Guestro Wheels (2004) 4 BALR 520 (CCMA); the applicant 
a dispatch clerk, was dismissed for making out false invoices for the sale of wheel rims to an 
‗undercover agent‘, and receiving money from the agent in return. The applicant denied that he had 
been involved in any corruption. The agent gave evidence at his disciplinary hearing, but refused 
to testify during the arbitration proceeding. The applicant contended that a written statement by the 
agent was inadmissible, and that the videotape made by the agent should be disregarded because it 




The court had to consider the submission of the applicant that the evidence should not be admitted 
because it was made during an entrapment process. The court referred to Lawrence v I Kuper & 
Company (Pty) Ltd t/a Kupers a member of Investec 1994 15 ILJ 1140 (IC) ; at 1146 D-H : 
―In the popular view it is regarded as somewhat unfair, if not unethical, to catch out 
someone by means of a trap and the modus operandi involving a trap is generally looked 
upon with disapprobation. Many others believe that it should be used only as a measure of 
last resort in order to deal with elusive criminals who cannot otherwise be brought to 
book‖.  
 
―Leaving aside traps used in criminal cases, it would appear that an employer may 
sometimes be faced with a situation in the workplace when it becomes necessary for him to 
employ the services of a private investigator in order to obtain concrete evidence against 
an employee who is suspected of being involved in some improper conduct such as 
accepting bribes, or passing on trade secrets to competitors, or of dealing in dagga or 
other harmful drugs with fellow-employees. I cannot see any reason why an employee may 
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not be placed under surveillance in such circumstances. The information or evidence so 
obtained should then be used to confront the employee and should form the basis for giving 
him a warning or even a final written warning. Should the employer however decide to 
hold a disciplinary inquiry, then the cogency of the investigator‘s evidence, the seriousness 
of the offence or contravention, the interests of the company, and the work record of the 
employee should determine inter alia whether he or she should be summarily dismissed or 
be given a lesser penalty‖.  
 
The court went on to hold that the evidence did not infringe upon the employee‘s right to privacy. 
The court held that the rights of the parties must be weighed, which entails the balancing of the 
employee‘s right to privacy against the employer‘s right to protect his property and economic 
interest.
865
 In this case confidential information concerning the employee was recorded. He was 
not discussing his own personal affairs. According to him, he was acting as an employee 
promoting his employer‘s business, that is, it was part and parcel of his normal functions. 
Therefore no privacy was infringed or for that matter any right to privacy which could be weighed 




The circumstances of every entrapment case must be examined on their own merits in order to 
determine whether the evidence so obtained should be allowed.  
The judgements set out above provide important and valuable lessons. The use of trapping is not 
necessarily considered to be unfair. Trapping is permissible when its object is to identify a 
wrongdoer and not make one.
867
 When employers do resort to the use of traps they must ensure 
that the conduct of the trap consists only of providing an employee with an opportunity to commit 
an offence, failure to do so will result in the evidence obtained being rendered inadmissible by the 
court.
868
 A successful trap should not be the only evidence against the employee. The evidence 
obtained from the trap should be supported by other evidence, this should be the case even if the 
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supporting evidence is only circumstantial.
869
 This may be achieved by producing other evidence 




There are certain cautionary steps and parameters that emerge for the use of entrapment in order to 




 a legitimate commercial need 
 high level consent/mandate from the organisation/employer 
 must be some reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing 
 management must be informed  of  the modus operandi or manner of interception/trap 
 management must monitor and be kept informed of the exercise. 
 
 It must be kept in mind that employers do not have the unlimited or absolute  right to intrude on 
the personal lives of their employees or to test the virtues of individuals on a random basis, the 
reason being is that entrapment techniques result in the commission of crimes by people who 
would not otherwise engage in criminal conduct. Therefore employers must tread carefully so as 
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The Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 as it applies to Electronic Communication in the 
Workplace 
 
When the employer monitors the activities of their employees the information obtained by the 
employer will potentially serve as legitimate grounds to dismiss, warn and discipline employees. 
As discussed earlier (in chapter 9) this information that is obtained by the employer is normally 
information that is communicated between employees, through the telephone, Internet and e- mail.  
 
However, there will be instances and specific occasions where the monitoring of employees‘ 
activities, will result in the employer becoming aware of information that employees have 
exchanged with other individuals, and no disciplinary action will be permitted because the 
communicated information is said to be protected. In other words, the employer will not have 




In terms of the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 ( PDA), employees are protected against 
dismissal or any prejudicial conduct if they disclose information to certain persons concerning the 
commission of criminal offences, miscarriages of justice, unfair discrimination and conduct 




The preamble to the PDA affirms that criminal and other irregular conduct in organs of state and 
private bodies are detrimental to good, effective, accountable and transparent governance in 
organs of state and open and good corporate governance in private bodies and can endanger the 
economic stability of the Republic and have the potential to cause social damage.
875
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 Protected Disclosure Act 26 of 2000 [In terms of section1 of the PDA, disclosure  means any disclosure of 
information regarding any conduct of an employer , or an employee of that employer , made by any employee who has 
reason to believe that the information concerned shows or tends to show one or more of the following:  
       (a)     that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed;  
       (b)     that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which that person 




 Parliament seeks to combat crime and corruption in the workplace by encouraging ‗whistle 
blowing‘ by employees regarding an impropriety, i.e. ‗unlawful and irregular conduct‘ by 
employers and fellow employees. The commitment by Parliament is further highlighted due to the 
fact that employees who take such action are to be protected from victimization by their 
employers.
876
 The intention is to create a culture which will facilitate and promote the disclosure 
of information by employees that relates to criminal and other irregular conduct in the workplace 
in a responsible manner. This is achieved by the formulation of comprehensive statutory 
guidelines for the disclosure of such information and subsequent protection against any reprisals or 




The dismissal of employees for disclosing such information is automatically unfair, provided that 
the disclosure was made in good faith and, if the information is incorrect, the employee had reason 




To be protected a disclosure must be made to: a legal adviser in accordance with s 5; an employer 
in accordance with s 6; a member of cabinet or of the executive council of a province in accordance 
with s 7; a person or body in accordance with s 8; or any other person or body in accordance with s 
9 of the Act. 
 
In addition to dismissal an employee may be subjected to suspension, demotion, harassment, 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
       (c)     that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur;  
       (d)     that the health or safety of an individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered;  
       (e)     that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged;  
       (f)     unfair discrimination as contemplated in the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act , 2000 (); or Act 4 of 2000 ] 
       (g)     that any matter referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f) has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed;  
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 Ibid 37, [see s 187 1(h) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995]. 
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Any employee who has been subjected to the above, that is, an occupational detriment in breach of 
s 3, may approach any court having jurisdiction, including the Labour Court established by s 151 




For the purposes of the LRA, including the consideration of any matter emanating from this Act by 
the Labour Court, any dismissal in breach of s 3 is deemed to be an automatically unfair dismissal 
as contemplated in s 187 of that Act, and the dispute about such a dismissal must follow the 
procedure set out in chapter VIII of the LRA; and any other occupational detriment in breach of s 3 
is deemed to be an unfair labour practice as contemplated in part B of schedule 7 to the LRA. A 
dismissal of a ‗whistle blower‘ constitutes an automatically unfair dismissal. The Labour Court is 
entitled to order the reinstatement of the whistle blower or to order compensation not exceeding an 
amount equal to twenty four months times the monthly remuneration payable to the employee at 




The following cases illustrate the application of the PDA 
 
In the case of Grieve v Denel (2003) 24 ILJ 551 (LC), the applicant was preparing a report for the 
company‘s board concerning certain allegations of wrongdoing by the general manager of one of 
                                                          
880
 Section 1 of the PDA 2000 defines ‗occupational detriment‘ in relation  to the working environment of an 
employee , as : 
a) being subjected to any disciplinary action;  
b) being dismissed, suspended, demoted, harassed or intimidated; 
c) being transferred against his or her will; 
d) being refused transfer or promotion; 
e) being subjected to a term or condition of employment or retirement which is altered or kept altered to his 
or her disadvantage; 
f)   being refused a reference, or being provided with an adverse reference, from his or her employer ; 
g) being denied appointment to any employment, profession or office; 
h) being threatened with any of the actions referred to paragraphs (a) to (g) above; or 
i) being otherwise adversely affected in respect of his or her employment, profession or office, including 
employment opportunities and work security 
 
9 Landman op cit note 4, 43  
 
10 
Grieve v Denel (2003) 24 ILJ 551 (LC) at 554 B-E & F-H. 
 
11






its divisions when he was charged with misconduct.
882
  The applicant was not charged expressly 
with making disclosures, but had been charged in relation to those disclosures with misconduct 
arising form the manner in which he obtained the information which led to the disclosures. The 
applicant was also charged with accessing pornographic sites on the internet and using e-mail to 




The applicant was accordingly suspended from his duty, and summoned to attend a disciplinary 
inquiry. Grieve referred a dispute to the CCMA, claiming he was the victim of unfair labour 
practice. He then launched an urgent application for an order restraining Denel from instituting 




 The court held that the disclosures which Grieve intended to make appeared to be bona fide and 




According to the court prima facie, the disclosures accordingly fell within the terms of the PDA. 
Furthermore, it was questionable why Denel chose to press other unrelated charges (including 
examining pornography on a company computer) at the same time. The court also held that an 
‗occupational detriment‘, against which employees are protected under the PDA, is wide enough 
to include being subjected to a disciplinary inquiry.
886
   
 
The employer was accordingly interdicted from proceeding with any disciplinary action or enquiry 
against the employee regarding any of the allegations contained in the notice to attend a 
disciplinary enquiry addressed to him pending the determination of an unfair labour practice 
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In the case of CWU & another v Mobile Telephone Networks (2003) 24 ILJ 1670 (LC), the 
applicant employee had accused his superiors of giving preferential treatment to a particular labour 
broker from whom it had hired workers.
888
 The allegation was made twice via e- mail to MTN‘s 
business risk unit, as well as to a number of senior employees.
889
 The employee subsequently went 
one better; he accused MTN‘s management of corruption. He immediately was suspended and 
summoned to attend a disciplinary hearing.
890
 Like Grieve, the employee in Mobile Telephone 
Networks obtained a temporary interdict restraining the company from instituting disciplinary 
action. On the return date, the court accepted that an occupational detriment, for the purposes of 




The commissioner held that the PDA is designed to encourage a ‗culture of whistle blowing‘, 
however protection granted by the Act is not absolute; it is not designed to protect disclosures 
based on mere rumours and conjecture.
892
 The court held that the employee‘s allegations did not 
convey information; they were merely expressions of opinion. There was no factual basis, 
however tenuous, in any of his communications to justify the conclusion that MTN‘s management 
had acted improperly. Furthermore, the commissioner held that the disclosure had been made 
publicly, whereas the PDA protects only private disclosures.
893
 Finally, the employee had not 
attempted to make use of MTN‘s elaborate procedures which includes a confidential hot line for 




In the case of H and M Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 1737 (CCMA), the employee was dismissed after making 
highly critical complaints to a shareholder of the company, resident in Spain, in which she listed 
forty two complaints concerning the management of the South African branch of the company. 
                                                          
888
 CWU & another v Mobile Telephone Networks  (2003) 24 ILJ 1670 (LC), at 1673 E-F 
 
889
 supra note 16, at 1673 G-J & 1674 A-C 
 
890
 supra note 16, at 1674 D-J 
 
891
 Grogan op cit note 1, 154 
 
892
 supra note 16, at 1678 E-J 
 
893
 supra note 16, at 1678 E-J 
 
894




The employee claimed that the disclosure was protected in terms of the Protected Disclosures Act 
26 of 2000, and thus she was entitled to protection against dismissal. 
 




 The person claiming protection in terms of the Act should be an employee. 
 The disclosure must contain information that the employee has reason to believe that is 
authorised in the PDA.  
 The employee must have some factual basis for his or her disclosure. 
 The disclosure must be made in good faith. 
 The bona fides of the employee in making the disclosure are important to determine the 
factual accuracy of the conduct complained of. 
 
The commissioner determined that only three of the forty two contentious complaints qualified as 
protected disclosures for the purposes of the Act, but nevertheless awarded compensation for the 




In the case of Tshishonga v Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development & another (2007) 28 
ILJ 195 (LC), the applicant found no-one in government willing to investigate his complaints. 
Frustrated by the lack of progress the applicant issued a press statement to the media in which he 
set out information about the alleged irregularities. He was suspended pending a disciplinary 
enquiry. The employee‘s disclosures had been made in a press statement in which he set out 
information about alleged improprieties which had taken place within the Department of Justice, 
in which he was employed. 
 
This case dealt with the first claim before the Labour Court for compensation under the Protected 
Disclosures Act 26 of 2000. The court made a comprehensive survey of the philosophy and 
purpose underlying the provisions of the PDA, and of similar legislation passed internationally, in 
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order to protect employees who disclosed improprieties by their employers or other employees. 
The court made a detailed analysis of the relevant sections of the PDA in order to determine what 
would constitute a disclosure for the purposes of the PDA, and what requirements must be met in 
order for such a disclosure. The court noted that the PDA contains a four-stage process that begins 
with an analysis of the information to determine whether it is a disclosure.
897
 If it is, then the next 
question is whether it is protected.
898
  The third stage is to determine whether the employee was 
subjected to any occupational detriment
899
  and the last stage is to determine what remedy should 




The court determined that only three of the forty two contentious complaints qualified as protected 
disclosures for the purposes of the Act, but nevertheless awarded compensation for the dismissal, 
which he found to have been substantively unfair to be protected.
901
 The court found that having 
regard to all the circumstances of the case the applicant employee had acted reasonably in making 
his complaint to the media, and that he had met all the requirements prescribed in s 9 of the PDA. 




The applicant was, as a result of the disclosures, held to have suffered an occupational detriment 





The protection of the PDA is not unconditional. The PDA does set certain limits of what 
constitutes a protected disclosure, as well as the manner of permissible disclosure by workers. 
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The protection extended to employees by the PDA is not unconditional. The definition of 
‗disclosure‘ clearly envisages that it is only the disclosure of information that either discloses or 
tends to disclose forms of criminal or other misconduct that is the subject of protection under the 
PDA. The disclosure must also be made in good faith. An employee who has a deliberate intention 
to embarrass, harass or tarnish the reputation of the employer is not likely to satisfy the 
requirement of good faith. The purpose of the PDA would be undermined if genuine concerns or 






The PDA records that it is incumbent on every employer and employee to disclose criminal or 
irregular conduct in the workplace, and that employees should be protected against reprisals as a 
result of such disclosures. Good, effective and transparent governance by employers is obviously 
in the broader social interest and employees should be encouraged, without fear of reprisal, to 
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 The use of electronic communication tools especially the use of the Internet and e- mail facilities 
has become a necessity for any employer, and the likelihood that the use of these ‗tools‘ will 
decrease due the potential risks posed to the employer, such as vicarious liability for defamation, 
sexual harassment, copyright infringement (all of which may be perpetrated by irresponsible 
employees.) is unlikely. How else in the information age in which we live , will employers be able 
to  advertise, contract, network with  international companies   and engage clients on a 
international scale and in doing so making themselves global players without the use of the 
Internet, e- mail, telephone , fax and of course a computer. 
 In other words the litigation involving employers being sued by employees for invasion of 
privacy, for defamation, and for harassment is not going to disappear from CCMA or Labour 
Court rolls any time soon.  
Bearing this in mind, it may be seen that it is not unreasonable for employers to use any and all 
available technologies to monitor employees‘ conduct. It is generally felt that employees who 
enter an employer‘s premises to do paid work have left ‗private‘ space and entered a ‗public 
arena‘, where they should expect to be observed by their supervisors. This argument however may 
prove unsustainable, the reason being, that even though individuals are to a large extent under the 
control of their employers while at work, it is simply not possible for the basic human need for 
privacy to be given up entirely during working hours. It is true as far as the electronic monitoring 
of employees is concerned, that employees should expect a degree of supervision. Employers do 
have a vested interest in monitoring employees‘ communication in the workplace, but the methods 
used by the employers must not be intrusive.  
Employers would need to take the pro- privacy arguments into account. Privacy is not an absolute 
right nor is it a paramount value. The right to privacy however is closely linked with the paramount 
value of human dignity and it exists where there is a reasonable expectation to privacy and the 
workplace is one such area.   
Workers invest much of their lives in the workplace and have an interest in the maintenance of 
working conditions which acknowledge their existence as autonomous beings. This is particularly 
true of today‘s society, where the traditional ‗nine- to - five‘ working hours are no longer a reality 




weekends. In these circumstances, it seems implausible to expect employees to put their private 
lives on hold and devote 100% of working time to work related matters. This is especially true of 
private communications of employees who work long and extended hours. Such workers 
sometimes have no choice but to carry out some private business during working hours.  
In the case of Moonsamy v The Mailhouse (1999) 20 ILJ 464 (CCMA) (at 496 H-I), the court held 
that there exist a balancing of competing interests of the employer and employee. This includes the 
employer‘s right to economic activity as against the employees‘ right to privacy. The court held 
that it was very difficult to clarify, with any degree of precision, the nature of the right to privacy of 
an employee on the premises of the employer during working hours. 
In terms of the Moonsamy decision (supra), to determine the degree and expectation of privacy the 
court held that this is determined by the working environment and by a case - by - case basis. A 
decision held also by American Courts in the case of Katz v US 389 US 347 (1967) and O‘Connor 
v Ortega 480 US 709 (1987). 
According to the Moonsamy decision (supra), the monitoring, which includes the electronic   
monitoring of employees can only be conducted by way of prior consent obtained from the 
employee, consent granted in terms of the employment contract, or authorization by the Labour 
courts in terms of section 158 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
In terms of section 5 of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication – Related Information Act 70 of 2002, communication may be intercepted if prior 
consent of such interception is given in writing by one of the parties to the communication. 
The best solution for an employer burdened with the issue of employee privacy as well as at the 
same time trying to protect his business and himself form injury and embarrassment is to draft a 
policy where the employer acquires not only the right to infringe upon the employee‘s right to 
privacy in appropriate circumstances but also to dismiss or discipline an employee for reasons 
relating to the misuse of communication tools. The policy will serve as the basis of a defence for 
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